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ABSTRACT 
 
It is argued that in the wake of the increasing number and extent of industrially 
produced risks, modern societies are transforming into risk societies (Beck, 1992). The 
implication of risk for modern society is understood to render traditional institutions and 
instruments incapable of managing what essentially are the consequences of 
modernization. The acid mine drainage (AMD) currently decanting from an abandoned 
underground mine shaft on the West Rand of Gauteng is in many ways the epitome of 
the type of risks that define a risk society. Having engendered intense political debate 
due to the threat it poses to the environment and society and the uncertainty over how 
to manage it, the circumstance on the West Rand might be argued as representing a 
classic example of a risk society. Using an inductive research design, this study aims to 
examine the truth behind this statement and furthermore, to what degree a unique form 
of risk society might be emerging.  Specifically, the concepts of organized irresponsibly 
and subpolitics are explored, as is the role of science. The findings suggest that on the 
one hand risk does have the predicted impact on institutional arrangements. However, 
due to certain unique factors within the South African context (e.g. weak state capacity 
and social inequality) it is evident that there is also potential for society to move deeper 
into a state of risk society. This is in contrast to the idea posited in Beck’s theory that 
many societies facing the circumstances of risk society will, over time and necessarily, 
adequately respond to the risks by becoming reflexive. Indeed, if this is to be the case 
however, the strengthening of current civil society engagement at the political level and 
a greater institutional willingness for change are seen as the essential ingredients for a 
more reflexive approach to the risk of AMD.            
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Many sociological debates have sought to grasp and conceptualize the apparent 
change which modern society is undergoing. The idea that modern societies (i.e. 
industrial societies) are undergoing radical change and entering a stage of second 
modernity is put forward by the theory of reflexive modernization (Beck, 1994, see also 
Beck, et al, 2003). Here, change is characterized by the transformation of the key 
institutions (e.g. government, economy, law) and principles (e.g. linear progress) of 
modern society itself, as oppose to their just their superficial structures. This change is 
understood to be in reaction to the myriad of industrially produced environmental risks 
confronting contemporary society (Lee, 2008). Consequently, in the wake of the 
increasing number and extent of these risks, it is argued that on their way towards this 
second modernity, modern societies are also transforming into what Beck (1992) has 
described as risk societies. The theory of risk society is founded on the notion that due 
to the unique nature of the risks facing society today, the institutions of modern society 
are unable to cope with what essentially are the accumulation of the ‘side-effects’ of 
modernization. Specifically, it is argued that the state’s ability to provide security for its 
citizens, science’s ability to provide certainty and the ideology of economic progress are 
being undermined. 
 
Indeed, like those that characterise a risk society, arguably the most significant 
environmental risk facing South Africa today is to a large extent the very consequence 
of its modernization. For over a century, exploitative mineral extraction, in the form of 
gold mining, has been the dominant industry across the Witwatersrand, playing a 
central role in the industrialization of the country as a whole. Subscribing to the logic of 
capital accumulation, this early gold-economy gave little consideration to its possible 
long-term adverse environmental and social impacts (Adler, et al, 2007). In turn, what 
were once simply ‘side-effects’, are today becoming recognized as significant 
environmental risks. The most manifest of these risks being the uncontrolled decant of 
contaminated mine-water- known as acid mine drainage (AMD) - from an abandoned 
underground mine void on the West Rand of the Witwatersrand. This AMD has proven 
to have had a devastating impact on the surrounding surface water systems in the area 
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and poses a significant threat to the associated environment and human health (Van 
Tonder and Coetzee, 2008, Adler, et al, 2007). Consequently, by virtue of the example 
given here, it can be argued that we are increasingly living in a risk society “that has to 
make decisions concerning its future under conditions of manufactured, self-inflicted 
insecurity” (Beck, 2009, p.8). 
 
1.2 Contextual Application of the Risk Society Theory   
 
The extensive political debate which the circumstance on the West Rand has 
engendered and the mounting evidence suggesting that controlling the AMD risk is 
beyond the capabilities of the current institutions, certainly does hint at the emergence 
of a risk society. However, to associate the situation that is currently unfolding (and has 
been since 2002) with that of a risk society would be premature. Specifically, two points 
are necessary to expand upon before establishing how the theory is applicable and 
relates to the context of the AMD risk. Firstly, risk society analyses the transformation of 
modern industrial societies. Although South Africa is an emerging economy and cannot 
be classified as a developed country, it can still be regarded as a modern society. 
Essentially, South Africa has all the fundamental institutional components (i.e. 
government; market economy; democracy) underpinning a modern society. For the 
purposes of this research then, at the structural level South Africa is understood to be 
the equivalent of the modern societies around which the theory of risk society is 
conceptualized. The importance of this point being that it demonstrates how the 
constructs of the risk society theory are relevant and applicable to the context of this 
research. 
 
Another important consideration in terms of the risk society theory in the context of 
South Africa is the fundamental argument that the transformation from modern society 
to risk society is said to occur via a change in political discourse. The political debate 
and conflicts of industrial society were characterized by concern over the distribution of 
wealth (Beck, 1992). However, as “the struggle for one’s daily bread” (Beck, 1992, p.20) 
loses its urgency and society’s knowledge of its risk producing nature becomes more 
apparent, the focus of political debate and conflict begins to concern the distribution of 
risk. Thus, a defining characteristic of the transformation from being a modern society to 
being a risk society is the fact they become ‘risk-distributing’ societies, as opposed to 
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‘wealth-distributing’ societies. Indeed, while the recent Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference (2009) is somewhat evident of this phenomenon, the focus of Beck’s 
analysis is exclusively on the “welfare states of the West” (Beck, 1992, p.20). In 
contrast, this research concerns South Africa as an “emerging economy” (Fig, 2005) 
where re-distribution of wealth is the focus of political debate and conflict. At the same 
time however, environmental risk is a threatening social and political reality. Thus, the 
question as to the effect that risk may have on those societies which are still 
overwhelmed by a concern for the distribution of wealth, but also face increasing 
environmental risks, remains unaccounted for by the risk society theory. Consequently 
then, it is clear that further analysis is required in order to understand how the theory of 
risk society might explain what the risk of AMD means in the context of the West Rand. 
The aim of this research is therefore to determine the implications of an environmental 
risk beyond the original scope of the risk society theory. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
           
Modern societies have tended to “unfold themselves on the basis of a scientifically 
defined concept of rationality that emphasizes instrumental control…implying a belief 
that scientization can eventually perfect the control of nature” (Beck, et al, 2003 p.4-5). 
However, as modern societies become risk societies, the uncertainty which industrially 
produced environmental risks engender begins to reveal the fallibility of such 
assumptions. Most notably, the idea that science alone is able to explain and manage 
environmental problems is increasingly questioned. It is argued that in the age of risk 
society, society is forced to recognize the inherent subjectivity of the concept of risk. 
Environmental risks become problematic for modern society to deal with for the reason 
that they exist only in terms of the knowledge about them and are thus open to social 
definition and construction (Beck, 1992). While science is still seen to play an important 
role, it is criticized for not being able to provide insight into the ambiguous socio-political 
aspects of risk. Nonetheless, when faced with having to decide upon risk under 
conditions of uncertainty, society still tends to make decisions on the grounds of such 
reductive procedures that are accepting of quantitative utilitarian trade-offs and ignore 
the controversial socio-political problems of risk (Stirling, 2003). This means that what 
counts as potentially harmful is left up to the experts and the dominant institutional 
authorities (Beck, 1998). These decision-making processes are especially inappropriate 
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for the reason that those who decide are often not the ones most affected by the 
potential threats. In the case of the risk posed by AMD, this approach is even more 
inappropriate given the extreme social inequalities that characterize the country. As 
politics is left to decide upon the uncertainties of risk, it is inevitable that the decisions 
made will reflect dominant institutional interests. In this case those of government and 
the mining industry. In contrast, the rest of society (particularly those who are most 
vulnerable to the risk and who are also the most socially marginalized), is left to deal 
with the consequences of those decisions and uncertainties.   
 
The problematic nature and implications of such decision-making processes are 
described in detail in this study, highlighting the cornerstone of Beck’s theory in that all 
hitherto known instruments and institutions for tackling risk and threat are in fact 
incapable of doing so (Matten, 2004). In particular, the inability of economic principles 
and science to adequately manage the AMD risk is explored. At the same time though, 
while such analysis reveals similar insights to those proposed by Beck, it can be 
expected that certain unique insights shall also be gained. A further implication of risk 
for modern societies is seen to be a dynamic of political change where state 
bureaucracies are undermined and the battle-line of contemporary politics redrawn 
(Beck, 1998). In this sense, risks themselves are conceptualized as powerful 
uncontrollable actors that “delegitimize and destabilize state institutions with 
responsibilities for pollution control… and public safety” (Beck, 1998, p.17). 
 
Before accepting this notion however, it must be considered that the political economy 
of South Africa is unique, in that it is engineered towards economic growth in order to 
address historic inequality by means of redistribution (Turton, 2009; Ndayi, 2009). In 
particular, the role of the mining industry in relation to society remains conceptualized 
almost exclusively in economic terms. Consequently, the mining industry’s role as a 
facilitator of wealth-redistribution would seem difficult to unsettle on a broad scale, 
despite the significance of the threat posed by AMD. Thus, the relative force that risk 
may have in terms of seriously destabilizing or delegitimizing institutions can be 
expected to be markedly different to that experienced in the modern societies in which 
Beck situates his theory. Furthermore, the analysis of the AMD risk through this 
sociological lens also provides a means of generating new insights as to how risk 
implicates a society that is heavily divided along socio-economic lines. In this way, 
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unlike the welfares states of the West, risk cannot be expected to have the same 
leveling effect that Beck speaks of, whereby everyone is a potential victim. Therefore, 
while some consistencies have already been alluded to, a very much specific and 
unique pattern of risk society and trajectory towards a second modernity can be 
expected to emerge here (Crotty and Crane, 2004; Beck, 2000).  
 
1.4 Research Scope and Direction (i.e. Methodology)      
 
1.4.1 Research Design  
 
The risk society theory is a widely acclaimed (and criticized) contribution to the 
discipline of sociology. As explained above, its insight is almost exclusively generated 
from analysis and experience within the context of what might be called the 
conventional model of developed countries. Unsurprisingly, the majority of Beck’s work 
has been applied and tested within that context (e.g. Benn, 2004; Matten, 2004; 
Hogenboom, et al, 2000; Dingwall, 1999) in contrast to that of less developed or 
developing societies (Rinkevicius, 2000; Crotty and Crane, 2004).   Therefore, in the 
case of South Africa which can be classified in a similar context, a unique opportunity 
exists to contribute to the theoretical insight and extend the theory’s relevance. An 
endeavor which Beck himself encourages, explaining that “to situate the non-Western 
world firmly within the ambit of a second modernity (and that of a risk society)… allows 
a pluralization of modernity… (and) opens up space for the conceptualization of 
divergent trajectories of modernities in different parts of the world” (Beck, 2000, p.3).  
 
As a result, an inductive (theory-building) approach to research design was undertaken 
using Yin’s (2003) case study method. The subject of the case study was the AMD 
problem which originates on the West Rand area of Gauteng, South Africa. Indeed, 
because “case studies emphasize the rich, real-world context in which the phenomena 
occur” (Eisenhart and Graebner, 2007, p.25), environmental problems are fitting topics 
of investigation for the case study method. The method is also described as one which 
is “used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge of organizational, social, 
political, and related phenomena (Yin, 2003, p.1). Since this research is essentially an 
enquiry into the political and institutional issues surrounding a particular environmental 
problem, it is an ideal framework from which to portray those issues.  
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 Yin (2003) notes that for case studies, four components are especially important in 
terms of the research design. These include: the study’s question/s; its propositions; its 
units of analysis; logic for linking the data to the propositions. Having positioned the 
AMD risk, as the research subject, within the context of the risk society theory, each of 
these components are determined in relation to the theory itself. They are outlined 
below.  
 
1.4.1.1 Research Questions  
    
The case study method is deemed most appropriate for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 
2003). Essentially, the risk society theory is used to analyse the social, political and 
institutional consequences of the AMD risk in the context of West Rand. Thus the 
overarching research questions concerning this case study are as follows: 
   
• How has the risk of Acid Mine Drainage impacted on the socio-political and 
institutional setting in which the environment is governed on the West Rand of 
Gauteng? 
 
• How relevant is the risk society theory in conceptualising the nature and 
consequences of those impacts?  
 
1.4.1.2 Theoretical Propositions 
 
This research specifically employs the risk society theory (Beck, 1992) as an analytical 
and conceptual tool. As Matten (2004) notes, the theory of risk society can essentially 
be reduced to providing insight into two issues, 1) the inability of modern societies to 
cope with ‘manufactured risks’, and 2) the institutional innovation required in order to 
better manage those risks. Consequently, two theoretical propositions have been 
developed in relation to the case of AMD on the West Rand.       
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The first proposition concerns the question of how the knowledge generated concerning 
the risk of AMD has affected political and institutional dynamics. The first theoretical 
proposition thus claims that: 
 
• The current institutional context of South Africa, particularly as it relates to the 
environment is unable to deal with the threat posed by the environmental risk of 
AMD, and in fact could be said to be a contributing factor to the production of 
risk. 
 
The second proposition is based on the idea that institutional innovation is necessary to 
manage risk. This proposition relates to the question inquiring to what extent, and in 
what shape, political and institutional change is taking place as AMD and the risk it 
poses becomes more widely accepted and understood. Proposition two thus claims 
that:  
 
• Over a period of time (which is variable and context dependent), as the 
environmental risk gains greater acceptance and understanding from multiple 
cultural perspectives, certain institutional transformations that encourage a more 
effective process of managing the risk will occur.  
 
By stating these propositions in advance, attention can be directed to exactly what 
should be examined within the scope of the study (Yin, 2003). In this way, the research 
has been framed in such a manner that it is relevant to both the theory and context.    
 
1.4.1.3 Units of Analysis 
 
Determining the ‘unit of analysis’ refers to the process defining what the case is (Yin, 
2003). For this study, the case is that of AMD on the West Rand, whereby the focus is 
on AMD as an environmental risk. As this research takes the form of a single case 
study, it must be placed within a contextual framework. This framework, at the broadest, 
most relevant level, is South Africa and its institutional context. However, as this 
research involves the governance of the environment and more specifically, the 
governance of the problem of AMD, there are what Yin (2003) describes as ‘embedded 
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units of analysis’ within the case itself. Specifically, the study site is the West Rand area 
of Gauteng. This is the location of where the AMD threat originates and is host to three 
mining houses. Although the pollution extends beyond the boundary of the West Rand, 
it is within this location that the physical risks (human, animal and ecological) and their 
impacts are considered. Finally, the social components embedded within the framework 
of this research include relevant stakeholders. For the purpose of this research these 
are described as the institutional components within the overall governance process. 
They include: A) government B) the mining industry and C) civil society.  
 
1.4.1.4 Delimiting the Units of Analysis  
 
Having outlined the general definition of the case being studied, certain limits were 
placed on each unit of analysis in order to clearly define the research scope. This 
provided an important guideline for the proceeding data collection stage. Firstly, in 
terms of the study site, only the AMD decant problem on the West Rand was analysed. 
AMD and related mining pollution problems also exist and have been documented on 
the Far West Rand, Central Rand and East Rand Mining Basins respectively. 
Furthermore, only AMD as a source of mining induced environmental pollution was 
considered. In terms of stakeholders and persons considered as potential interview 
respondents for this study, a general requirement and limit was that they had to have 
direct and current involvement in the management process concerning the problem. 
This meant that mining industry stakeholders were limited to persons representing 
active mining companies in the area (i.e. Mintails, Rand Uranium and DRD Gold). In 
general, civil society stakeholders were taken to include anyone directly or indirectly 
involved with, or affected by the AMD risk but not affiliated to government or the mining 
industry. However, only certain individuals within this group were deemed appropriate 
for this study. These individuals included NGO representatives, activists, scientists and 
researchers. Nearby community members and other affected parties (e.g. farmers) were 
not included for reasons relating to time constraints on the research and their potential 
to provide directly relevant information. As for government representatives, this was 
limited to individuals from DWA, DME and GDARD. Finally, a restriction was placed on 
the time period relevant for this study. Although historical data was important, the main 
time period concerning this study was from late-2002 (when decant started) to the 
present (i.e. 2010).              
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1.4.1.5 Data Collection   
 
The data required for this research was qualitative data and therefore ‘non-probability’ 
samples were used. That is, the samples were deliberately selected because they have 
particular features that are relevant to the case study and enable a detailed explanation 
of the central themes surrounding the topic (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2003). The 
samples constituted of both primary and secondary sources of data. It was mentioned 
above that case studies rely on multiple sources of data that converge in a triangulating 
fashion. In the case of this research multiple sources of data are of particular 
importance due to the complex nature of the problem. As Bryman (2008) notes, multiple 
sources of data are particularly useful when direct observations and interviews (see 
below) are used, as one can cross-examine in order to check what they might have 
misunderstood.              
  
Most significantly, data gathered from interviews formed the main contributing source of 
evidence for analysing this case study. The interviews conducted were semi-structured 
and open-ended which allowed for flexibility. This was important due to the diverse 
backgrounds of the respondents. For example, activists and mining representatives hold 
very different views and have very different perspectives on the problem of AMD. 
Therefore, semi-structured interviews allowed for more specific issues to be addressed, 
whereby different respondents could supply information which was directly relevant to 
their respective backgrounds (Bryman, 2008). Interviewing for qualitative research 
purposes is inherently challenging. A specific challenge when using interview data is 
that it may often be biased (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Considering the politically 
charged and sensitive nature of this research, this was a valid concern. In order to 
reduce the possibility of biased responses, an attempt was made to use highly 
knowledgeable informants from a diversity of perspectives. To a large extent, this was 
achieved whereby almost all informants were senior in terms of their respective fields 
and directly involved with the AMD issue1. Both primary and secondary sources of data 
were obtained as detailed below. 
 
 
                                                 
1 It is possible that owing to the highly publicized nature of the AMD problem, gaining entrance to senior 
personnel in the field was made that much easier.    
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Primary sources of data included: 
 
1) Interviews with key stakeholders (see appendix): 
 
• Government officials  
• Mining company sustainability managers (or similar) 
• NGO representatives  
• Independent researchers and scientists 
 
2) Documentary data 
 
• Minutes from various forums and public meetings 
• Media reports 
• EIA reports 
• Government documents and publications  
• Letters and communications 
• Presentations  
 
3) Direct observations 
 
• Attendance at various public participation meetings and forums, 
specifically concerning mine-related pollution issues regarding the West 
Rand mining operations 
 
Secondary sources of data were obtained from journal articles and book chapters. 
 
1.4.1.6 Linking Data to Propositions  
 
This stage is essentially the data analysis stage. As the first step of the data analysis 
stage, data was reduced and sorted according to relevant themes or constructs which 
inform the propositions. In this case, certain theoretical constructs described in the risk 
society theory were identified. These same theoretical constructs informed each of the 
two propositions. The theoretical constructs relevant for the first proposition included: 
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organised irresponsibility, the changing role of science in risk societies and, subpolitics. 
Only one construct was relevant for the second proposition and that was reflexive 
modernization. The data collected was then sorted and reduced in relation to the 
respective theoretical constructs. 
 
The actual data analysis technique used for this research was the ‘explanation building’ 
analytical technique outlined by Yin (2003). The objective of this technique is to build an 
explanation based on the case study data obtained. This method is similar to that of the 
‘grounded theory method’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), which builds theory from data 
gathered throughout the research process. Because explanations in qualitative research 
cannot be precise, reflecting on theoretically significant propositions and relating those 
to the data helps to make the explanation that much more valid (Yin, 2003). Indeed, 
without an overarching theory, this method loses some of its integrity in terms of its 
ability to provide a factual account of the case in question. Having established the 
research question and collected and sorted the data, the final step was to analyse the 
relationship between the empirical data and the theoretical constructs. The outcomes of 
this process are reflected on in chapter four, whereby a distinct ‘risk society hypothesis’ 
was generated and the issues at stake for dealing with the AMD problem are discussed.        
 
1.4.2 Limitations to the study 
 
First and foremost this study was limited by financial and time constraints. In turn, this 
had the consequence of reducing the number of interview respondents. In particular, 
this relates to government respondents, who were extremely difficult to get in contact 
with or schedule interviews with. Furthermore, due to the sensitive and political nature 
of this research, the manner in which the questions were answered possibly contained a 
certain degree of bias. More interview respondents may have helped reduce this 
problem. Yet, at the same time the diversity of respondents proved to be useful in 
creating a balance between perspectives. Access to information at times was difficult to 
obtain, as certain research documents were available only via the particular research 
institutes themselves.  
 
 
 
 19
1.5 Structure of the Research  
 
As the first chapter to this research, the above has provided an overview of the 
theoretical and contextual nature of this research, as well as the research methodology. 
Chapter two explores in detail the concept of environmental risks and their relevance for 
contemporary society. Specifically, the risk society theory, as the analytical and 
conceptual tool for this study, is described. Chapter three provides in more detail the 
necessary contextual and background information, including a description of the impact 
of mining on the environment and the political economy of South Africa in relation to 
gold mining and its history. Chapter four is the core of this research. Specifically, this 
chapter examines the findings from the fieldwork undertaken in relation to the risk 
society theory with the objective of generating a theoretical perspective of risk that is 
directly relevant to the circumstances on the West Rand. Chapter 5 is the conclusion 
and provides a brief overview of the research, its findings and its implications.            
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a theoretical perspective of how environmental risks are 
constructed and dealt with in contemporary society. From a sociological perspective, 
risk has been defined as “the possibility that human actions or events lead to 
consequences that harm aspects of things human beings value” (Klinke and Renn, 
2002, p.1071). Environmental risk therefore refers to ‘a threat to both the environment 
and society which is a direct consequence of past and/or present human actions’. On a 
practical level, the concept of an environmental risk is synonymous with that of an 
environmental problem (e.g. land degradation, air pollution). However, the former more 
clearly illustrates the concept as one which is inherently value-laden. Risk has different 
meanings for different groups and therefore, the term environmental risk is used here on 
the grounds that it points to both the structural and abstract (social) components of an 
environmental problem. The theoretical content of this chapter provides the conceptual 
tools and foundation on which the empirical case study is described.  
2.2 Environmental Risk and Modern Society 
The modern environmental movement is considered to have begun in the 1960’s, 
largely in reaction to the publication of Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’ in 1962 (Bell, 
2004). In her book she documents the environmentally destructive impact of modern 
industrial society as a result of the indiscriminate use of chemicals and pesticides. 
Although later gaining official recognition in the realm of the formal institutions of 
modern society, environmental and risk critiques such as Silent Spring essentially 
began as “manifestly cultural innovation movements” (Wynne, 2002, p.460). In other 
words, the early environmental movement can be understood to have been founded on 
the perspective that man-made threats to the environment are in fact a moral and 
ethical dilemma facing humanity.  
From these origins, the discourse generated by ecologically enlightened social 
movements represented what amounted to a direct challenge to the industrial and 
technological utopianism of the post-war period (Bell, 2004). Today however, the 
discourse of environmental concern is no longer dominated by those who challenge 
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modern institutional conventions. What started out as a new social movement has since 
transformed into a “network of professional mass membership organisations at the 
national (and international) level” (Rootes, 1999, p.201). The consequence of which can 
be seen as a sceptical appropriation of environmentalism by the movement’s opponents 
(Eder, 1996). On the positive side, this dominant cultural appropriation of 
environmentalism means that the problem of an ecological crisis, and the risks it 
embodies, is by now almost globally recognised. On the contrary, the negative aspect 
resides in the increasingly apparent fact that the assumptions contained within the 
discourse of modernity render it incapable of dealing with environmental problems. The 
concept of a ‘modern society’ is understood to constitute the “dominant container model 
of society” (Beck, Bonns and Lau, 2003, p.1). In this respect modern society will be 
defined here as: a model founded on a realist worldview whereby progress is equated 
with economic growth and scientific and technological innovation. Furthermore, it can be 
noted that within this model of society, economic relationships have considerable 
influence over other institutions (Giddens, 1990). In terms of the environment and 
environmental risk, the modern discourse is guided by the following assumptions: 
• The environment is external and separate to human society 
• The environment is an exploitable resource base, existing exclusively for 
economic progress 
• The environment and the risks it poses for human society are controllable  
• Scientific knowledge, as morally neutral and objective, is able to provide the 
means to control those risks   
 
To a large extent, these assumptions remain at the core of how the environment is 
viewed today. They form part of the dominant public discourse through which 
environmental concern is raised. By this very nature of modern societies then, the 
legitimization and decision-making processes involving environmental risks has become 
the authority of what Wynne (2002, p.460) describes as “the dominant scientific-
institutional risk culture”. Through this channel, risk has become public discourse 
founded on the perceived infallibility of ‘rational risk assessment’ (Bell, 2004). Thus, in 
the framework of modern society, environmental risks are institutionally legitimated by 
claims of scientific certainty, accompanied by the belief that full control is possible. 
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2.3 Institutions and Environmental Risk  
 
The next section presents a completely different perspective on the environment and 
environmental risk. However, even before looking at risk from a postmodern (late-
modern) perspective, what is made most obvious from the above discussion is that 
institutions must be considered when understanding environmental risks. Institutions 
“consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behaviour” (Scott, 1995, p.33, as cited in Nyambe, et al, 
2007, p.202). The modern approach to environmental risk is thus representative of the 
structural institutions of modern society. Importantly, these include government, industry 
and the economy. Essentially, these are ‘formal institutions’ which represent a particular 
sector of society. Informal institutions on the other hand, represent the ‘rules of the 
game’ and denote the values, norms and practices of the relevant formal institutions 
(Nyambe, et al, 2007). Modern society thus broadly represents society as a formal 
institution which is founded on those values, norms and assumptions (informal 
institutions) which give it meaning. For example, in this case, society as external to the 
environment and able to control it via scientific knowledge, is characteristic of modern 
society as an institution. As explained in the following, at the centre of the environmental 
risk discourse in late-modern society is a loss of faith in the idea that these institutions 
can provide solutions to the multiple environmental risks facing society today.     
 
2.4 Environmental Risk and Late-modernity  
 
A post-modern perspective recognises a shifting landscape within the constructs of 
modernity. Such a view claims that “the certainty of the modern era, constructed as it 
was on widely shared and accepted notions of about economic progress has been 
pulverised, leaving a fragmented, chaotic world which is utterly devoid of meaning” 
(Hannigan, 2000, p.178). The post-modern perspective is in itself complex and 
constitutes many different meanings across various contexts. Discussing it in detail is 
not necessary here. Instead, for the purpose of this section the term is used in its broad 
context. Thus, if we are moving into a phase of post-modernity, it is taken to mean that 
modern society is witnessing an historic break from the ways in which it has traditionally 
defined itself. In particular, this break is seen as a result of the numerous environmental 
risks which have “rocked the apparently solid, industrial, scientific and technological 
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foundations upon which modern society is based” (Burchell, 1998, p.1). In turn then, as 
those foundations are questioned and revealed as fallible, it is argued that a re-
structuring and re-conceptualization of modern society itself is taking place. In essence, 
it is considered that contemporary society is on its way towards a new kind of 
modernity, characterised by fundamental societal transformations (Beck, Bonns and 
Lau, 2003; Giddens, 1990).          
 
However, because the shape of this post-modern order is still being negotiated, the 
term late-modernity more accurately encapsulates the notion. Late-modernity can be 
defined as a society which remains within the broad framework of modern discourse, 
but at the same time is open to, and experiencing, changing dynamics in the way that 
discourse has traditionally been framed. Beck, et al (2003), depict this as a stage in the 
development of modern society when a fundamental societal transformation within 
modernity begins to emerge. In light of the prominence of the environment and its 
preservation being arguably the debate of our time, much has been written on the role 
of man-made environmental problems in relation to the changing dynamics within 
modern society (e.g. Eder 1996; Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992). A common agenda within 
this body of literature are the various provisions of both a critique on ‘the modern’ and a 
conception of an alternative. Also fundamental to these sociological analyses is a sense 
of ‘social instability’ prevalent in society today. For example, Beck (2009, p.231) 
describes this as the “dialectics of modernity” whereby there exists an apparent 
ambivalence between “more-modernity” and “anti-modernity”.  
 
In the context of environmental risks, this ambivalence within the constructs of 
modernity has several implications for the construction, assessment and decision-
making processes surrounding these risks. As Hogenboom, et al, (2000, p.88) note, 
“most commentators and policy-makers agree that the process of dealing with risk is 
much more complicated (today) than is suggested by the conventional model of ‘policy-
makers adhering to natural science-based facts’”. Indeed, it is becoming apparent that 
unquestionably adhering to scientifically-based facts has meant that the underlying 
question why the risks arose, who caused them and who they affect has been ignored. 
Consequently then, the notion of late-modernity also implies the growing acceptance of 
the need for a change in the way risks are handled, particularly from a political 
standpoint. Important is that in late-modernity there is awareness that no amount of 
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accumulated knowledge could encompass all circumstances (Giddens, 1990). More 
specifically, the idea that science, as an institution of knowledge in modern society, is 
able to explain and manage environmental problems is rejected. In order to more clearly 
capture these lines of thought, Klinke and Renn (2002) have outlined a number of 
themes around which debate regarding environmental risk occurs today. Importantly, 
the philosophical debate between the realist and constructivist perspectives and the 
handling of uncertainty are two major challenges confronting the institutional 
assessment and management of environmental risks. Additionally, the role of science in 
the assessment and decision-making process assumes a new role. These issues are 
discussed below.  
 
2.4.1 Competing Discourses 
 
Environmental risks increasingly involve not only the scientific and expert community, 
but a diverse array of informants and stakeholders. In particular, non-scientific 
knowledge held by the public and civil society has come to be articulated in many 
debates over environmental governance (Gooch, 2007). Consequently, the number of 
discourses present represents a real challenge for decision- and policy-making within 
the political arena of risk management. As the two major discursive approaches to risk, 
the realist and constructivist approaches are largely considered responsible for the 
conflicts surrounding environmental risks (Burchell, 1998; Wynne, 2002).         
  
2.4.1.1 Technical Approach to Risk Construction 
 
As the dominant response to environmental risks, the technical approach is based on a 
positivist or epistemologically realist world view (Szerszynski, Lash and Wynne, 1996). 
In other words, this approach assumes that objects in the world are waiting to be 
perceived or defined as risky. As a result, environmental risks are considered to be 
singular, neutral and objective concepts, whereby a quantifiable assessment of society’s 
impact on nature is possible (Burchell, 1998). Those who hold this view are “convinced 
that technical estimates of risk constitute true representations of hazards that can and 
will affect people as predicted by the calculated results, regardless of the beliefs… of 
the analysts involved” (Klinke and Renn, 2002).       
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2.4.1.2 Constructivist Approach to Risk Construction  
 
In contrast is the constructivist approach, which until recently did not concern itself with 
environmental problems and received almost no interest from social researchers 
(Hannigan, 2000). In line with the concepts of late modernity, this perspective has 
become increasingly prominent. As a challenge to the technical perspective, it 
emphasises the idea that nature is inextricably part of society and therefore sees 
environmental risks as “subjective; shaped and constructed by cultural, social, 
economic political and psychological factors” (Burchell, 1998, p.8). Environmental risks, 
it is argued, are not just facts about nature, but are also socially constructed and 
dependent on successful claims-making (Irwin, 2001). It is thus important to note that 
this perspective does not deny the reality of environmental problems. Rather, it points 
out that for a risk to be put on the environmental agenda, it must first be socially 
constructed (Irwin, 2001).   
 
2.4.2 Construction of Environmental Risk 
 
Hannigan (2000) points out that today the successful construction of an environmental 
risk requires several conditions (figure 1.1). Considering the fact that the existence of 
risks arising from man-made environmental damage is a globally accepted notion, the 
construction of risk can in fact be seen to take place in two stages. At a superficial level, 
in most cases concluding that a ‘risk’ exists is relatively straight-forward. Today, global 
and national institutions openly accept the adverse consequences of environmental 
degradation. However, illustrating the complexity of environmental problems, the 
multiple actors and stakeholders involved in the process of risk construction transforms 
what began as an environmental problem into a political and social problem. In other 
words, as Burchell (1998, p.4) eloquently points out, it is the ontological paradox “that 
environmental risk is, somehow at the same time, both objectively real and subjectively 
constructed” that makes dealing with the concept so problematic. In this sense, the 
problematic nature of environmental risks for late-modern society can be seen to lie 
more in the process of assessing the degree of risk and what action to take and less in 
the actual agreement over the existence of the risk. ‘Risk construction’ is therefore 
defined here as ‘the process involving multiple societal institutions, such as agencies, 
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social groups within society and individuals, trying to establish consensus on the extent 
of a risk’ (Klinke and Renn, 2002).     
 
 
1. Scientific authority for and validation of claims 
2. Existence of ‘popularisers’ who can bridge environmentalism and 
science  
3. Media attention in which the problem is ‘framed’ as novel and 
important 
4. Dramatisation of the problem in symbolic and visual terms 
5. Economic incentives for taking positive action 
6. Emergence of an institutional sponsor who can ensure both 
legitimacy and continuity  
  
 
Figure 2.1: The six conditions required for the construction of an environmental risk 
(taken from Hannigan, 2000, p. 65) 
 
2.4.3 Domains of Risk Assessment  
 
The outcome of the political process of risk construction is the public meaning given to a 
particular risk. As the product of the interaction between various actors then, risk 
construction occurs within two separate, but overlapping domains. The domain 
occupied by specialised professionals or “chief constructors of risk” (Hannigan, 2000, 
p.101) is where the most important action takes place. Essentially, risks are legitimised 
by those chief constructors of risk (scientists, engineers, lawyers, political officials) and 
the institutions of modern society which they represent (the state, industry, science). 
Being the bearers of risk, risk construction also occurs in the public domain. NGOs, 
public participation meetings and to some extent the media operate within this domain 
in an effort to give risk a more democratic and socially relevant meaning. However, due 
to the hegemonic role of formal institutions in the construction of risk and the scientific 
basis of their argument, the voices and concerns of these other stakeholders is often 
overshadowed (Irwin, 2001). Evidently, it appears that environmental risks continue to 
be largely framed along these lines. The overarching discursive power of the scientific-
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institutional risk culture (the technical approach) seemingly continues to subvert and 
marginalise the essential human-cultural political dimension of risk (the constructivist 
approach) (Wynne, 2002). As a result, the concept of risk is very often reduced to a 
scientific model of probability, which in itself is unaccountably representative of 
dominant political interests. From a sociological perspective, this fear of the insincere 
appropriation of environmentalism is one of the central themes concerning critiques of 
modern society. As Eder (1996, p.203) anxiously puts it: 
 
“The more that environmentalism serves for generating legitimacy, the more it becomes 
an ideological weapon in political discourse. Environmentalism is becoming a new 
ideological tradition in addition to the ideological cleavages of advanced modern 
societies”   
 
In response, the constructivist discourse does illustrate a changing framework, 
theoretically and practically, for dealing with environmental risks. Implying the need for a 
more open, inclusive and accessible process for dealing with risk, this perspective 
becomes evermore relevant in light of particular developments concerning the 
environment within late-modernity. Specifically, I refer to the notion of certainty and 
control upon which modern society is founded. While risks arising from man-made 
environmental harm continue to get assessed from a largely technical-scientific aspect, 
there is much debate over the concept of certainty and the ability of institutions to 
control the (adverse) consequences of modernity. The following section discusses the 
consequence of rising uncertainty for decision-making.   
 
2.4.4 Decision-making, uncertainty and loss of control   
 
Following from the process of risk construction and legitimisation is the need to make 
decisions and implement solutions. Invariably, pressure to act grows as the socially 
constructed, yet real, threat begins to reach a (political) point where action or the 
appearance of it, needs to be taken. The increasing number and extent of disputes 
concerning industrial legacies illustrate this changing pressure on corporations and 
government (Benn, Dunphy and Martin, 2009). Naturally, what thus emerges is a 
political arena characterised by a framework of traditional politics, whereby conventional 
institutions take the central role of deciding upon appropriate action (Hogenboom, Mol 
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and Spaargaren, 2000). The central theme prescribed by the conventional institutional 
perspectives being an “incisive and compelling instrumental approach to decision-
making under uncertainty” (Striling, 2003, p.33).     
   
Founded on the unquestioned notion promulgated by the natural sciences of society as 
external to nature and at the same time able to control it (Szersynski, 1996), decision-
making is seemingly systematic. Action sought by institutional decision-makers is 
legitimated based on the assumption that they are capable of acting in a balanced, 
logical and technically informed manner (Irwin, 2001). However, today the risks created 
by modern society are becoming evermore pervasive and uncontrollable. This 
development in particular has led to an increasing scrutiny of modern institutions and 
the foundations of the decision-making processes followed. Consequently, as the 
legitimacy of dominant knowledge systems, such as those produced by science and 
other ‘experts’ is questioned, their ‘marginal’ counterparts are given greater legitimacy 
(Burchell, 1998). Instead of progressing towards a solution however, the opposite 
appears evident as the inevitable conflict and contestation which develops, along with 
the risks themselves, induces a sense of loss of control. In other words, in spite of 
increasing efforts towards total control in reaction to environmental problems, we are in 
fact facing rising levels of uncertainty as we move into a bleak, yet unknowable future 
(Adam, 1996). The result is that today “the governance of environmental problems has 
become a matter of significant practical and institutional concern” (Irwin, 2001, p.113). 
More and more it is becoming seemingly clear that this traditional process of risk 
management and the norms which underlie and guide it are both flawed and 
inappropriate.  
 
Ultimately, late-modernity is suggestive of the idea that environmental risks are raising 
fundamental problems for social institutions (Irwin, 2001). No longer is it possible to 
understand environmental issues from the point of scientific insight alone. Neither is it 
possible to expect government policy and legislation to effectively manage current 
problems or secure a future of certainty. What does become clear though is that the 
boundaries between the social and the natural are shifting. That is, “terms such as 
‘social’ and ‘natural’ do not refer to predetermined entities but rather have a changing 
discursive and rhetorical role to play” (Irwin, 2001, p.91). Yet this decreasing sense of 
clear social definition creates further uncertainty as the environment can no longer be 
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conceived as external to our social world. Traditional institutional mechanisms thought 
to be able to control the environment also become questionable.   
 
The question is now: where to from here? Today, the risk we face from environmental 
problems is accepted in almost all spheres of society. Yet, it is now a case of coming to 
terms with what is fast becoming one of the most dominant issues of contemporary 
modernity. Following from the fact that the technical approach is losing its legitimacy as 
an authority for controlling environmental risks, Eder (1996, p.203) asks two 
fundamental questions as to what the political implications of this recognised uncertainty 
are: “Does this change the public space as the central political institution of modern 
societies?” and “Does this lead to more democracy or a new technocracy in the name of 
environmental protection?”  
 
2.5 Late-modernity as a Risk Society  
 
The main thrust of the late-modern perspective concerns the idea that coming to terms 
with environmental risks requires a redefining of the operating assumptions and 
practices of modern society itself. This line of thought is advocated by many social 
theories responding to a time in which the threat resulting from environmental 
destruction is a leading political and social debate. Of particular interest is Beck’s (1992) 
theory of ‘risk society’. Providing insight into the politically and socially pervasive nature 
of risks, the concept of a risk society represents a specific development within the 
framework of late-modern society.  
 
In the late-modern tradition, the theory of risk society (Beck, 1992) argues that modern 
societies are transforming. Specifically, the claim is that contemporary society is 
undergoing radical change wherein the principles and institutions of modernity become 
challenged (Beck, 2000). For Beck, synonymous with the concept of ‘modern society’ is 
that of ‘industrial society’ or ‘first modernity’. As outlined in the above, it was during this 
phase of development that the harmful effects of industry were assumed to be easily 
identifiable, measurable and controlled (Matten, 2004). The process of assessing and 
evaluating environmental risks involved the use of conventional methods of scientific 
calculation (Beck, 2009). Based on the subsequent risk assessments, risk probabilities 
and norms generated by science and ‘the experts’, decisions could be systematically 
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made and the ‘relevant’ action taken. During this stage of first modernity, it is argued 
that society was assured by the idea that it was “capable of dealing with its own 
unforeseeable future through risk assessments” (Beck, 2009, p.26). Essentially, this 
process is seen to have had two opposing effects. On the one hand, it legitimized the 
production of industrially produced risks, thus further entrenching the dominant ideology 
of modernisation as linear progression (Beck, 1994). Risks were accepted as the 
necessary ‘side-effects’ of modern progress. On the other hand, it had the effect of 
intensifying those same risks it sought to control. However, the perceived controllability 
and certainty regarding the process of modernisation during first modernity meant that 
the risks being produced remained relatively unseen. Where they did occur, they were 
regarded as systematic events requiring political regulation. Indeed, as long as those 
legitimized hazards do not become issues of overt social or political concern, society 
remains content and unaware of its self-endangering nature.       
 
Inevitably though, as a result of the accumulation of those risks and society’s 
abstraction from the environment, their effects begin to emerge more explicitly (Beck, 
1994). Quickly, modern societies begin to find themselves confronted with certain 
unignorable consequences of their modern lifestyle. Public and private debates become 
dominated by a growing awareness of industrially produced threats (Beck, 1994). What 
were once seemingly objective issues of environmental concern now become issues of 
subjective political concern. This is because, unlike risks attached to fate, those most 
concerning for society now are ironically the ones that have been created by society 
itself- they are a product of human hands and minds (Beck, 2009). Furthermore, these 
‘manufactured risks’ are unique in that they are often invisible, existing only in terms of 
the knowledge about them and are thus open to social definition and construction 
(Beck, 1992). Essentially, this means that the conventional instruments and institutions 
of modern societies are unable to cope with the self-imposed consequences of 
modernization. A specific observation here is that these risks “challenge the bases of 
the probabilistic calculations of scientific risk management which proceed without 
reference to the human being affected by them” (Dingwall, 1999, p.478). The result is 
that the assumption of society as separate to nature and the social sciences as 
separate to the material sciences breaks open. The relationship between modern 
society and the risks it faces becomes more apparent: risks are both socially mediated 
and therefore subjective and at the same time assume an objective component in that 
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they are manufactured by experts and industry (Beck, 2000). In turn, the institutions of 
industrial society become both the producers and legitimators of risks they cannot 
control, rendering certain features of industrial society socially and politically 
problematic (Beck, et al, 1994). This state of unrest is explained as “a phase of 
development in modern society in which the social, political, ecological and individual 
risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control and 
protective institutions of industrial society” (Beck, 1994, p.27). At this point, industrial 
societies are said to begin to lose their established foundations in the wake of 
‘manufactured’ risks, transforming them into risk societies.   
  
A defining feature of this transformation from industrial society to risk society is 
described by the veritable change in political discourse. During first modernity, political 
debate and conflict was centred on the distribution of wealth (Beck, 1992). However, as 
“the struggle for one’s daily bread” (Beck, 1992, p.20) loses it urgency and society’s 
knowledge of its risk producing nature becomes more apparent, the focus of political 
debate and conflict begins to concern the distribution of risk. That is, ‘wealth-distributing’ 
societies become ‘risk-distributing’ societies. Risk society thus “designates a stage of 
modernity in which the threats produced so far on the path of industrial society begin to 
predominate” (Beck, 1994, p. 6). For this reason Beck makes the claim that first 
modern, industrial societies are unable to cope with the risks they systematically 
produce: the institutions of first modernity were designed for the distribution of ‘goods’, 
not the distribution of ‘bads’ (Beck, 1994). In a similar fashion, one could say that 
dealing with industrially produced risks via the mechanisms of first modernity is like 
trying to fit a round peg into a square hole.              
 
As mentioned above, the risks that give way to the risk society differ from those usually 
dealt with during first modernity (risks of fate or accidents). They are open to social 
definition and construction. The result of which means that the risks facing societies 
today shake the fundamental assumptions of the conventional institutional system and 
social order (i.e. law, science, economics). This insight finds its evidence in the principal 
notion that “the risk society has become an insuranceless society in which insurance 
protection paradoxically diminishes with the size of the threat” (Beck, 2009, p.27). 
Indeed, the risks of climate change, chemical production and nuclear power transcend 
the capacity of conventional insurance solutions (Matten, 2004). Yet, these risks 
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nonetheless pose a constant threat to society at large.  Significantly, this means that 
despite the continuity of industrially produced risk, the capacity of modern institutions to 
provide protection or compensation via its once effective mechanisms is called into 
question. The following table highlights the dynamics of the risks of risk society and 
what they imply for society and the institutions of first modernity. 
 
 First modern society Risk society 
Type of risk Risks at the work place, 
accidents 
Artificial catastrophes, 
industrially produced 
risks  
Dependence on 
individual’s decision 
Yes (driving, flying etc.) No (collectively taken 
decision of modern 
society, imposed on 
individual) 
Scope of destruction  Limited by space, time, 
social boundaries 
Unlimited ‘accidents’ 
Calculation of threat Calculable uncertainty 
(likelihood, level of 
destruction known, 
compensation available 
via insurance)  
Very small, yet level of 
destruction infinite and 
impossible to calculate  
Responsibility  Rules of assignment Yes and no: organised 
irresponsibly 
             
Table 2.1: Characteristic features of the risk society (Beck, 1988, p. 121-122, as cited 
in, and adapted from Matten, 2004)  
 
Evidently the implications of living in a risk society, or rather the implications that 
environmental risk has on modern societies, are several. Those effects play out on a 
number of different levels and in a number of different ways.  The overriding theme of 
Beck’s theory however can be summed up in that risk societies are defined by the 
failure or disruption in the workings of previously taken for granted and trusted 
institutional arrangements. What becomes extremely important in the risk society is the 
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politics and ‘subpolitics’ which surround risk definition (Beck, 2000). To a large extent 
the new political nature of the concept of risk is the definitive characteristic of the risk 
society. Based on the notion that risks have become a major political force replacing 
conflicts over wealth distribution, a new power game is said to emerge where the 
question as to who is to define risk becomes central (Beck, 2000). Given the uncertainty 
surrounding the industrially produced risks of a risk society, the old power structures of 
first modern society begin to be undermined. Effectively, what ensues is a struggle 
within the established ‘relations of definition’ of modern society (Beck, 2000). In other 
words, because risks are socially constructed and not simple, obvious scientific facts of 
reality, their definitions and what they are taken to mean are a result on the dominant 
norms of society. However, when modern society faces risks which are incalculable, yet 
created by society itself (and therefore by the dominant powers in society) the old ways 
of defining and deciding upon risk lose their legitimacy. The institutions of modern 
society lose their legitimacy. The consequence of risk for modern society then is that 
there opens up space for reform, reform not only within the institutions of modern 
society, but also within the principles of those institutions (Beck, et al, 2003).  
 
By expanding on this point, the positive aspect to Beck’s seemingly otherwise 
pessimistic outlook for modern societies is illustrated. Not only is risk considered a 
socially destabilizing force, but more broadly it is considered a socially transformative 
force. So, when Beck speaks of modern institutions being undermined in the face of 
risk, the implication is that they necessarily have to be replaced by new and innovative 
social arrangements. This idea reveals the risk society theory as a specific development 
and application of the concept of reflexive modernization (Matten, 2004). The theory of 
reflexive modernization and reflexivity is discussed in more detail below. For now 
however, the focus is on the effects of risk for modern society and specifically their 
implications for certain institutions of modern society. The following looks in detail at 
three aspects of risk society which highlight the dynamics of environmental risk and the 
social and political challenges they pose for institutions. Firstly, the concept of 
‘organised irresponsibility’ is discussed. It demonstrates the difficulty faced when trying 
to assign blame or obtain compensation for industrially produced threats. Secondly, the 
role of science in assessing risk and the inherent dangers it poses for contemporary 
society is examined. Finally, the concept of subpolitics is examined, revealing the 
broader political implications of risks in contemporary society. Together, these concepts 
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illustrate the ‘social and political explosiveness’ of the risks faced by society today. 
Moreover, the extent to which industrially produced risks transcend the traditional 
mechanism employed by ‘risk professionals’ and the institutions of modern society itself 
is revealed. 
 
2.5.1 Organized Irresponsibility  
 
The concept of ‘organised irresponsibility’ makes note of the fact that by the nature and 
extent of environmental risks present in contemporary society, no individual or institution 
can be held specifically accountable (Beck, 1998). During the stage of first modernity, 
risks on the other hand were covered by insurance. In the case of those risks, such as 
motor accidents, provisions were more or less easily made for the worst conceivable 
eventuality (Beck, 2009). However, the risks of today are fundamentally different to 
those of the past. As demonstrated in table 1.2, they are incalculable in terms of their 
probability of occurrence and their level or scope of potential damage. Additionally, they 
are not the result of individual decisions, but rather the consequence of historical 
actions and therefore imposed on individuals and society as a whole. In turn, this means 
risks are no longer calculable in terms of the conventional rationale of insurance 
(Matten, 2004). The insurance principle is thus cancelled- not only in the economic 
sense, but also in the social, medical and cultural sense (Beck, 2009). In other words, 
everybody is at risk and nobody is (directly) responsible. Whereas in modern society, 
the effects of industry were spilling over, they were able to be ‘mopped up’ (i.e. 
rhetorically through law, science, economics), in a risk society however they no longer 
can be effectively mopped up.    
 
Nonetheless, in a risk society, the traditional institutional mechanisms still come into 
play. Increasing technical-scientific based assessments, norms and controls for risk 
continue to be put in place (Beck, 2009). However, because those risks are in reality 
‘institutionally incompatible’, they continue to spread and slip through the loopholes of 
law, science and politics. In other words, most apparent in risk societies is that while 
there is an expansion in environmental law, there is paradoxically more and more 
environmental degradation for which no one is specifically held responsible (Beck, 
1998). Additionally, that there is no way to conceive of their likelihood- their probability 
tends towards zero, while their potential damage tends towards infinity- risk becomes 
 35
based on subjective (and therefore conflicting) perceptions (Matten, 2004). The socially 
diverse notion of risk results in political disputes as to what constitutes adequate 
compensation. Ultimately, the result is that the risk producing industries are able to 
acknowledge those threats, adhere to imposed regulations and standards, yet at the 
same time deny responsibility and preclude compensation (Beck, 1998). This social and 
political contradiction is one which remains hidden so long as the old institutional 
patterns of rationality hold up (Beck, 2009). Importantly, those patterns of rationality are 
not only the institutions of modernity, but the underlying power structures of industrial 
society. Indeed, because those power structures define the institutions of modern 
society, as along as they remain environmental risk will continue to be produced. So, it 
is in fact only when the instruments of the industrial system can no longer hide the 
extent of the risks being produced and society itself becomes questioning of their ability 
to do so, that we see the condition of ‘organised irresponsibility’ emerge. In turn, this 
explicit institutional failure increasingly transforms modern societies into risk societies. 
        
2.5.2 Changing Role of Science 
 
Control and certainty were presupposed notions characteristic of the first modernity. 
Importantly, within this discourse, science is a key informant, playing a dominant role in 
terms of underpinning this belief in the ability to attain certainty and control (Beck, 
2009). However, considering that certainty over risk can no longer be guaranteed, the 
role of science must necessarily change. The idea that science can be used as an 
objective decision-making tool is inappropriate for the risks of risk society. Risk 
definitions vary due to the different social and political assumptions embedded within 
the natural scientists models (Hogenboom, et al, 2000). Therefore, in risk society the 
role of science in dealing with risk becomes revealed as one which is based on how risk 
is defined:  
 
“In the case of risk conflicts, politicians can no longer rely on scientific experts. This is 
so…because there are always competing and conflicting claims and viewpoints from a 
variety of different actors and affected groups who define risks very differently” (Beck, 
1998, p. 16). 
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For Beck, the danger of science for dealing with risk relates to both its use in assessing 
and managing an already existing risk (i.e. environmental threat such as air pollution) 
and its use in promoting technological development. The problem encountered in risk 
societies is that political decisions about risk are always based on uncertainty. Experts 
can only supply more or less uncertain factual information about probabilities, but never 
answer the question: which risk is acceptable and which is not (Beck, 1998). The 
difference between “safety and probable safety, seemingly so close, are worlds apart” 
(Beck, 2000, p.60). Therefore, science becomes problematic for dealing with risk 
because it is no longer able to provide objectivity; the possibility and extent of a risk 
depends on decisions taken. As a result, if politicians just implement scientific advice, 
they risk getting caught up in the mistakes and uncertainties of scientific knowledge 
(Beck, 1998). The dilemma encountered in risk societies becomes one of how to use 
science and how to justify what decisions are taken given the unavoidable uncertainty of 
the knowledge guiding decisions.  
 
What risk society represents for science is that the monopoly of the expert in diagnosing 
risk is called into question (Beck, 2000). This is not to question the importance of 
science for assessing and managing risks. Instead, what is revealed is the inherently 
social nature of science. Depending on how science is used and implemented, it is able 
to conceal social change and perpetuate the industrial production of risk, rather than 
reduce it (Beck, 2000). In other words, because risk definition involves many actors (not 
least the risk producing institutions), there is always the danger that decisions 
concerning environmental risk are based on scientific claims that serve powerful 
interests… those same interests which create the risks in the first place (Hogenboom, et 
al, 2000). What is thus called for is the opening up of debates regarding risk whereby 
science is used not as an objective decision-making tool, but as a democratic 
legitimating force. For risk societies then, the challenge is to shift the role of science 
from one which previously directed decision-making, to one where politics and morality 
have to take priority over scientific reasoning (Beck, 1998).  
 
2.5.3 Sub-politics  
 
Environmental risks can be characterised as being surrounded by uncertainty, unable to 
be controlled by the instruments and institutions of modern society and socially 
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determined. Yet, in risk societies modern institutions try to remain tied to the ‘realist’ 
assumption that human knowledge of nature and, therefore, environmental risk is 
singular, neutral and objective (Burchell, 1998). Eventually however, the 
inappropriateness of this approach becomes overtly explicit, giving way to conflict 
between expert and public opinion. No longer are risks made public discourse by 
experts alone, but because of the subjective realities which they give rise to, civil 
society, expert groups, cultures and even nations are having to get involved with each 
other whether they like it or not (Beck, 1998). The logic behind the advent of sub-politics 
in the arena of risk society is thus the interface between counter-claims to knowledge 
and traditional (modern) forms of knowledge in conceptualizing the problem. For 
example, the disenchantment in the ability of science to make clear cut decisions in risk 
society, brings to the fore the socially and culturally diverse nature of environmental 
threats. Industrial society automatically dealt with environmental problems via its 
conventional politics of the state, parliament and bureaucracy (Hogenboom, et al, 
2000). In risk society however, the uncertain nature of the risks now appearing and the 
inability to manage them is taken to signal the end of such modes of political decision-
making. Additionally, because of the socially, culturally and individually unaccountable 
nature of the dominant institutional risk management strategies, “the political breaks 
open and erupts beyond the formal responsibilities and hierarchies” (Beck, 1994, p.18).  
 
Consequently (and necessarily), an alternative form of political interaction emerges at 
what is now the level of ‘subpolitics’. This interaction is seen as a process where 
traditional political actors struggle to maintain their legitimacy, while a number of newly 
conceived political actors enter debate. They themselves also struggle to gain 
legitimacy. Here, a dual process is said to take place where certain institutions of 
industrial society become unpolitical, while those arenas which were previously 
unpolitical becomes political (Beck, 1994). Environmental subpolitics thus accounts for 
the way in which significant institutional change and transformation occurs as non-
traditional actors become involved, increasingly pressuring and questioning the status 
quo. The end result being the formation of new ways and means in which political and 
social interaction takes place in order to cope with risk (i.e. a reflexive second 
modernity). Importantly, within this new dynamic that unfolds in the arena of 
environmental politics in risk society, previously marginalized communities (usually 
worst affected by environmental risks), NGOs and environmental activists are given a 
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more prominent role (Matten, 2004). Therefore, not only does the concept of subpolitics 
denote the emergence of new political (and power) arrangements, but also the 
incorporation of new forms of knowledge. Subpolitics, thus underlines one of the 
founding notions of risk society in that the common danger of risk “has a levelling effect 
that whittles away some of the carefully erected boundaries between classes, nations, 
humans and the rest of nature” (Beck, 1998, p.10).  
 
2.6 From Risk Society to a Reflexive Society 
 
As the concept of subpolitics illustrates, despite Beck’s seemingly negative 
interpretation of risk for modern society, his understanding is in fact more than simply 
the demise of humanity. The role of subpolitics is seen to constitute the means by which 
institutional innovation is generated in order to cope with risk. Risk is thus taken to 
represent a transformative force for modern society. This brings to light a further 
development on the risk society theory. Describing society’s recognition of the need for 
institutional change as a result of uncontrollable risk is the term ‘reflexive 
modernisation’. The concept of ‘reflexive modernisation’, as a process, is described as 
society’s “self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and 
assimilated in the system of industrial society” (Beck, 1994, p.6). Rather than additional 
legislation, scientific research or financial input, reflexivity suggests deep-rooted 
change. It is a concept that describes fundamental change within the social relations of 
society. Accordingly, reflexive modernity is somewhat different to the theory of strict 
post-modernity. Rather, as a process, it is based on the notion that society is still 
modern, but this modernity is radicalizing itself as a conscious response to the myriad of 
risks and unintended side-effects of industry which are only now coming into sight (Lee, 
2008).   
 
Returning to the concept of subpolitics, what we see is that change and progress from 
risk society to a reflexive society is in many ways the product of the new political 
dynamics the take shape at the level of subpolitics. During the stage of risk society, the 
institutions and instruments of modern society are rendered incapable of dealing with 
the increasingly complex nature of industrially produced risks. Over time, the 
subsequent political dynamics (subpolitics) that take place in reaction to the conditions 
of risks society begin to initiate a transformation of those failing institutions. Central to 
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this transformation is the idea that previously non-political actors are gradually 
becoming inextricably part of the formal political arena. In turn, they are becoming 
influential in the decision-making process and are thus a vital means for change. To this 
end, risk societies become reflexive societies via fundamental changes to their 
otherwise modern institutional systems- changes which are especially driven by new 
actors and new forms of knowledge. As noted earlier, under conditions of risk society, 
modern institutional mechanisms remain the predominant means of dealing with risk. 
Thus, the fundamental institutional changes that are required must necessarily come 
from beyond the institutions themselves. This means that subpolitics and the important 
role of previously non-political and extra-institutional actors are key to realizing 
reflexivity. In this sense, risk society is a theory which on the one hand is descriptive of 
the effects risk has on modern society. At the same time, it is also prescriptive as to how 
risk can, and does affect social transformation. As the second main contribution of 
Beck’s work then, reflexive modernization, as initiated by the subpolitical arena, is 
suggestive of institutional innovation as a pathway out of the failure of modern societies 
to cope with the self-imposed consequences of risk (Matten, 2004).        
 
2.7 Reflections on Risk Society 
 
The theory of risk society follows in parallel with the description of environmental risks 
as conceived by postmodern (i.e. late-modern) social theory. As part of the wider body 
of late-modern social theory, risk society is often pointed out for its close link with 
certain other theoretical contributions (e.g. Giddens, 1990). The theory’s unique 
contribution however lies in the proposed link between the changes in modern society 
and the increased presence of risk. Risk society in fact is almost entirely premised on 
the notion that risk is a fundamental precursor to the changes synonymous with late-
modernity. In other words, the ‘crisis’ that risk is described as inducing coincides (and is 
inextricably linked) with many of themes common in late-modern theory (e.g. a loss of 
faith in centralized institutions and the assumptions of ‘progress’ upon which these are 
based) (Irwin, 2001). Despite these commonalities though, it goes without saying that 
many of the ideas and concepts of Beck’s work have received criticism. Most 
significantly these relate to what some perceive as an overly realist approach to risk 
(Fischer, 1998; Burchell, 1998) and the notion of institutional and governmental failure 
in dealing with risk (Dingwall, 1999). Nonetheless, it is the unique way that risk is linked 
 40
to contemporary society that is thought to be relevant and provoking. As Matten (2004b, 
p. 372) specifically points out:  
 
“For the context of environmental management the value of Beck’s work lies in 
providing an interdisciplinary explanatory framework for the new character of 
environmental problems and the institutional failure of modern societies in tackling risk. 
As Beck himself concedes in reaction to his critics, the interdisciplinary character of his 
work requires the application of his ideas in the respective disciplines and rather than 
questioning his general conceptual approach, the issues brought forward by his critics 
should be regarded as potential fields of further research.” 
  
In other words, it is that “the concept of risk is accorded major explanatory status” (Irwin, 
2001, p.63) rather than its empirically robust nature which provides it with character. 
Risk is shown to be a concept which is more than a statistical probability- it is 
problematic for modern society on a large scale. At the same time however, neither can 
risk be confined to perceptions and social constructions alone (Hannigan, 2000). Thus, 
at its core, risk society explains a society where we have to make social assessments 
about the magnitude of risks and at the same time cannot ignore the fact that “scientific 
evidence (and other modern constructs) can be a helpful source of information in 
making these decisions” (Hannigan, 1995, p.95). So essentially, it is this ‘midway’ 
position (between a realist and social constructive perspective) that risk society 
embodies and the fact that it creates a new avenue of research possibilities which justify 
it as being a valuable theoretical research asset. Its significance and relevance here 
specifically relates to the way in which risk, as a catalyst for social and political change, 
is explored. In this way, the theory is employed not on the basis of its empirical strength, 
but rather as a means to uncover new ideas and provide unique insight. Furthermore, 
not only is risk society descriptive of late-modern society, but also prescriptive (Barry, 
1994). Through a vision of an ‘ecologically rational’ and reflexive society, driven by 
those outside the traditional institutional realms, Beck provides the theoretical 
components for potentially dealing with the uncertainty and risks faced by society today. 
Thus, an interrogation and conception of the future in terms of the risk analysed in this 
case study is enabled.   
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Having now discussed the theory of risk society which forms the analytical foundations 
of this research, the following sections deal with the concept of governance. 
Specifically, the concept of environmental governance in relation to risk is discussed. 
The importance of dealing with this concept lies in the fact that the implications of 
environmental risk are expected to largely manifest themselves as problems of 
environmental governance and the corresponding institutions.    
 
2.8 Environmental Governance  
 
The term ‘governance’ is a broad concept used in varying circumstances and no single 
definition accounts for its meaning. This definition developed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (as cited by Hall, 2007) is useful: 
 
“Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels… it comprises of the mechanisms, processes 
and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.”  
 
Put succinctly, governance can also be described as “the relationships between people, 
the ways they interact with each other in the context of their environment, and the 
systems of principles, rules and norms that are set up to guide these interactions” 
(Turton, et al, 2007, p.7). Therefore, governance can also be seen as the means by 
which certain assumptions and values are upheld in order to achieve specific objectives. 
In this sense, environmental governance would refer to both the means by which the 
environment is governed and the assumptions, values and norms underpinning those 
means. Relevant and common means of environmental governance include the use of 
command-and-control instruments, economic or market based instruments, voluntary 
agreements and information-based strategies (Godfrey and Nahman, 2007). In turn, the 
assumptions, values and norms underpinning those means essentially are driven by 
global, national and political influences. 
 
Without going into historic detail, both developed and developing countries, have 
traditionally followed what came to be the dominant approach to environmental 
governance: the command-and-control approach. This approach involves direct 
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regulation and relies on the application of regulatory instruments such as standards, 
authorisation and land-use controls (Godfrey and Nahman, 2007). It can be seen that 
this approach falls within the framework of modern society in terms of how the 
environment is conceived and managed. Described in the previous chapter, two 
important assumptions reflect this. Namely, that the environment is external to society, 
and the environment and the risks it poses are controllable by institutional means. 
However, modern societies are also transforming into late-modern societies. While the 
effect of this in relation to environmental risk is seen to be a growing loss of faith in 
central institutions and the emergence of, and conflict between, ‘new’ forms of 
knowledge, environmental governance has also been influenced. Evidence of this can 
be seen in a shift away from ‘policing’ to one of co-operation and the introduction of a 
number of ‘softer’ alternative policy approaches (Godfrey and Nahman, 2007). Also 
described as a ‘progressive approach’, environmental governance in late-modern 
societies is an approach which: involves a large and multidisciplinary knowledge base, 
incorporating the natural, physical, engineering and social sciences within the context of 
a practical decision-making framework that emphasises process, wider and more 
democratic participation and deliberation (Pollard, et al, 2004).   
 
However, the question for the governance of the environment in those countries which 
are harder to define as late-modern, or more precisely, developing countries still 
remains. Godfrey and Nahman (2007) note that regulatory controls remain the principal 
means of environmental governance in developing countries. However, to assume 
therefore that those countries are ‘modern’ and show no signs of becoming late-modern 
(or are able to adapt) is too simplistic. For one, it is presumptuous to just assume that 
environmental governance in a developing country is of a particular standard. More 
importantly, to generically distinguish between a developed and developing country in 
terms of its governance principles and institutions would be to ignore the importance of 
historical and current contextual factors. The next section thus looks at how context 
influences the governance of the environment and also how this affects how risk is dealt 
with.    
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2.9 Governance and Environmental Risk in Context 
 
Importantly, the above discussion regarding environmental risk is explicated in relation 
to ‘modern society’ as the generic framework describing developed or industrialised 
nations. However, as a socially and politically infused concept, environmental risk in 
less developed or developing countries requires further discussion. Based on the 
overarching value assigned to economic growth, the environment is invariably devalued 
as a societal concern for most developing countries. That is to say, economic security 
and well-being is often given greater interest by institutional bodies over that of the 
environment. Dealing with worsening environmental conditions is therefore a matter of 
competing institutional values and norms. For countries in a stage of ‘advanced 
modernity’ Beck (1994, p.29) describes them as having reached “a stage of modernity 
in which the hazards produced in the growth of industrial society become predominant”. 
In this case, risk is a predominating factor over and above the “logic of wealth 
distribution” (Beck, 1992, p.19). While this idea may be controversial, it does present the 
logical argument that developed nations, having reached a point of ‘satisfactory 
economic welfare’ amongst their citizens, are more permeable, accepting and reactive 
to environmental risk. Indeed, climate change has become a leading social and 
(political) issue in most developed countries. In this sense, reflection and reflexivity 
occur as a result of a society having achieved the objective of economic security and 
reached an advanced stage of industrial and technological innovation. This is perhaps 
because more room has been opened up for additional social issues to be dealt with on 
a political level (Rinkevicius, 2000).  
 
However, we are also living in an increasingly connected and globalised world. This 
means that today even developing countries placing the environment higher on their 
political agenda. In some cases this may be voluntary. More generally though it is a 
case of being forced to do so by virtue of the fact that environmental risk is becoming a 
discernable reality in developed and developing nations alike (Dalby, 2002). This raises 
important issues for the developmental trajectory and future progress of developing 
countries. If both industrialised and developing countries are having to deal with similar 
problems, the question for the emerging economies is what developmental path to take. 
Do they continue to embrace the principles and values assigned to continued economic 
growth and address environmental problems more thoroughly once they have reached 
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a point where it becomes economically viable? Or are they able to learn and react 
appropriately? The question of interest here is thus: when economic growth and wealth 
distribution are the dominant concerns of a society, what happens when an 
environmental risk is understood to exist? Moreover, how is the system of governance 
concerning the environment affected?  
 
How the environment is formulated in less developed countries is becoming a growing 
topic of interest. Expanding on Beck’s risk society for example, Rinkevicius (2000) 
proposes the concept of a double-risk society, investigating the relevance of the risk 
society theory for Eastern European transition countries. Additionally, it is argued that to 
some extent, reflexivity in response to environmental risks can take place in those less 
developed countries. Turton, et al (2007) state that reflexive change in the way 
environmental resources are governed is being projected, and at times forced, on the 
less developed countries. Describing these circumstances and change means exploring 
environmental risk beyond the way in which it is understood in the context of advanced 
industrial countries. From this one would be able to see that environmental risk 
necessarily has to set those less developed countries on a different developmental path 
to that of their developed counterparts.               
 
Reflexivity as ‘responsiveness and adaptation’ to changing environmental developments 
is most effective and needs to occur within the institutional setting of the country 
concerned (Folke, et al, 2002). Societal values and expectations are increasingly 
helping shape changes in governance and environmental risk management. 
Nonetheless, final policy-making and implementation are inescapably the authority of 
the governing institutions. This means that proponents of change, not only in the public 
but those within the institutions themselves, face several challenges. Most notable is the 
prevailing values and norms underpinning the direction and content of governance. In 
other words, while it is the job of the formal institutions to implement policy, the informal 
institutions, defined as “the customs and practices of such agencies” (Nyambe, Breen 
and Fincham, 2007, p.201) are not only less tangible, but deeply embedded. For 
developing countries in particular, focusing on promoting their economic interests is 
undeniably the most defining value in terms of governance. Although this strongly 
implies the marginalization of environmental concern, this cannot be taken for granted. 
As Rinkevicius (2000) explains, just as higher environmental concern among developed 
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nations does not imply the absence of any conflict over economic concerns, it is also 
not true that an overshadowing display of material values negates all concern for the 
environment. Rather, the fact seems to be that “risk awareness is downplayed in 
developing… societies owing to the complex issues of social, economic and political 
change” (Rinkevicius, 2000, p. 280).  
 
2.10 Conclusion   
 
This chapter represents the theoretical underpinnings for this research. It has been 
demonstrated that environmental risks are becoming increasingly problematic for 
modern societies. Examining risk from a sociological perspective reveals the often 
ignored social and political challenges modern society is faced with when dealing with 
industrially produced risks. In particular, Beck’s risk society theory has addressed the 
incapability of modern societies to cope with the consequences of modernization by 
revealing the institutional failures (Matten, 2004). Significantly, the contribution of the 
theory also reveals risk as a force which has the ability to transform institutional 
arrangements. Subpolitics and the emergence of a reflexive society are unique 
concepts which have both theoretical and practical relevance. Theoretically, they offer a 
potentially valuable perspective from which to analyse the changing dynamics in the 
arena of environmental politics. Practically, the notion that subpolitics offers a way out of 
the circumstances of risk society is of relevance to the process of environmental 
governance. 
 
Taking this into account, it is now important to provide a description of the context in 
which risk occurs. As explained above, the implications of environmental risk for a 
developing country can be expected to be substantially different to that of a developed 
country. Beck’s description of environmental risks is based on his admittedly European 
outlook. The fact that South Africa has elements of both a developing country and a 
developed one (Godfrey, et al 2007), means that a significantly different type of risk 
society can be expected to emerge. In turn, the outcome of applying Beck’s theory to 
the risk of AMD on the West Rand is potentially transformative for the way in which the 
situation is currently perceived. Thus, having described the social and political character 
of environmental risks at a generic level, an assessment of that setting is necessary in 
order to fully understand the implications of the risk itself. Accordingly, the following 
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chapter provides the background to the current situation in which we find ourselves on 
the West Rand. From there, it is possible to begin to determine in what way it is 
reminiscent of a risk society. In making this connection we can then also begin to 
determine the country’s risk trajectory in terms of becoming a reflexive society, as 
opposed to remaining trapped in the conditions of a risk society.  
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CHAPTER 3 - BACKGROUND 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The fact that the current situation concerning the AMD problem on the West Rand is 
due to the logic of exploitative capital accumulation demonstrates the truth behind a 
central theme of risk society. Namely, that it “clarifies a world characterised by the loss 
of a clear distinction between nature and culture” (Beck, 1998, p.10). In other words, the 
rise of risk society ushers society into an era where it becomes impossible to remain 
tied to traditional conceptions of boundaries separating different spheres of life. As a 
result, it is inescapably necessary to accept the fact that risks are not merely ‘outside’ 
phenomena, but are generated right inside, and are inextricably part of, the very 
institutions of modern society which at the same time try to control them (Beck, 1998). 
For this reason, ignoring the political, historical and socio-economic matrix in which 
environmental risk is bound up in is both futile and costly. This chapter describes this 
matrix. Firstly, a brief overview of the environmental impacts of mining are covered, 
before describing the current situation in terms of the actual and potential biophysical 
problems resulting from AMD on the West Rand. A proposed solution to the problem 
has been put forward and is also discussed. This chapter then goes on to briefly 
describe the current political economy in South Africa and how this relates to the 
prevailing way in which the environment is governed. Then the chapter focuses directly 
on the historical aspects of gold mining in South Africa and the West Rand. Finally, it 
concludes with a discussion exploring the possibilities of change and the potential role 
of the risk posed by mining in that change.      
 
3.2 Environmental Impact of Mining 
 
Amongst the many environmental impacts associated with mining activities, air pollution 
and land degradation from mine tailings, sinkhole formation from underground 
dewatering and water pollution are some of the most notable. This is true not only with 
regards to mining in South Africa, but for the industry on a global level. This quote from 
the European Environmental Bureau is particularly demonstrative of the implications of 
mine related pollution and the risk perception it engenders: 
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“…problems relating to mining waste may be rated as second only to global warming 
and stratospheric ozone depletion in terms of ecological risk. The release to the 
environment of mining waste can result in profound, generally irreversible destruction of 
ecosystems.” 
(EEB, 2000, p.27) 
 
Above all its destructive impacts, contaminated mine water effluent (in the form of AMD) 
is almost unanimously accepted as the single greatest environmental risk associated 
with mining activity (Oelofse, 2008). As the focal point of this research, AMD is a 
general term which refers to the waste water produced as a result of mining. When 
mineral deposits or the associated spoil generated by mining come into contact with 
water and oxygen, they become oxidised and contaminate the water source. This 
contaminated water is characterised by a low pH (high acidity) high salinity levels, 
elevated mineral and heavy metal concentration and may also contain radionuclides 
(Oelofse, 2008). This mine effluent, which is both chemically toxic and radioactive (in 
the case of the West Rand), is generated from mines in several ways: as run-off from 
mine dumps entering surface water streams and groundwater, seepage from mine 
dumps into underground water and as overflow from abandoned mines. What makes 
the problem of AMD unique and particularly problematic is the fact that it is extremely 
difficult to rectify and has the potential to persist for centuries after mine closure 
(Oelofse, 2008).    
 
Defined in these terms, mine related pollution has an objective component in that the 
source of pollution and how it is generated is known. Notably, apart from structural 
landscape degradation, the effect of mining on nearby water sources is its most 
threatening impact. When contextualized however, defining the problem, determining its 
implications and dealing with it results in the creation of a complex array of political, 
socio-economic, scientific and legal interactions (Adler, et al, 2007). In light of this and 
given its instrumental cultural connection to modern discourse, it is hardly surprising 
then that mining, like technology, requires social assessment of some kind (Wynne, 
2002). 
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3.3 Current Situation Regarding Mine Water Pollution on the West Rand 
 
The current debate regarding the decant of toxic mine water from the unused 
underground mine workings and previously dry springs on the West Rand can be traced 
back over one hundred years. However, the actual event itself is far more recent and 
served as the trigger for what amounts to a current attempt at remediation and finding a 
long-term solution. As early as 1996 the flooding of the gold mines of Krugersdorp and 
Randfontein (on the West Rand), collectively referred to as the Western Basin Mine 
Void, was predicted by specialists (Du Toit, 2009, interview; Krige, 2009; Cobbing 
2008). That insight was largely ignored by the authorities and the mining houses 
themselves, with counter-claims also made regarding the direction in which the water 
would flow. However, in late-August 2002 polluted mine water (AMD) from the flooded 
underground mine Void indeed began decanting, first from a borehole and then the 
disused mine shaft as originally predicted (see appendix B). The reason for the sudden 
alarm over what has transpired into an observable environmental risk relates to the 
decision made in 1998 to stop pumping relatively ‘clean’ water from the mine workings 
(Krige, 2009). Consequently, with the gradual abandonment and closure of mines 
(which is synonymous with the cessation of pumping) in the area over recent history, 
the water table began to return to its original level in the Western Basin Mine Void (Van 
Eeden, Liefferink and Durand, 2009). The side-effect of which is what we see today: 
water polluted by mine effluent rising to surface levels and issuing from mine shafts and 
once dry springs alike (Krige, 2009).  
 
While the decant itself remains the underlying problem, the reason for concern is due to 
1) the potential for a vast number of water sources to be affected (see appendix B) and 
2) the long term nature of the problem. Firstly, the geographical location of the decant 
points atop a watershed means the escaping water finds its way into several important 
river systems across South Africa (Swart, et al, 2003). Secondly, unlike ‘conventional’ 
environmental problems’, the problem of AMD is that it does not cease when mining 
itself ends. In fact, as noted above, it occurs because, and is made worse when, mining 
activity ends (Adler, et al, 2007). Along the way communities, industry and ecosystems 
relying on the natural water sources are all potentially at risk. A further unique aspect of 
the AMD problem on the West Rand is that it poses a risk to the Cradle of Human Kind 
World Heritage Site. This aspect has significantly helped to highlight the problem and 
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add to the acceptance of having to address, or at least look into the problem more 
thoroughly. As Oelofse, et al (2008, p.7) remark, “it will be a sad day if AMD is allowed 
to impact negatively on archaeological material preserved over millennia, leaving 
questions of human origin unanswered.”         
 
3.3.1 Proposed Solution                   
 
At the time of writing, the only solution which has elicited any significant response is that 
proposed by Western Utilities Corporation (WUC). This ‘mine water reclamation project’ 
is a private sector investment strategy, which seeks to use technological and scientific 
methods for cleaning the water and selling it for profit: 
 
“Western Utilities Corporation (Pty) Ltd (WUC) proposes to establish a project to collect 
mine affected water from existing mines in the Witwatersrand mining area (which are 
currently pumping mine affected water to surface from underground mine voids), treat 
the water and distribute the reclaimed water to third parties on commercial terms.” 
(WUC EIA, 2009, p.1) 
 
In accepting the reality that a large part of the responsibility rests with the mining 
houses still operating on the West Rand (Mintails, Rand Uranium; DRD Gold), the 
Western Basin Environmental Corporation (WBEC) was established. As a section 21 
(not-for-profit) company, WBEC was formed in order to manage the process of water 
rehabilitation associated with AMD on the Western Basin (DRD Gold, 2008). After 
registering as a ‘Water Service Provider’ (WSP) with DWA, WBEC is entitled to remove 
water from the underground voids, treat it and sell it. In order to reclaim the water, 
WBEC subsequently entered into an agreement with WUC as the proposed company to 
be responsible for the reclamation, treatment and selling of the water. As part of the 
agreement, none of the mining companies involved with WBEC will profit from the WUC 
operation. In this sense, they are seen as facilitators of the solution and thereby fulfilling 
their responsibility in terms of a sustainable business code of conduct. To date, the 
initial feasibility study and scoping assessment has been approved by government. The 
second phase prior to approval involves the submission of an EIA. This has 
subsequently been submitted by WUC, but has not as of yet been accepted and is 
being reviewed by government in terms of its EIA process and feasibility. It is however 
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the ‘monopoly’ in terms of available solutions and a central issue relating to the 
management of the AMD risk.           
 
3.4 Political Economy and Environmental Governance in South Africa      
 
In terms of its developmental status, South Africa has been described institutionally as a 
“fledgling democracy” (Turton, et al, 2007) and economically as an “emerging economy” 
(Fig, 2005, p.599). The fact that today, fifteen years after the abolition of apartheid rule, 
South Africa still needs to overcome the social and ecological damage inflicted during 
that time, one may even regard it as a transitional economy. The consequent 
ambivalent nature of the country’s developmental needs reflects what is a complex 
situation. That is, while the majority of South Africa’s public policy is necessarily driven 
by the pursuit for ‘wealth redistribution’, the country also faces deteriorating 
environmental conditions (DEAT, 2006). More significant however, is the widely held 
argument that instead of moving towards a more socio-economically equitable society, 
in South Africa “one can detect… the evolution of an ascendant hegemonic project” 
(Marais, 2001, p.233). On the one hand then, South Africa faces what could be likened 
to Rinkevicius’ (2000) ‘double-risk society’, whereby it is facing challenges in the form of 
both socio-economic and environmental risks. On the other hand, it is a country 
overshadowed by a dominant political agenda, characterised by a drive for capital 
expansion, justified on the grounds of a trickle-down effect, yet also motivated by elite 
(and corporate) interests (Bezuidenhout, et al, 2007; Marais, 2001).  
 
Ultimately, most evident in this account is the fact that although a democratic 
government came to power on strict oppositional terms to the principles of the former 
apartheid regime, the extent to which change has been augmented is limited. 
Unsurprisingly, the case of realizing better environmental governance in South has 
suffered too. At first glance however, a review of South Africa’s environmental 
legislation contradicts this rather bleak picture. Having taken many of the best elements 
from cutting-edge legislation globally, South Africa’s environmental legislation has been 
described as being amongst the best in the world (Hattingh, et al, 2007; Kotze, 2006). 
During apartheid rule the environment was at best governed as an entity to be 
selectively conserved for the benefit of a few. After emerging from decades of rule 
where decision-making excluded all but the central tier of government, the legislation 
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that accompanied the democratic transition was inspiring. Of particular relevance are 
the following pieces of environmental legislation:   
 
- National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), (Act 107 of 1998)  
- National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) 
- Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, (Act 28 of 2002)    
 
The approach to the governance of the environment as enshrined in legislation follows 
closely with the ‘progressive approach’ outlined above. Phrases such as “co-operative 
environmental governance” (NEMA, 1998, 3), “integrated environmental management” 
(NEMA, 1998, 5), “ensure that water is allocated equitably and used beneficially in the 
public interest, while promoting environmental values.” (NWA, 1998, 1(3)), “that the 
development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the ecosystems of which 
they are part do not exceed the level beyond which their integrity is jeopardised” (RSA, 
1998a, s.2.4.a), all follow directly in-line with what seems an enlightened and genuinely 
forward-thinking approach. Unfortunately, the fact is that the strength of environmental 
governance in South Africa ends at the rhetorics of legislation. Bond and Stein (2000, 
p.1) attest to this fact, stating that “notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary, apartheid-
era state support for industrial development and capital accumulation at all costs was 
not significantly altered through the new (environmental) laws”. The result of which is 
demonstrated in the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Environmental 
Outlook report (DEAT, 2006) which notes that many aspects of the environment are 
deteriorating, despite improvements in environmental management. 
  
Certainly, a strong policy favouring economic growth can been seen as a challenge in 
terms of the realization of a greater level of environmental sustainability. However, the 
administrative and legal precedence to implement more favourable standards and state 
capacity to do so is possibly a more fundamental challenge (Turton, 2009; 
Bezuidenhout, et al, 2007). From this perspective, the most cited problem facing South 
Africa in terms of working towards more sustainable environmental practices is the 
fragmentation of environmental governance (Nel and Kotze, 2009; Hattingh, et al, 2007; 
Kotze, 2006). Fragmentation at both a horizontal (mandates vested in separate, 
autonomous organs of state) and vertical (mandates shared between national, 
provincial and local spheres) level is problematic. Consequently, Nel and Kotze (2009, 
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p.18) highlight the fact that “the legal underpinnings of environmental management and 
governance…may have a profoundly negative impact on the effectiveness of any 
environmental governance and management system.” The impact of this fragmentation 
has several consequences for integrating environmental governance processes. Most 
significantly these include: 
 
• Disjointed and incremental decision-making processes 
• Costly delay in decision making  
• Inefficient arrangements between organs of state that control similar activities 
• Significant gaps in control arrangements  
• Conflicting conditions of authorisation  
• Externalisation of governmental inefficiencies to development costs, resulting 
in negative impacts on development in South Africa and perpetuating the 
existence of environmental problems 
(Adapted from Nel and Kotze, 2009, p.18-19)   
 
In turn, these flaws mean that legislation is largely unable to alter the fact that in South 
Africa, the environment continues to remain within a strict modernist framework. That is, 
at an institutional level, the environment is still considered as, (1) external and separate 
to society and, (2) existing exclusively as a resource base which must necessarily be 
exploited in order to achieve the objective of economic growth and wealth redistribution. 
In light of mining as the topical focus of this research, this recent excerpt from a speech 
given by the Minster of Mineral Resources, Susan Shabangu, highlights this point: 
 
“We seek to further deepen this relationship with Australia so that we can unlock the 
mineral resources of the continent to address the inherent socioeconomic challenges.” 
(From address to Australian Investors given at the Africa Down Under Conference, 3rd 
September, 2009) 
 
This section has briefly illustrated the current ‘on-the-ground’ situation in terms of the 
environment and the way it is conceived and managed in South Africa. In particular, it 
can be noted that a strong neo-liberal policy approach of economic growth is certainly 
not complementary in terms of the attainment of greater environmental stewardship, 
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specifically as it relates to the role of government. However, state capacity and other 
challenges to implementing the legal framework for achieving a stronger regulatory 
environment can possibly be regarded as having a more profound impact. Considering 
these challenges for reversing South Africa’s declining environmental conditions now, 
the following section examines how the country’s historical development laid the 
foundation for what we see today. That this research is focused on gold mining as a 
factor relating to the governance of the environment in South Africa, the remainder of 
this chapter looks specifically at this aspect.        
  
3.5 The History of Mining in South Africa 
 
3.5.1 Establishing an industrial society  
 
The fact that today the Witwatersrand is a hub of industrial activity and economic 
stimulus can almost exclusively be attributed to the discovery of gold in the area in the 
late 1800’s (Bond, 2002). This discovery saw the establishment of several mining 
houses in the area. Rather than just being operators of mines, the established mining 
houses have been described as “facilitators of mining, bringing together the acquisition 
of mining rights, operation and management, and… the international finance required 
for the capital-intensive mining of the …deep gold deposits on the Witwatersrand” 
(Hamann and Bezuidenhout, 2007). In these terms, the early industrialization of South 
Africa, as a product of the discovery of mineral wealth, has a seemingly generic 
storyline. However, the socio-historical conditions under which this process took place 
have far reaching implications for the subsequent environmental crisis facing the 
country today. Expanding on them is thus necessary in order to gain a greater 
appreciation and understanding of the challenges involved in dealing with such a crisis.  
 
In the context of South Africa, the gold mining industry has been described as the 
representation of imperial capitalism (Hallowes and Munnik, 2006). It is widely agreed 
that the emergence of the mining industry was inextricably linked to both early colonial 
rule and subsequent the apartheid regime and even regarded as the blueprint for the 
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formation of the regime itself2 (Hamann and Bezuidenhout, 2007; TRC, 2003). The 
mining of gold on the Witwatersrand began as a simple extractive process during British 
colonial occupation, whereby all profits were claimed by the European superpower 
(Adler, et al, 2007). The consequent demise of colonial rule as a result of the 1948 
Afrikaner National Party victory signalled an obvious change in policy. This change took 
the form of the mining industry and its profits being treated as national assets for the 
benefit of South Africa (Turton, 2009). In essence, this meant the merging of 
entrepreneurial and profit interests of the large mining houses and the state (Adler, et al, 
2007). It is thus unsurprising that not only did the government allow the industry a 
privileged position of power, but its activities were not based on any notions of 
environmental concern. Instead, “the early gold-economy was simply an extractive 
industry with little consideration given to possibly adverse long-term effects” (Adler, et 
al, 2007, p.33). This pattern characterises the relationship between the environment and 
the mining industry in South Africa between the time gold was initially discovered right 
up until the late days of apartheid rule.         
 
3.5.2 Mining and the Environment on the West Rand 
 
The Witwatersrand gold deposits are divided amongst three basins, namely the 
Western, Central and Eastern basins. Collectively they form what is known as the 
Witwatersrand Supergroup, which extends in an east-west direction over a length of 
some 45km (Naicker, Cukrowska and McCarthy, 2002). Gold was first discovered in the 
area in 1886, with West Rand Consolidated established just one year later (Coetzee, et 
al, 2006). Thus, the Western Basin mining area is home to some of the oldest mining 
activity in South Africa, all of which were conducted under the same principle of ‘simple 
extraction’.  
 
The disregard for long-term costs of environmental impacts of mining is relatively 
consistent with all historical mining operations in South Africa. However, three unique 
features of the geophysical area of the Witwatersrand compound the local 
                                                 
2 Initially, during the first few decades after the discovery of gold, began what was a struggle to profit from 
the largest gold reserve. This was in the form of the Anglo Boer War between the content farmers of the 
Boer republic and the wealth seeking British foreigners (Turton, et al, 2006). The establishment of the 
Union of South Africa in 1910 represented both the victory of British invasion and the emergence of a 
racially defined industrial class system which would later become institutionalized in the form of apartheid.      
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environmental impacts of mining. These include: water-bearing dolomite which lies 
above some of the gold reefs (Coetzee, 2006); the presence of uranium (Cobbing, 
2008) and the fact that the reefs lie on the Atlantic Ocean/Indian Ocean watershed 
(Swart, et al, 2003). Additionally, the impoundment of mine tailings (mine waste dumps) 
on land was the preferred option of ‘disposal’ on the Witwatersrand (Oelofse, et al, 
2007).   
 
In order to get to the deeper gold-bearing reefs it was necessary to dewater the 
underground dolomite compartments. The means to do this was only acquired some 40 
years after the initial discovery of gold in the area, which then subsequently led to the 
establishment of additional mines in the 1930’s (Coetzee, et al, 2006). With the 
development of efficient pumps and other dewatering technology gold mining quickly 
flourished to the point that up until 1998 a further 18 mines (extracting both gold and 
uranium) were opened (Cobbing, 2008; Coetzee, et al, 2006).  
 
Unfortunately, the combined effects of dewatering, the presence of uranium, exposed 
mine tailings and the location atop a watershed would come to have a pronounced 
influence on the environmental impact of mining, both in the area and beyond. Firstly, 
the act of dewatering had several influences on the surrounding environment, most 
significantly, the lowering of the water table and compromised ground stability, often 
resulting in sinkhole formations (Adler, et al, 2007). Secondly, the presence of uranium 
means that the subsequent AMD decant has a radioactive component (Coetzee, et al, 
2006). The exposed mine tailing add to this AMD (at both the surface and groundwater 
level) through run-off and underground seepage. Finally, that mining operations are 
spread on and around the watershed means that the now chemically toxic and 
radioactive AMD decant pollutes not one but two of South Africa’s major rivers: the 
Atlantic draining Orange river and the Indian draining Limpopo river.  
 
Surprisingly, some of the impacts of mining in the area became noticeable as early as 
1905, when farmers complained about changes in water quantity and quality (Adler, et 
al., 2007). However, it was only in the 1950’s when environmental issues relating to 
mining activity became a topic of debate between stakeholders in and around the West 
Rand (Van Eeden, 2008). For the first time since mining began in the area the effects of 
certain mining practices were deemed necessary to investigate. On the one hand, the 
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focus was around the support of geological and geographical research in order to better 
grasp the richness of the country for mining (Van Eeden, 2008) and on the other, 
research was based on a cost-benefit analysis of dewatering the underground dolomites 
(Jordaan, et al., 1960, as cited in Adler, et al., 2007).  
 
However, far from 21st century environmental perspectives, the reasons behind this 
apparent change in mind-set were primarily economic (Van Eeden, 2008). The 
significance of the political environment at the time is an extremely important driver 
behind this one-sided approach. The ruling National Party, which had seized power 
from British rule in 1948, was beginning to experience a legitimacy crisis in the form of 
anti-apartheid protest marches. Such opposition began to arise strongly due to the 
country’s immanent emancipation from British colonial rule in 1961 and consequently 
this transitional period resulted in certain political instability. In order to re-establish its 
hegemonic rule, the apartheid government not only banned various black liberation 
movements, but installed a policy of rapid growth characterised by a strong 
collaboration between state and industry (Turton, 2009).           
 
Unsurprisingly, the entrenched and self-serving principle of ‘simple extraction’ was 
deemed most appropriate. The scientifically self-validating claim that the benefits from 
mineral extraction, despite its environmental impacts, which it must be noted were 
known at the time, meant that mining was favoured over the interests of surrounding 
farmers (Adler, et al 2007). Interestingly, this is reflective of the strong modernist 
principles which are said to have dominated society at the time. In particular, we see 
evidence supporting the idea that society was dominated by a faith in economic 
progress and the complementary role of science, whereby a reductive quantitative 
approach was deemed sufficient in capturing the full reality of the situation (Stirling, 
2003). In this case, the flaw in the approach is exemplified by the fact that farmers 
suffered extensive losses in production. This is specifically because the dewatering 
meant the drying up of otherwise productive natural springs and surrounding water 
sources which were essential for all forms of agriculture. What is thus clear here is the 
overarching power of the combined interests of the state and the mining industry which 
was put into practice. 
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Nonetheless, from an institutional perspective, there were various attempts by the 
government to legitimate their position by introducing certain Acts and laws relating to 
the use of the environment. Of particular relevance is the Water Act (no. 56 of 1956) 
“which replaced all previous water-related acts of parliament (and)… made provision for 
direct state control over areas in which water was abstracted, supplied or distributed” 
(Tempelhoff, 2006, p.451). This meant government was wholly responsible for the 
distribution of water to those who were legally entitled and how this water was used. In 
special reference to mining and water use, it was stipulated in the Act that all mines 
were required to have a permit to discharge pumped underground water beyond their 
boundaries (Van Eeden, 2006).  
 
During this time legislation pertaining to the environment itself remained ‘archaic’ or 
completely absent. In which case, it could be argued, that the true meaning behind the 
reference to mining activity in the Water Act was substantially different to what it 
seemingly implies when read today. Furthermore, that such regulations were not strictly 
enforced did not help either. Highlighted here is the fact that the government’s policy 
trajectory of the time was geared towards rapid economic growth, with water simply 
being used a strategic resource (Turton, 2009). Despite a growing global shift in 
environmental awareness later in the 1970s, largely institutionalised by the United 
Nations Stockholm conference on environmental protection, government’s perspective 
on the environmental situation on the West Rand did not change significantly (Van 
Eeden, 2008). Thus, government essentially left the mining industry to self-regulate, 
while continuing to support and benefit from the increasingly unsustainable, yet highly 
lucrative extractive processes (Adler, et al., 2007).  
 
3.5.3 Democracy and the Emergence of the Environment as a Subject of Politics 
 
In terms of the migrant labour system alone, which placed black communities in 
inhospitable areas in proximity to the mines, the mining industry was an integral part of 
the apartheid regime (Hamann, 2004). As the anti-apartheid movement gained 
momentum in the 1970s, issues such as this became increasingly recognised and were 
incorporated in the struggle under the banner of the ‘environmental justice movement’. 
Its precise contribution to the apartheid struggle was in bringing issues of inequality in 
spatial location and social marginalization to the heart of the debate (Ruiters, 2002).  
 59
On the other hand, the environment itself and the effect that years of externalising 
costs, in the form of pollution, had on society and the environment remained completely 
ignored. Where the concept environmental responsibility did exist, it remained tied to 
nature conservation and devoid of social content (Bezuidenhout, Fig, Hamman and 
Omar, 2007). However, as the apartheid regime reached its overdue demise, the costs 
of industrialisation in particular became increasingly noted (Hallowes and Munnik, 
2006). Consequently, from the mid-1990s the definition of the environment was 
broadened to include the direct ecological impacts of industry and the working and living 
space of black South Africans (McDonald, 2002). Additionally, the advent of democracy 
in 1994 signalled a weakening between the mining industry and government and hope 
for a rights oriented approach to past environmental mismanagement. In order to 
administer the progressive National Water and Environmental Management Acts 
(discussed above), three National Ministries were each tasked in some way to address 
the environmental sustainability challenge (Van Eeden, 2008). These included the 
Department of Environment and Tourism (DEAT), the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) and the Department of Mineral and Energy (DME)3.  
 
The extended environmental discourse that followed apartheid was largely attributable 
to the space that the political reform process opened up for progressive civil society 
organisations and policy entrepreneurs (Turton, 2009). Most significantly, the 
enlightened sense of combined social and ecological awareness that was engendered 
during this period saw a new wave of NGOs and civil society organisations challenging 
industrial environmental malpractices in significant ways (Bezuidenhout, et al., 2007). In 
the early stage of reform (1994-97) the crafting of environmental legislation (NEMA) and 
similar policy-making processes were characterised by government consultation with 
NGOs and transparent multi-sectoral input (Bezuidenhout, et al., 2007). Additionally, 
during this time South Africa’s capital markets were also gradually being re-integrated 
into the international economy, which meant the mining houses experienced increasing 
pressure to adapt to international standards (Hamman, 2004). This pressure from 
abroad, in terms of environmental responsibility pertaining to the mining industry, was 
largely driven by two factors. Firstly, the fact that most large mining companies were 
                                                 
3 As a need for greater and more efficient environmental regulation, two government-related sub-bodies 
were formed to ensure a stricter regulatory environment, namely the Enforcement Directorate (also 
known as the Green Scorpions) and the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) (Van Eeden, 2008). Their 
effectives, like that of the state departments is also questionable.   
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listed on the main stock exchanges had significant implications for local operating 
policies relating to corporate social and environmental responsibility (Hamann, 2005). 
This in turn was driven by the firm embedding of the sustainable development narrative 
in both the public and private sector which was occurring mainly in the developed world, 
but also filtering down to the developing world (Esty, 2008).  
 
Thus, for the mining industry the combined local and international pressures meant that 
aligning itself with more progressive and holistic codes of business practice was an 
unavoidable task. Due to its symbolic and rhetorical power the sustainable development 
narrative was the mechanism most widely employed (Hamman and Bezuidenhout, 
2007). Specifically, this was done in the form of sustainability reporting, characterised 
by both environmental and social disclosure and has been evolving over the past two 
decades (Dunbavan, 2005). The incorporation of sustainable development into business 
practice is seen to include, as a primary ethical responsibility, “research and 
development leading towards better methods to harness our natural resources with 
minimal impacts on the environment” (Rajaram, Dutta and Parameswaran, 2005).  
 
Further demonstrative of the rhetorical power of the sustainable development discourse 
and of a greater appreciation of the social and environmental components linked to 
development in general, is the fact that at the institutional level the concept was also 
given formal status within the 1996 constitution (Bezuidenhout, et al., 2007). 
Consequently, both the Environmental Management Act (107 of 1998) and National 
Water Act (36 of 1998) gave “a degree of legislative effect to the concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ in keeping with the discourse of ecological modernisation” (Bond and 
Stein, 2000, p.1).       
 
3.5.4 Limits Environmental Concern   
   
The early years of post-apartheid reform and decision-making were evidently 
progressive, inclusive and somewhat balanced. Although the environment in the 
ecological sense remained in the background, there was still space for optimism due to 
the progressive civil society and sustainable development influences on policy-making. 
The idealist-type institution of democracy that emerged in the early stages, “framed by a 
liberal and ‘rights rich’ constitution… (and) greater political freedom” (Hallowes and 
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Munnik, 2006, p.112), certainly boosted such optimism for a more serious 
environmental approach.  
 
However, with the influence of capital and industry, the ‘liberal and rights rich’ narrative 
was transformed to one that was more suitable to their desires. From 1996 there was a 
discernible shift in discourse, marked by a greater commitment to neo-liberalism and the 
private sector (Bezuidenhout, et al, 2007). This was made apparent via the introduction 
of GEAR, which replaced the original RDP approach. Notably, “GEAR foresaw more 
privatization, deregulation and trade liberalization… was formulated under World Bank 
influence and implemented without any public debate” (Fig, 2005, p.600). At the same 
time however, state involvement and influence did place obligations and expectation on 
industry. This came primarily in the form of the Mines Health and Safety Act (Act 29 of 
1996), promoting greater safety measures and the more significant MRPDA (Act 28 of 
2002). The latter was aimed at promoting a new mining dispensation whereby State 
sovereignty over mineral resources was proclaimed and all companies were required to 
renew their licences (Hamann, 2004).  
 
The positive aspect of such post-apartheid developments meant that the mining 
companies were no longer a law unto themselves. Rather, they became integrated into 
the overall development strategy of the country. This is specifically reflected in the 
resulting broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter for the South African 
mining industry (Hamann, 2004). Unfortunately, as for the promotion of improved 
environmental practices, this was left in the hands of a new and therefore legally and 
administratively weak Department of Environmental Affairs. Furthermore, sustainable 
development rhetoric and self-regulation of industry offered little hope of seeing 
transformations in environmental management practices to the same extent that there 
were positive socio-economic transformations. In some respects it could be argued that 
what was previously a weak state environmental regulatory system was substituted for 
a discourse (sustainable development) that “in official and business circles, seems 
indistinguishable from classic modernisation narratives, with the added business 
imperative of good neighbourliness” (Bezuidenhout, et al., 2007, p.42). Thus it seems 
that having been driven by a strong political culture that never had a core ethic of 
human or environmental rights (Liefferink, 2008), the mining industry has never had any 
business reason to change its tact.              
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Under these conditions, the terms ‘corporate environmental responsibility’ or 
‘sustainability’ undoubtedly lost a great deal of the initial inspiration they engendered for 
change. Such rhetoric consequently has become the feature of much criticism, often 
regarded as an attempt to create more positive corporate images while ignoring the 
fundamental questions of environmental compliance, legacy and ethical responsibility 
(Bezuidenhout, et al, 2007; Fig, 2005). Thus, it is evident that the internalisation of 
better environmental management practices, despite being sorely needed to overcome 
the damage of the past (Bezuidenhout, et al, 2007), cannot be independently relied 
upon by companies themselves (Hamann, 2004). What becomes clear here is that 
during the unstable early post-apartheid years, there were indeed attempts (both 
sincere and not) to move towards incorporating environmental issues into broader 
governance frameworks. However, overshadowing all such efforts was the persistent 
desire for capital generation via exploitative resource extraction. Consequently, in 
remaining consistent to the patterns of the past, up to today, the various government 
bodies (i.e. DEAT; DWA) have still not managed to show any signs of progress towards 
changing institutional continuity or addressing past injustices. Rather, they often come 
up against a more politically supported discourse coming from the DME.  
 
Not to completely discredit steps taken towards environmental reform, over the last ten 
years combined government and industry efforts have included implementing more 
effective environmental management plans (EMP’s), ensuring the availability of 
rehabilitation funds, reworking licensing agreements and initiating forums for 
stakeholder participation (Van Eeden, 2008). Still, with the aim of addressing the West 
Rand’s mining issues, all of these initiatives have been relatively ineffective at 
engendering fundamental change. Instead, a more striking feature of the dynamics of 
the processes aimed at addressing the environmental problems facing the West Rand is 
the conflict and mistrust between stakeholders. This can largely be understood to be as 
a result of the financially-related secrecy through which the area was co-managed by 
the state and industry, misleading the public “about the nature of the environmental and 
other pollution to which they were and still are victims” (Van Eeden, 2006, p.428).               
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3.5.5 Rudiments of Change   
 
South Africa faces many challenges in terms of achieving a greater degree of 
environmental sustainability and social equality. This is particularly true for the mining 
industry. However, despite the bleak outlook painted above, there are signs of positive 
change. The underlying elements and possibilities for such change, particularly as it 
relates to environmental governance, stem from what is in fact already in writing. Within 
the Constitution of South Africa, chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights explicitly highlights the 
following in relation to the environment and water: 
 
24. Everyone has the right- 
  
a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being 
b) to have the environment protect, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that- 
i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation 
ii) promote conservation; and 
iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and the use f natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development 
 
27. Everyone has the right to have access to- 
 
a) … 
b) Sufficient food and water 
c) … 
 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
 
Unfortunately, to date these statements have not been fully, or even partially, realised. 
To a large extent the same discursive continuity that was apparent during the early days 
of mineral extraction still exists today. Indeed, as Rinkevicius (2000) notes, the 
hierarchy of a society’s values and priorities is not susceptible to rapid changes. So, 
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while democracy may have allowed for fundamental changes in terms of racial equality, 
such progressive thought has not had the desired affect on how the environment is 
managed. This remains true even in the face of growing environmental pollution, 
degradation and health risks. On the one hand, this could be said to be unsurprising. In-
line with Beck’s (1992) perspective as to how society evolves into a risk society, it 
seems plausible that a policy of ‘wealth (re)distribution’ will continue to overshadow any 
concern for the environment, so long as economic development is conceived of as the 
country’s overarching ‘problem’ (or rather as the optimal development strategy). 
However, on the other hand, this is also an overly realist view, one which even implies 
that South Africa shows no signs of progressing into late-modernity. In other words, to 
take that view is to say that all spheres of South African society remain tied to the notion 
that the environment is separate to society and its destruction has nothing to do with 
issues of socio-economic inequality or development. 
  
Yes, it is true that South Africa remains dominated by a political agenda of wealth 
distribution (and accumulation) and development based on economic growth. However, 
as the country’s socio-economic woes and growing environmental risks are increasingly 
attributed to this approach, what we are beginning to see is a mounting tension (Ndayi, 
2009; Turton, 2009). From what was explained in the previous chapter, late-modern 
societies are more open to the idea that the environment is not external to society but 
inextricably part of it. It is thought that in those societies experiencing ‘changing 
structures of modernity’, environmental debates are now atleast as significant as 
matters of social and material inequality (Irwin, 2001). Can the same be said about 
South Africa? Certainly there is emerging evidence of this as not only is concern for the 
environment per se is entering the political agenda, but poor environmental conditions 
are becoming understood as inseparable to those of socio-economic inequality. The 
prime example is that of mining. Following democracy, the route to solving inequality 
was narrow, consisting of the legal requirement outlined in the BEE approach which 
allowed for the accommodation of blacks into the corporate ranks (Fig, 2005). As the 
environment continues to be put under threat though, it is becoming clear that 
addressing inequality is also a matter or addressing environmental problems and taking 
a more holistic approach to development (Kotze, 2006; Fig, 2005). The key driving force 
behind this emerging discourse comes not from the polity, but rather the grass-roots 
level. NGOs and civil society are the chief advocates forcing environmental issues into 
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the socio-economic development debate. Here we can begin to imagine a rising social 
undercurrent, with the aim of seeing the institutionalisation of more a progressive 
developmental discourse.  
 
The truth behind the fact that today there is growing unrest and reactivity relating to the 
current institutional structures is also evident in the numerous examples of failed state 
activities, such as the power crisis and poor service delivery. These serve as a 
demonstration of the overall performance crisis that the public sector entered, especially 
but not only at the local and regional level (Habib, 2009). Here we see some truth in 
what Simon (2003, p.22) describes as “the potential for conflict between the provisions 
of the progressive National Water Act and NEMA and the Bill of Rights…and the 
increasingly neoliberal thrust of national policy”. More appropriately and evident 
however, within the mining sector, this ‘unrest’ has been theorised by Turton (2009) as 
a tension between two competing policy perspectives (figure 3.1). On the one hand, 
there continues to exist what has been the traditional policy perspective of ‘simple 
extraction’ (i.e. externalisation of costs to the environment and society). On the other, 
there is also an emerging a policy perspective of constitutional protection and changing 
governance architecture. This is based on a growing dissatisfaction with current 
transformation efforts and a desire within civil society for a development strategy that 
does indeed address historic inequality by means of redistribution (Turton, 2009). In this 
way, we can say that state capacity and legal and administrative challenges are to a 
large degree the catalyst behind such tension and not exclusively the neo-liberal 
economic policy.       
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Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of the evolution of mining policy from beginning of 
mineral extraction (1886) to present (2009). (Adapted from Turton, 2009)  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
From the above, it is evident that an emerging tension is developing between two 
divergent political perspectives relating to the mining industry. Specifically, this tension 
 
 
 
Democracy 
(1994 – Present) 
Changing 
Governance 
Architecture 
Constitutional 
Protection via 
Bill of Rights
Pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
of
 C
on
st
itu
tio
na
l 
Hu
ma
n r
igh
ts f
ocu
s w
ithi
n a
 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n
Policy 
Paradigm of 
wealth 
redistribution 
Unresolved policy 
tension revolving 
around Policy Perspective 
of ‘Simple Extraction’ 
and  Perspective of 
Constitutional Protection  
 67
is seen to be characterized on the one hand by a continued ‘simple extractive’ 
approach, geared exclusively towards economic growth. On the other hand, there is the 
less entrenched, yet relevant perspective calling for greater environmental sustainability 
and the realisation of Constitutional rights. Forming part of the argument concerning this 
research then is that the AMD risk is increasingly becoming a driving force behind this 
tension.  As a socially pervasive and ‘non-discriminating’ force (Beck, 1992), risk is a 
common issue for both sides of the debate (albeit in different ways). It then becomes a 
question of establishing consensus on the risk itself and finding a (democratic) solution. 
This is where the major challenge seems to lie, because unlike the early gold-mining 
economy, there is now also government and industry acknowledgment of the problem 
and not exclusively claims from civil society. The issue now is how to effectively 
combine all necessary interests (environmental, economic and social). From the 
perspective of this research, how the risk of AMD and its management is influenced by, 
and influences, the context in which it arises is pertinent to the understanding and 
explaining the risk as more than just an objective problem facing society. More 
specifically, it is argued here that the competing policy perspective for rights-based 
change can to some extent be characterised by the increasing prevalence of 
environmental risks.  
 
The environmental and water threat posed by AMD on the West Rand of Gauteng is 
thus analysed from the perspective that it forms part of the larger development debate 
taking place in South Africa today. Emphasis is placed on the possibility of a changing 
role for the ‘stakeholder dimension’ to help encourage a more balance approach to 
development. Having provided both a theoretical grounding in the concept of risk 
(chapter 2) and the socio-historical and political background to the AMD risk itself, the 
next section analyses how the two relate. In particular, Beck’s risk society theory is 
employed as a means of generating insight into the issues at stake concerning the 
management of the risk. Placing the findings from field research undertaken within the 
theoretical constructs of the risk society theory, it is hoped that novel and valuable 
insights will be gained into a problem that has the potential to cripple South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 4 – DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The idea that acid mine drainage currently decanting from the West Rand mining basin 
poses a threat to both the environment and humans is undisputed. Yet, at the same 
time it is still an issue that has, and continues to, engender contestation among 
stakeholders. Described as an “emotional” and “sensitive” issue, the environmental risk 
of AMD is to a large extent the epitome of those risks which are characteristically 
prevalent in a ‘risk society’. As a result, the social and political dynamics that have been 
set in motion are demonstrative of a risk society itself- a society unable to (physically 
and institutionally) manage and control the negative ‘side-effects’ of its process of 
modernisation. In an emergent sense, we are thus witnessing in South Africa a society 
necessarily having to shift away from any preconceptions of certainty and control. 
Describing the social and political dynamics that AMD has affected and examining the 
challenges that the conditions of the ‘risk society’ pose for dealing with the problem and 
finding an effective solution are the focus of this discussion. Part one describes the 
construction of AMD as a risk and the socially destabilising effects in relation to the risk 
society thesis. Analysing the risk of AMD in the context of South Africa using the 
framework of the risk society thesis presents a highly unique and compelling 
perspective of what the issue actually means for the country at large. Applying what has 
become a timely and distinguished social theory in this unexplored context therefore 
presents the opportunity to enrich the theoretical insight. Importantly, risk society is the 
examination of the transition from industrial society to reflexive modernization (Beck, 
1992). Having existed for over seven years, one can therefore expect certain reactive 
and pro-active developments to have taken place in an attempt to solve and mitigate the 
risk. Therefore this chapter also discusses those developments in terms of the process 
of governance and decision-making and the challenges faced. Explaining what they 
represent for how the situation is currently being dealt with and for what the future may 
hold for both the governance of AMD on the Witwatersrand and the institution of 
environmental governance in South Africa more broadly is the focus of the second part.   
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4.2 The Social Construction of AMD as a Risk 
 
The question concerning this section is to what extent the risk posed by AMD on the 
West Rand has led to a situation reminiscent of Beck’s risk society. The key themes 
from risk society that inform this analysis are: organized irresponsibility, the challenges 
for science in dealing with risk and the emergence of subpolitics. An overarching theme 
in risk society and arguably its main objective is to bring to the fore the social 
significance of risk concerns. Thus, for the first part of this discussion it is necessary to 
analyse how the risk of AMD has been socially constructed. I am in agreement with the 
view that “environmental issues… only become socially relevant when acknowledged by 
human beings” (Hogenboom, et al, 2000, p.93). Therefore, it is important to define the 
various social actors and groups which have transformed the risk into one which is 
socially relevant and thus given public meaning to it. Table 1 (below) corresponds with 
those actors and groups who are involved in the problem on the West Rand with what 
Hannigan (2000) lists as ‘the six conditions required for the construction of an 
environmental risk’. Essentially, these actors and stakeholders and their interaction are 
what give social meaning to the risk posed by AMD. Emerging from this collection of 
divergent views is an ongoing political debate, overwhelmed by conflict relating to both 
the significance of the risk and to finding a solution. These views are characterised by 
those actors who give scientific meaning to the problem (WRC; CGS; CSIR), social 
meaning (Mariette Liefferink and FSE), economic meaning (WUC) and political meaning 
(DWA).   
 
Condition Represented by 
1. Scientific authority for and 
validation of claims 
Water Research Commission (WRC), 
Council for Geosciences (CGS), 
Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) 
2. Existence of ‘popularisers’ who 
can bridge environmentalism 
and science  
Mariette Liefferink   
3. Media attention in which the 
problem is ‘framed’ as novel 
Numerous media reports on the 
problem have featured in newspapers 
 70
and important (the Star, the Beeld, the Sunday 
Times, Mail and Guardian), 
magazines (Financial Mail, Mining 
Weekly), radio (702), television 
(50/50, eTV news, Carte Blanche) 
4. Dramatisation of the problem 
in symbolic and visual terms 
Often cited dramatically as a threat to 
South Africa’s water supply and 
resources in the media (e.g. “A rising 
acid tide in South Africa” Mail and 
Guardian, 2005; “Where poison water 
seeps from the earth” – Saturday 
Star, 2010) 
5. Economic and political 
incentives for taking positive 
action 
WUC as the primary private sector 
investor seeking to implement a 
profit-generating solution. As the 
custodian of SA’s water resources, 
the DWA has a political incentive (and 
responsibility) to take action.  
6. Emergence of an institutional 
sponsor who can ensure both 
legitimacy and continuity  
Federation for a Sustainable 
Environment (FSE) as the main NGO 
involved.  
 
Table 4.1: List of stakeholders directly and indirectly involved in the social construction 
of the AMD problem of the West Rand.  
 
Immediately evident here is the idea that when a risk becomes public discourse, as 
AMD has particularly since 2002, an exclusively natural-science based approach is not 
adequate. Such a singular outlook denies the important and legitimate dimensions of 
the problem which are grounded in social relations other parameters (e.g. political and 
institutional ideologies) (Hogenboom, et al, 2000). However, this is not to reject the 
important role that science has, and continues to play in addressing the problem. 
Rather, what needs to be emphasised is the importance of extra-institutional (i.e. non-
scientific, non-governmental and non-economic) actors for bringing the true nature of 
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the problem to the forefront of debate. In this case, the involvement of an NGO and 
‘popularisers’ such as Mariette Liefferink have proven to play the vital role of bringing 
the AMD problem out of an otherwise exclusively scientific framing. For a country like 
South Africa this is an extreme necessity, where the water pollution poses the greatest 
threat to numerous communities living nearby or downstream from the point of decant. 
These communities (many of which rely on the affected rivers and streams as their sole 
source of water) are some of the poorest and most vulnerable in society. Devoid of the 
efforts from Mariette and the NGO, it can be presumed that their interests would have 
either been significantly downplayed in the current risk agenda, or even altogether 
forgotten. Furthermore, characteristic of many stakeholders involved in environmental 
issues on a moral and ethical front, is that they often act as ‘whistleblowers’. In turn, and 
by virtue of their role as ‘promoters’ of the negative aspects of industrially-produced 
environmental problems, a dynamic relationship invariably develops between 
whistleblowers and the media. This results in the problem being brought to the public as 
a social risk. Indeed, the real meaning (i.e. socially relevant) of the AMD threat has 
been brought to the attention of the public since 2003, whereby numerous media 
publications have given extensive attention to the social character of the problem after 
having followed Mariette’s exploits. When asked about her role in the problem, it was 
almost unanimously agreed upon by the interviewees that she was both an important 
and significant part of the political debate. With regards to her role as someone helping 
to broaden the scope of the risk agenda and reveal the problem as being more than an 
isolated environmental threat, one respondent even stated that:  
 
“…in the case of the West Rand, it has come down to Mariette Liefferink, one person, 
it’s a one man band”  
(Dr Anthony Turton, scientist, private)  
 
It is thus fair to say that without her involvement and NGO support, the important social 
dimensions of the problem would not feature as prominently in the media, nor would 
AMD be the political nerve it is today. The role of non-traditional actors and the 
implications for the political dimensions of the AMD issue are discussed in more detail 
later. For now the point here is to highlight the fact that the AMD risk is by no means 
one which can be defined in scientific terms alone. Instead, it needs to be examined as 
one which is impossible to separate from society. From the above, one can begin to see 
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the truth behind this notion. Following any discussion regarding AMD it is almost 
impossible to avoid noticing how the issue of the ‘socio-structural’ (Irwin, 2001) state of 
South Africa also begins to emerge. More specifically, when debating the problem of 
AMD we see that it begins to reveal, and forms part of, a number of the country’s larger 
social problems. For example, the water crisis, socio-economic under-development and 
the marginalizing of the poor. Thus, what is made apparent is that an environmental risk 
is in fact merely part of the broader social context in which it is situated. A particular 
defining theme of many late-modern social theories (including that of risk society) is that 
the relationship between society and the environment becomes challenged. Where 
modern society is founded on the assumption that the environment is external to 
society, risk in late-modern society has the effect a destabilising such views. Indeed, we 
can see here that it is inescapable to think of mine-water pollution only in relation to the 
environment. Instead, because AMD is understood as a risk, when we talk about AMD 
we talk of society too… sometimes implicitly and other times explicitly. 
 
Ultimately, what is now clear is the fact that AMD is more than just a problem for the 
environment and more than just a problem about which science can reveal all. As a 
problem which also as yet has no clear solution, it has in reality become a fundamental 
institutional and political challenge. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of late-
modern social theory, what we see is that the risk of AMD is in fact a far more complex 
and challenging issue for society to deal with than may otherwise have been thought. 
For a country such as South Africa this is even more so given its socially ambivalent 
nature. Focusing directly on the theory of risk society now, the following sections 
elaborate on these points. Specifically, the aim is to reveal what the risk of AMD really 
means in the context of South Africa and in what way it is transforming the relationship 
of “society to the hazards and problems produced by it” (Beck, 1996, p.29). 
 
4.3 South Africa as a Risk Society?  
 
Risk society is defined as the stage of development in modern societies when the 
consequences of the technological innovation and industrial expansion which defined 
those societies begin to emerge more explicitly. That is, they begin to become 
understood as risks which threaten the very existence of society. This advent 
transforms what were previously defined as modern societies into risk societies. 
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Following the line of thought that modern societies are becoming late-modern societies, 
here risk is seen to embody the principal mechanism forcing this transformation. 
Characteristic of the risk society is that they are witness to endless debates amongst 
both the public and private sphere concerning how to manage those manufactured 
threats. Key to Beck’s description of how modern societies become risk societies lies in 
what is described as a shift away from the “conflicts of a ‘wealth-distributing’ society” 
(Beck, 1992, p.20) and a move towards a society where the conflicts (politics) of a ‘risk-
distributing society’ dominate. The risks faced by society begin to have a huge bearing 
on the way society defines itself. In the context of South Africa this idea presents a very 
interesting point of departure, for it is a country described as an ‘emerging economy’ 
and one where wealth re-distribution informs its political economy. So the question to 
ask is when risks such as AMD begin to inform political debate at the highest level, does 
that same theoretical insight stand? Furthermore, risk societies are defined as those in 
which “awareness of large-scale hazards, risks and manufactured uncertainties sets off 
a dynamic of cultural and political change that undermines state bureaucracies, 
challenges the dominance of science and redraws the boundaries and battle-lines of 
contemporary politics” (Beck, 1998, p. 12). However, considering the political discourse 
and historical backdrop that the issue of AMD is set against, deeper analysis is required 
in order to accurately gauge what the conditions of risk society mean for dealing with 
the problem and more broadly the political system in South Africa. With reference to the 
theory of risk society, two questions are thus necessary to frame this analysis: 
 
a. What are the implications for the management of AMD in this context? 
   
b. In what way are certain social and institutional dynamics transforming in 
response to a risk which poses a threat to large part of the country’s water 
resources?  
 
Firstly, the problem of AMD is no doubt a parallel risk to those which inform a risk 
society. It follows quite uncannily with the description of the risks that Beck sees as 
demonstrative of late-modern (risk) societies. Specifically, risks in risk societies are 
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unlike risks in first modern societies4 which were essentially: visible; material in their 
consequences; insurable; limited in their scope of destruction; blame could be assigned 
and dependent on individual decisions. In contrast, the risk of AMD is the converse of 
these. It is invisible at it source; the consequences remain material only insofar as the 
immediate natural environment is concerned (health effects remain impossible to obtain 
consensus on); it is uninsurable; its scope of damage is indefinable, as its time-period; 
responsibility lies not only with the mines, but their predecessors and government and 
its predecessors, and finally, one cannot choose to avoid the risk of water pollution 
(particularly if it is in ones only source of drinking water).   
 
Despite this convenient fit however, a whole new situation develops when a risk of this 
dimension occurs within a society that remains divided along socio-economic contours 
and where a political ideology of economic growth and re-distribution are central. Beck 
himself acknowledges that contemporary societies indeed differ with regard to the 
overlaps of conflicts between the distribution of wealth and risk. For South Africa, the 
‘potentially devastating threat of AMD’, which is by now the well established public 
discourse, can thus be seen to help transform the country into what has previously been 
defined as a ‘double-risk’ society (Rinkevicius, 2000). Where the more ‘conventional’ 
modern societies reach a point where they reflect on their circumstances of risk, South 
Africa instead faces the difficult task of having to reflect on both its circumstances of 
socio-economic risk and environmental risk simultaneously. Undeniably, this ‘double-
risk’ character renders the political debate more complex. In particular, due to the 
conflict between the agendas of risk and economic growth, decision-making is that 
much more drawn out and finding a solution that much more difficult. It is thus 
unsurprising that a unique typology of risk society should emerge. Thus, the role of the 
following sub-sections is to now examine what exactly the social and political 
implications are in the case of the West Rand.                                        
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Beck does not deny the existence of such risks in industrial society. Rather the point is that due to their 
accumulation, late-modern societies are forced to become more aware of such risks. Accordingly, it is 
understood that one of the consequences of the modern approach to dealing with environmental risks in 
industrial society is that it had the effect of marginalizing those risks which where less visible and 
material. Again, this highlights the central notion that modern societies transform into late-modern (risk) 
societies as a result of those previously ignored consequences of industrial and economic growth.       
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4.3.1 Organized Irresponsibility  
 
The concept of ‘organized irresponsibility’ illustrates just how dealing with AMD 
transcends conventional institutional mechanism for obtaining compensation and 
assigning responsibility. The concept of ‘organized irresponsibility’ is explained by Beck 
(1998) as the idea that in risk societies there exists paradoxically continued 
environmental degradation and expanding environmental law and regulation. Yet at the 
same time, no individual or institution seems to be held accountable for anything. In the 
case of AMD, legal enforcement of environmental management standards and more 
specifically water quality standards cannot be placed on the mines alone. This is 
because AMD is a problem which is the culmination of over one hundred years of 
underground mining. Therefore, those companies which created the underground shafts 
(which are responsible for the decant) cannot be held accountable for the obvious 
reason that they are no longer in existence5. Adding further complexity to the situation is 
the fact that all the current mining operations on the West Rand do not even mine 
underground. Yet, there still needs to be some accountability, particularly financially if 
the risk is to be managed.  
 
This raises one of the central arguments around which the current political debate is 
evolving: how to assign responsibility. In this way, the problem of AMD as an historical 
problem relating to past irresponsibility from both industry and government transcends 
the ability of any type of environmental management strategy. Rectifying that is thus 
one of the major struggles and essentially the foundation upon which the conflict of 
today is built on: 
 
“…it’s always challenging to quantify this stuff. Do you quantify it by mining rights, 
property rights, surface rights, as per who was responsible 20 or 30 years ago? It’s not 
that easy.” 
(Marius Keet, Regional Director, DWA) 
 
Currently, apportionment of liability has been ‘calculated’ in terms of the percentage of 
water that must be treated per relevant mining company relating to their total area 
                                                 
5 Since gold mining began in 1887, over 20 different mining companies have mined on the land from 
where the decant currently occurs.   
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footprint. Where no current mining operation is in existence, government has assumed 
responsibility. The percentages are as follows:     
 
 
• Rand Uranium: 46% 
• DRD Gold: 44% 
• Mintails: 0.8% 
• Government: 9.2% 
 
In the context of South Africa, the enforcement and process of assigning liability is also 
inextricably linked with the prevailing political environment. Where the (re)distribution of 
wealth (i.e. ‘goods’) is the focus of the political discourse, having to now bargain for the 
distribution of liability (i.e. distribution of ‘bads’) seemingly works against the current 
institutional arrangements. This demonstrates the changing pressures experienced by 
both the mining industry and government. Specifically, the public nature of the problem 
means that now industry interests and government policy can no longer operate under 
the assumption that their roles are to simply extend economic benefits to society. 
Instead, they are now forced to balance between contributing towards economic growth 
while equally managing the social and environmental risks generated by that very 
process.  
 
Risk society argues that during the stage of industrial society, environmental risks 
generated by industry were easily accepted as the necessary ‘side-effects’ for progress. 
By implication, the economic contribution would be assumed to neutralize and in fact 
override those risks. However, the advent of the AMD catastrophe has demonstrated 
the flaw in this logic- on top of posing a risk to society and the environment, AMD is now 
also considered a risk to the mining companies themselves: 
 
“At the moment we are doing what we can from a financial constraint. This mine does 
not make a profit, yet we are spending on cleaning of water because of our responsible 
citizen nature of managing the business. Should we stop pumping and close the mine, it 
becomes a government problem… If the gold price drops this mine will close and 
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overflowing will happen. Financial viability of the company is very important in the short 
term and therefore we can’t guarantee (economic or environmental) sustainability.” 
(Louis Kruger, Sustainability manager, Mintails)               
 
What we see illustrated here is the irony inherent in the debate regarding the distribution 
of responsibility. That is, that the risk AMD poses to society has been generated by the 
very same process which tries to alleviate socio-economic ills. Necessarily, the question 
society has to now ask itself is how might it be possible to realize a balance between 
environmental exploitation and environmental sustainability? While this is certainly not a 
new question, it does highlight a key theme of risk society. What we see is that it is 
becoming more and more apparent that balancing this equation is an impossible task 
given the current institutional (and ideological) apparatus at hand. Indeed, the AMD risk 
reveals the fact that the risks of risk society cause special problems for politics and 
decision-making because the truth is that “we no longer have the means of redressing 
the imbalances caused by risk” (Irwin, 2001, p.58). Subsequently, it can be inferred that 
a major implication of the AMD threat is that it reveals the fact that the current 
institutional logic of economic distribution and economic growth cannot, and should not, 
be expected to be capable of tackling the risk. Legal enforcement of responsibility 
relating to this unprecedented risk using the same framework for which wealth 
distribution is assigned is wholly inappropriate and a primary reason behind the political 
conflict.   
 
In addition though, it must also be explained that certain arrangements do exist in the 
mining industry and legislation with the aim of avoiding or mitigating such unforeseen 
problems. This comes in the form of a mandate requiring the mining company to set up 
what is called a rehabilitation trust fund. By law mining companies are obliged to put 
away money in order to be used at a later stage (usually following closure) for 
environmental rehabilitation. The MPRDA states that “an applicant for a prospecting 
right, mining right or mining permit must …before the minister approves the 
environmental management plan…make the prescribed financial provision for the 
rehabilitation or management of negative environmental impacts” (MPRDA, Act 28 of 
2002, section 41(1)). Indeed then, there are certain insurance-like mechanisms in place 
for dealing with future environmental issues. The unfortunate side is that “since most 
underground mining on the West Rand Goldfield ceased before the promulgation of 
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legislation requiring proper financial provision for closure it is unlikely that adequate 
funding is available for proper closure of the mines6.” (van Tonder and Coetzee, 2008). 
Considering this fact, it is difficult to argue against the efficacy of these types of modern 
institutional means for managing the environmental impacts. One cannot undermine this 
provision since it has not been implemented. Perhaps then, the context of the risk 
should be seen to play a large role in undermining the integrity of modern environmental 
management tools instead. This is an easier argument to make and one which would be 
compatible with many assumptions regarding the poor enforcement of regulations in 
South Africa. Here the status of South Africa as a developing country could be blamed 
for the unmanageable nature of the AMD risk. The risk society theory claims that risks 
such as that of AMD are unable to be negated by mechanism of modern institutions. In 
reply, one can instead say that the contextual nature of the risk and the poor 
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations on industry are to blame. 
Certainly, the view that capacity constraints for government do not allow them to 
forcefully and adequately ensure such measures are taken also resonates strongly with 
this argument.        
 
Nonetheless, a further argument in response to this is able to demonstrate that indeed 
the conventional instruments (rehabilitation funds, environmental management plans 
etc.), even if available or properly implemented, would have proven ineffectual. That is 
because in the case of AMD, while past financial input and proactive (as oppose to now 
reactive) measures certainly would have reduced the severity of the problem, it almost 
defies monetary value7. This is not to mention the socially irrelevant nature of such 
instruments either. Additionally, as the underground tunnels are the cause of the 
problem, no amount of environmental regulation would have sufficed. In other words, 
underground mining is almost synonymous with AMD- to mine gold one must dig 
underground. So, unlike other certain other environmental impacts of industry that may 
be more or less fully resolvable or avoidable, AMD is a problem to which no short-term 
remedy is available. Nor is it one which can be avoided. Therefore, what transpires is a 
problem that has to be managed almost indefinitely. Financial provisions would only 
                                                 
6 Proper funding for closure of the mines would include financial provisions for dealing with AMD, as this 
is one of the key environmental issues. 
7 It has been estimated that the cost to treat the AMD in the West Rand basin amounts to approximately 
R 28 800 000 per year (Liefferink, 2009). In no way would remediation funds have been able to cover this 
cost for any significant length of time.  
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contribute on a small (short-term) scale by temporarily covering pumping costs. 
Following the depletion of those funds, the political conflict and actual environmental 
problem currently being experienced would have simply occurred in the (near) future. 
The point is it still would have occurred. Also, in this case where industry has failed, the 
argument that government should therefore take matters into their own hands holds little 
promise: 
 
“Government can’t just go out there and embrace this stuff and say we are going to do 
something about it, because what do you do? No one actually knows what to do about 
it.” 
(Dr Anthony Turton, scientist, private)  
 
Again then, this paints the picture that South Africa indeed is in a situation of a risk 
society. The concept of organised irresponsibility helps demonstrate the nature of the 
problem as one which transcends any assumptions regarding the capabilities of the 
institutions of modern society. Specifically, it as illustrated the implications of a 
manufactured risk for the way in which modern institutions have sought to provide 
security. The following section now goes on to examine the implications for the 
institution of science. 
 
4.3.2 The Changing Role of Science 
 
An important implication of a risk society is that certainty can no longer be guaranteed. 
In the era of industrial society, it was taken for granted that the authority of science 
could guarantee certainty over the extent and meaning of environmental risk. Today, the 
contestation evident amongst scientific claims relating to the degree of water pollution in 
the West Rand and the explicit uncertainty expressed by scientists challenges these 
assumptions. In contrast, when the problem first arose, many scientific based-decisions 
were made in confidence of certainty. These have however since proven costly and 
inaccurate. Firstly, early remediation measures for dealing with AMD decant involved 
the pumping of the contaminated water into holding pond and dams (Cobbing, 2008). 
This was seen as a suitable short term measure. It later turned out to in fact be a short-
sighted measure, in that many of the dams were found to be situated on dolomite, 
meaning that a portion of the AMD water simply flowed back into the local groundwater 
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system. Another scientific error has since proved to be what is called the Environmental 
Critical Level (ECL). This term refers to the maximum level at which accumulated water 
in the mine void can reach before overflowing into the surface environment (van Tonder 
and Coetzee, 2008). It was initially assumed that if water was kept below this level via 
pumping, the contaminated water could be contained in the underground compartment 
in which it lay. Subsequent studies however, have indicated that even if water is kept 
below this level and not rise to the surface, it may still be able to penetrate the 
compartment’s rocky walls which are now thought to possibly be non-porous (Cobbong 
2008; van Tonder and Coetzee, 2008; Zorab, 2009). If this is the case, underground 
water sources in adjacent compartments will also have been contaminated by 
underground AMD which are otherwise unaffected by mining8.  
 
The key concern of scientific uncertainty is that it not only elicits further political conflict, 
but depending on where those claims come from it can have a significant effect on how 
the problem ends up being dealt with. The main fear is that uncertainty regarding the 
details of the risk could lead to complacency and inaction. To this end, the above 
illustrates that even if action is taken, the mistakes and uncertainty of science can prove 
costly, often adding to the risk. Additionally, there is also the threat that the solution or 
action decided upon is done so on the basis that it serves certain individual or group 
interests rather than the society at large. Again, dealing with the AMD problem is thus 
not only scientifically problematic, but politically problematic too. The next section 
specifically examines the role that science is playing in terms of finding a solution to 
AMD and the institutional challenges being encountered.     
 
4.3.2.1 Science as the ‘Only’ Solution 
 
Not only is scientific uncertainty a problem, but as there is also the danger regarding the 
normative assumptions of those scientific claims. The consequence of which has led to 
the AMD risk being treated by certain sectors as one where science is singularly 
assumed to constitute the vehicle through which a solution shall be found. Those who 
hold this position specifically believe the solution lies in WUC- the proposed water 
                                                 
8 One of the key concerns regarding contaminated underground water is that nearby springs will begin to 
produce polluted water. Furthermore, downstream the Cradle of Human Kind World Heritage Site would 
be receiving water which may threaten certain historically and archaeologically significant structures.   
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reclamation and treatment company. The fact that the project is in collaboration (albeit 
indirectly) with the mines raises several issues as to the objectivity of the project and 
therefore, science and technology. The main fear is that for a society faced with risk, 
science is used for the benefit of the mines, whereby they are able to forfeit any direct 
responsibility. What we see is that all possible solutions have come down on one level 
to science, and on another, to this single proposition. Relying on science alone for a 
solution and “putting all our eggs in one basket” as one respondent called it, poses 
other problems:  
 
1. Despite the perceived credibility of the project, concerns have been raised as to 
the quality of the treated water which will be sold for human consumption.  
2. What about the already contaminated water sources, degraded environment and 
possibly adversely affected communities?  
 
In response to the first issue, to be sure, although “the water will conform to the South 
African Bureau of Standards and quality checked by Rand Water” (Jaco Schoeman 
(WUC, managing director), quote from Rosebank Gazette, 2009), there is doubt over 
the ability of the technology to provide completely contaminant free drinking water: 
 
“No process removes 100% of the impurities in AMD 100% of the time”  
(Dr Anthony Turton, quote from Prinsloo, 2009) 
 
Interestingly, WUC themselves admit this same fact: 
 
“WUC’s treatment technology does not, by their own admission, remove 100% of the 
impurities from the AMD 100% of the time” 
(Noseweek, 2009) 
 
With this the case and considering that at the same time the water shall be treated to 
SABS standards, what comes in to question is the classical argument of ‘who is to 
determine the standards and what constitutes a risk?’ This is essentially then an issue 
of power. For if the project is accepted it will mean that science is not in fact acting as 
an objective tool in addressing the risk. Instead, by virtue of an institutional response 
based on the ‘out-dated’ assumptions of scientific certainty (which all water quality 
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standards necessarily rely on), it will mean that science has been used to serve the 
interests of some, while putting others in a different position of risk. On the one hand, 
mining interests are served as they no longer have to claim responsibly for the problem. 
This essential allows them to dodge the polluter-pays-principle, thus also revealing the 
ineffectiveness of modern environmental law in an age of risk. Also, WUC’s interests 
are served via the presupposed and institutionalized assumptions of science. In other 
words, by assuming an instrumental approach to decision making, the ethical 
considerations of the decision is ignored (Stirling, 2003) whereby they are able to profit 
from what is a selectively favourable solution. On the other hand, society at large is 
unwillingly put in a new position of risk in that their tap water may now contain trace 
elements of AMD. Indeed, this quote provides a perfect illustration of what has been 
outlined above and how science in the era of risk society is an inappropriate tool on its 
own: 
 
“WUC is a classic example of an optimal solution at the level of the mining sector. It 
optimises the solution for the mines, but it is a sub-optimal solution for others (i.e. 
society at large).” 
(Dr Anthony Turton, scientist, private) 
 
Ultimately, the danger here is that by giving into the idea that science is the only way 
out of the situation, it will result in society’s retreat from a risk society, rather than the 
advancement towards reflexive modernisation. In other words, if the WUC project is 
government endorsed, the circumstances of the risk society generated by AMD would 
have strengthened, rather than weakened the foundations of modernist assumptions. 
We would thus be witnessing the continuity of those same principles that brought us to 
this point of risk: “dangers are being produced by industries (mining), externalized by 
economics (WUC), individualised by the legal system (right to sell treated water), 
legitimized by the sciences (SABS approved) and made to appear harmless by politics 
(not 100% clean, yet meets the imposed quality standards)” (Beck, 1998, p. 14). 
However, the conundrum is that a solution is needed extremely urgently. So, on the one 
hand science cannot be completely sidelined, but nor can it used as the exclusive tool 
for guiding the direction of the debate. For risk societies this is one of the main 
institutional complexities- unquestionably relying on science and the experts, is now out 
of the question. Yet, who is to be relied upon and how does society reposition science 
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within an objective and democratic framework? This then is the challenge that the AMD 
risk poses for the institution of science and science-based decision-making.   
 
Indeed, science is vital for working towards a solution, but cannot be assumed to be the 
be-all-and-end-all. For if this is the case, it shows South Africa remaining within a 
narrow modernist framework. The consequence being that the solution will be 
suboptimal. In this example we see the exact opposite of what defines a ‘good 
governance approach’ (if the proposed WUC project is to be approved by government). 
Instead of a multi-disciplinary approach, what we will have is one that is dominated by 
science, and therefore dominated by certain interest groups. This brings us on to the 
next question concerning the already contaminated environment and communities that 
have been exposed to the risk for so long. While the technological solution may resolve 
the problem in the future, what about the already incurred ‘costs’?  
 
Beck claims that risk has the effect of levelling between classes and groups of society 
(Beck, 1998). This proposition however overlooks the massive socio-economic divides 
in developing countries. It is clear that the general response so far has been to solve the 
physical problem of AMD rather than integrate it into addressing other problems 
simultaneously. Essentially, AMD results from mine closure, which also implies job 
losses for the nearby communities, thereby compounding the socio-economic impacts 
of the risk (Oelofse, et al, 2008). Thus, a possible solution may be through job creation 
at the local community level. In this way, workers who face redundancy could be re-
employed on the basis of administering and managing the problem at site, thereby 
‘killing two birds with one stone’. However, such examples of an alternative solution are 
scarcely mentioned. Instead, it seems an unsustainable neo-corporatist approach 
continues to be favoured, arguably due to the potential benefits offered to those in 
power. In this way, it may be proposed that when developing countries face conditions 
of risk society, they may not as easily make the transition towards reflexive 
modernisation. Instead, they choose to remain tied to the assumption of linear economic 
progression, as oppose to appreciating the qualitative aspects of progress. Also, the 
fact that South Africa is still a young democracy means that risks such as these are 
often regard as threats to government legitimacy, rather than opportunities. A fear which 
is justifiable, given the fact that the ANC is facing mounting critique for its poor record 
relating to social and environmental justice (Simon, 2003).   
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Indeed, the economically and politically destabilising effect of AMD has struck fear into 
a number of South Africa’s already sensitive spheres of government. The possibility is 
therefore that the risk of AMD may be dealt with as problem which threatens the 
legitimacy of the polity, rather than one which threatens society at large. Indicative of 
this is that government’s initial response to the problem has been seen to be one of 
avoidance: 
 
“Since 2002… we argued that look, you have to get all these other people involved, but 
the state said no its got nothing to do with them, you the polluter…in 2005 they only 
issued a directive, so for three years it took them to think about it and then they said you 
three guys (three mining companies on the West Rand) get together and sort it out”  
(Rex Zorab, Sustainability manager, Rand Uranium) 
 
So, what we see here is a response where government has tried to hand the risk off to 
the nearest available party (the mining industry) in order to avoid further risk to their 
legitimacy, as they are well aware of the difficulties inherent in trying to manage the 
problem. The danger is that in contrast to risk having a levelling effect, it may in fact 
create more division. Firstly, if a purely scientific and technological response is followed, 
it would allow the mining industry to separate themselves further from the communities 
and environment already impacted. They will no longer be forced to get involved at the 
‘lower end’ as the political incentive to do so is undermined. Furthermore, should the 
WUC project go ahead, an elite interest will be benefiting financially from the risk while 
at the same time the conditions facing those already poor communities at location will 
remain largely unchanged. The pollution already in the environment will not simply 
disappear. There is thus the possibility that when a risk is handled from a narrow 
modernist framework, the inherent institutional power structures can in fact exacerbate 
certain social divisions. That is to say, while some are able to effectively distance 
themselves from the risk, other have no choice and end up facing exponential risk as 
the problem continues to go unresolved.  
 
Ultimately, what is most clear is that under these conditions of risk society, science is 
not the embodiment of objectivity. As Beck (1998) claims, the authority of science for 
perceiving risk breaks down and its function is thrown into question. However, in a 
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political environment still dominated by economic pursuits9, it should not be assumed 
outright that this means that science necessarily avails itself to more a democratic 
decision-making process. As the above suggests, there is also the acute chance that, in 
contexts where risk society is less explored, science may be cunningly used to re-
instate the legitimacy of those previous modes of enterprise that created the risk in the 
first place. Moreover, there also exists the fear that the pressing nature of the AMD 
threat could mean that science is turned to out of desperation, rather than exclusively as 
a means of serving interests. In this case, South Africa is unwillingly and unintentionally 
put on a path towards the possibility of a greater or new risk.  
 
To be sure, this critical analysis of science and its role in the politics of risk is mere 
speculation. The WUC project is still be negotiated and there is evidence both 
supporting the prospect of its approval and evidence suggesting otherwise. The point 
though is that this ambivalence resonates strong with the overall idea of risk society- the 
difficulty for modern institutions to makes decisions relating to risk. Specifically, that 
there is disagreement between industry and government on the project hints at the 
prospect of reflexive modernisation. Additionally, the involvement of civil society has 
shown to be an important force in revealing the rhetorical ruse used by certain parties in 
the scientific debate. However, the difficulties in knowing the problem and the policy 
difficulties posed by science in terms of a solution suggest there exists the equal danger 
of a shrinkage in democracy and creativity when it comes to addressing the problem. 
This is summed up by the fact that on the one hand the modern, scientific approach to 
risk is failing and on the other there seem to be no other solutions to an immanent 
disaster. The fear is that the decision-making institutions will succumb to science in its 
modern framework, thereby ignoring its social character. The reason for the 
inappropriateness of this approach is the fact that conditions of risk society demand 
more flexible structures and cautious decision-making (Benn, 2004). The current 
approach instead shows an over reliance on a centralized state-driven decision-making 
process as it pertains to science. In which case the polity risk getting caught in the 
mistakes, modes and uncertainties of scientific knowledge all over again (Beck, 1998).  
 
                                                 
9 …as oppose to those in traditional risk societies where economic pursuit is still a dominant agenda but 
less so for the purpose of addressing socio-economic inequalities. 
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Up to this point the concept of organised irresponsibility and the changing role of 
science have been discussed in isolation. As conditions of a risk society, both are 
important issues facing South Africa as it attempts to deal with the AMD threat. 
Essentially, both concepts have demonstrated the inability of modern institutions to 
cope with the risk crisis engendered by AMD: legal enforcement of environmental 
standards and regulation has failed to reduce the threat; economics has proved a 
hopeless solution via the apportionment of liability; government has shown to be 
incapable (and unwilling) to protect its citizens from environmentally related risks or to 
control those whose produce the risks; and science has proven sceptical at best in its 
ability to provide a clear-cut solution. While this is demonstrative of beck’s prophecy, 
evidence also suggests other implications of risk in the context of the West Rand. Most 
notably that a strong modernist approach to risk and environmental management can 
remain robust, despite obvious failings and inadequacies. However, as yet the larger 
political and social dynamics that this state of uncertainty and uncontrollability has 
engendered has not been covered. Talking of these institutional failures separately 
paints only half the picture. In reality, they are all simultaneously entangled within the 
melting pot that is environmental politics. Thus, the next section describes the broader 
political arena as it relates to the AMD risk. This arena is defined by the overarching 
concept of ‘subpolitics’. As the heart of risk society theory, it looks at the changing 
dynamics that take place between social actors in the face of these destabilising 
conditions of risk society. As is illustrated, this proves to be particularly important for 
addressing the many continuities in terms of traditional institutional approaches which 
the above has demonstrated. Specifically, the role of civil society is expanded upon as a 
way to initiate and manage change.         
   
4.3.3 Emergence of Environmental ‘Subpolitics’    
 
Beck proposes that under the conditions of risk society, traditional politics no longer 
holds. By virtue of the fact that even the dominant institutions are able only to simulate 
power in a risk society, the traditional political sphere proves itself to be ineffective for 
managing and distributing risk (Beck, 2000). The result of which is the emergence of a 
new and alternative form of political interaction- ‘subpolitics’. Here we see previously 
depoliticized areas of decision-making become politicized through the perception of risk. 
Beck specifically calls for these decision-making arenas to be “opened up to public 
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scrutiny and debate” (Beck, 1998, p.18). The concept of subpolitics then is perhaps the 
most fundamental theme in the risk society theory. So far, this discussion has 
exclusively analysed the destabilizing force of risk for modern institutions. Economics 
and the insurance logic are shown to be incapable of remedying the consequences of 
industry, while the previously unrecognized or hidden dangers of science have been 
made apparent. The emergence of subpolitics however, points not only to the unsettling 
and destabilizing implications of risk for modern institutions (as new debates are 
engendered), but also the possibility for change. Essentially, it is within the arena of 
subpolitics that we can begin to see modern society become reflexive- that is, 
concerned with its unintended consequences, risks and foundations (Beck, 1998).  
 
Specifically, in light of subpolitics being a catalyst for reflexivity and institutional change, 
the importance of the role played by ‘grassroots’ politics (NGO’s, activists, 
environmentalists) is strongly emphasised and highlighted in Beck’s work. In this way, 
subpolitics allows for the creation of a new force, driven by extra-institutional actors, for 
social control of the corporate sector and better implementation of government 
regulations (Matten, 2004). Furthermore, the inclusion of such actors represents an 
important catalyst for achieving a more democratic and socially relevant risk discourse. 
Indeed, the role played by non-government and non–mining institutions has had a 
significant effect on how the AMD problem has been brought to the public and how it 
has become institutionalized. However, apart from the importance of exploring civil 
society as a new political component, another seemingly relevant subpolitical dynamic 
also became apparent during the research process. That is, the changing relationship 
between government and the mining industry. The reason this can be seen as 
‘subpolitical’ rather than political, is that the advent of risk gave rise to new debates 
between the two institutions which necessarily occurred beyond the formal political 
boundaries. Thus, for the following discussion subpolitics is defined as the complex and 
changing interactions between government, the mining industry and civil society 
(NGO’s, activists and other non-governmental or industry related stakeholders, such a 
research groups and the media).  
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4.3.3.1 Subpolitics: Government and the Mining Industry   
 
In the theoretical framework of modern society, the relationship between government 
and industry can be conceptualized as one whereby the two are institutionally separate, 
yet at the same time mutually dependent. One the one hand, government acts as the 
‘defender of security’ and industry as the ‘producer of economic wealth’ (Beck, 1994). 
Here their roles are distinct and mediated by their respective institutional norms (Miller 
and Rose, 2008). On the other hand, both institutions operate under the same objective 
(economic progress) and necessarily rely on each other in this respect. However, in 
South Africa the historical relationship between government and the mining industry 
differs in certain respects to this more conventional perspective. From the time of British 
imperialism to more or less the end of apartheid, the relationship between the two 
institutions was one of mutual and exclusive economic benefit. Essentially, the political 
lines were blurred, particularly with regards to the apartheid regime, where it has been 
argued as having provided the blueprint for its establishment (TRC, 2003). In terms of 
environmental management, the mining industry, as the foundation of the political 
dictatorship, was subsequently able to ignore any such commitments and avoid any 
type of regulation. Although this relationship broke down in many respects as the 
apartheid era came to an end, there is still evidence of a certain continuity in terms of 
the industry’s avoidance of environmental regulations. To a large extent this spill over is 
seen in the legacy of actual environmental damage. However, more concerning is the 
almost explicit continuity in the way it is regulated from a legislative point of view and in 
the way it conducts its own operations. While the global change in discourse within the 
industry itself has added a positive dimension, the political and institutional dynamics 
within South Africa have stifled any possibilities for real change. By virtue of the 
embedded status quo favouring economic growth over stronger regulation and being 
able to hide behind sustainable development rhetoric, the existing power structures 
have served to exacerbate the production of environmental risk by the mining industry 
(Van Eeden, 2008).  
 
In light of this, it is thus unsurprising that the AMD problem was initially ignored despite 
various pre-emptive warnings:  
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“…what happened here was predicted in 1996. I was at the first forum meeting where it 
was announced by the mines. I was the person who discovered the decant from a 
borehole on the 27th of August 2002. I was the first person who went to the Gauteng 
legislator on the 20th of November 2000 before the decant started, trying to convince 
them that decisive actions and intervention needs to be taken to address a pending 
disaster. At that stage everyone was telling me that ‘no the decant will go towards the 
upper WFS, where there is a lot of wetlands and where they will deal with the problem’.”    
(Stephan Du Toit, Mogale City Municipality)  
 
Furthermore, it is also unsurprising that when it did happen, both government and 
industry were complacent in addressing the problem and unprepared for the political 
ramifications. Initiating the political conflict which followed was the fact that when AMD 
did begin to decant from underground, absolutely no management plans were in place 
(DME, 2008). In the period immediately following the decant not much attention was 
paid to the problem either. However, as it expanded in terms of broader social 
engagement and understanding of the severity and potential for further disaster, certain 
short-term strategies had to quickly be put into place. The risk society theory tells us 
that in this type of situation when risk becomes apparent, actions and decisions will still 
be taken on the basis of the old institutional patterns of industrial society. This certainly 
was the case and the following relevant strategies were turned to: 
 
 Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA’s)  
 Site monitoring via the government appointed ‘site monitoring task team’ 
 Individual water treatment plants and pumping systems employed by mining 
companies   
 
For the most part these were short-term interventions. Over time they have proved 
incapable of changing the risk profile of the AMD threat. For example, the complexity of 
the chemical and physical nature of the risk means that still today, the treated water 
being discharged into the Tweeloopies is nonetheless damaging to aquatic life (Kruger; 
Keet; Zorab; Van der Walt, interviews, 2009). As a result of the poor foresight and these 
subsequently ineffective reactive measures then, significant amounts of political conflict 
and confusion developed. On the one, hand this is seen to have occurred within and 
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between various government spheres. On the other, a different kind of tension resulted 
between government and the mining industry.  
 
Firstly, within government, confusion stemming from the novel character of the risk 
arguably rendered any initial intervention strategy on their part ineffective:  
 
“…what GDARD (local government authority for environmental affairs) did at the time – 
2006 – is that they wrote off their own accountability in terms of NEMA and said that it 
has now been transferred to water affairs, so they can make the decision as to what can 
be done with this water decant problem.” 
 (Stephan Du Toit, Mogale City Municipality)  
 
However, whilst being the national body for all matters relating to water, the DWA’s lack 
of knowledge relating to the EIA process resulted in a scenario where the impacts were 
assessed, but no mitigation plans were put in place (Du Toit, 2009, interview). Apart 
from the WUC project and water treatment plants (which are both exclusively mining 
initiatives), to this day evidence of government intervention is still absent. From a risk 
society perspective, this illustrates two things. Firstly, by the very nature of the risk 
which the problem engenders and the improbability of solving it in the short term, it has 
become a political ‘hot potato’. The fear that it has invoked in terms of eroding political 
legitimacy has created a situation where no department wants to take responsibility.  
 
“Their (government’s) decision making process is delaying this process hugely; they 
don’t want to take decisions, because if they do they are responsible and accountable. 
They do not want the accountability. That will not make them win votes in the next 
election.” 
(Louis Kruger, Sustainability manager, Mintails) 
 
Secondly, because of the much criticized fragmentation in environmental legislation 
(Kotze, 2006, Bond and Stein, 2000) no one department (local, regional or national) is 
able to take responsibility for the problem. Instead, as it is a problem related to the 
mining industry on a national level, but also impacts on local and regional water sources 
and the local environmental conditions, there are essentially three different departments 
who have to share responsibility. Given the competing agendas and difficulty of the 
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problem justification can be made not to get involved. That is, one department can 
argue that it is more the responsibility of the others. Thus, what transpires is a case of 
one type of institutional failure (at the level of environmental legislation) leading to 
another type of institutional failure (in terms of effectively being able address the risk). In 
turn, the undeniable social and political character of the risk is revealed. In the end, we 
simply return to a state of organised irresponsibility in the face of a manufactured risk.           
    
Disquietingly, this confusion and disagreement also extends to the horizontal level of 
government in terms of who should take primary responsibility. Political dispute between 
the national authorities of DMR and DWA poses the greatest obstacle for more effective 
state intervention:  
 
“We are sitting here with various challenges from a political point of view and a 
regulatory point of view, where the regulator is both the Department of Water Affairs, 
Mineral Resources and Environmental Affairs”  
(Stephan Du Toit, Mogale City Municipality) 
 
The DME has two roles: to promote mining and to monitor environmental management 
plans. As these two roles conflict, the ability of the DME to achieve success with both 
objectives is seen as controversial among environmental circles (Mara and Pressend, 
2001). Emerging here is thus the fact that the institutions currently in place in South 
Africa are incapable of managing a risk of this extent. The political disagreement 
between the relevant government bodies strongly demonstrates that in no way are they 
able to handle the risk for two reasons. Firstly, AMD is the result of mining, but is a risk 
relating to water resources. Therefore, it is almost impossible to expect the current 
institutional model which differentiates between a department responsible for the risk 
generators (DME) and a department responsible for the subjects of the risk (DWA) to 
adequately manage the problem. Secondly, because the risk is of such a magnitude 
that current instruments for controlling or managing it are inadequate, there is the desire 
to avoid getting involved for fear of losing legitimacy. This explains the ‘passing of the 
buck’ between GDARD and DWA. What this sub-political development suggests is that 
the bureaucratic arrangement setup in terms of the state as a regulating body for 
environmental matters does not hold when ‘manufactured’ environmental risks are the 
problem. Inevitably, what develops is political conflict between two departments with 
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competing agendas- one economic and the other environmental. At this stage it seems 
that the formed is being favoured, resulting in a situation whereby we remain stuck in a 
condition of risk society.   
 
A further and more striking development in terms of the new political dynamic engender 
by the AMD risk is that relating to the relationship between government and the mining 
industry. It is noted that there has been a response from government whereby they 
have used the AMD problem to re-instate their legitimacy and power: 
 
“we can see the state in two roles: the regulator who beats us over the head, and as the 
state who says because there is no owners here, it is your problem.” 
    (Rex Zorab, Sustainability manager, Rand Uranium) 
 
“Prior to the decant it was self-regulation. (Following 2002) they (government) were 
forced to take action. Their action is now lets look for someone who we can give a fine 
or put in jail. To be seen to be doing something. Because it takes the pressure away 
and puts it in a different sphere.” 
(Louis Kruger, Sustainability manager, Mintails) 
               
In this instance, the destabilising effect of the AMD risk has created a significant divide 
between government and the mining industry. This plays out on two fronts. Firstly, 
government have to an extent utilized the AMD problem to implement their legislative 
powers and assume the role of environmental regulator. Secondly, there have been 
large political ramifications it terms of the WUC project. Each is discussed separately.   
 
Concerning the first point, it is necessary to take into account an important fact raised 
throughout this research. Given the mining industry’s importance in terms of contributing 
to economic growth, despite often blatant environmental mismanagement, the industry’s 
continued expansion has been given precedence by government over environmental 
standards (Wells, et al, 2009). In addition, this also means that ‘self-regulation’ has is in 
reality been a guise to minimise public scrutiny and guard against the perceived need 
for stricter environmental standards. Ultimately, we can say the in terms of 
environmental management, it was ‘business as usual’ for the industry up until the time 
of decant. In other words, below the surface, the mutually beneficial relationship 
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between industry and government, with its focus on economic growth, remained the 
dominant theme of the relationship.  
 
However, come late-2002 and we see a discernable shift in discourse between the two. 
The fact that government are said to now be acting as ‘the regulator beating the mines 
over the head’ indicates that the subsequent entrance of the AMD risk onto the political 
stage has disrupted the mutually serving equilibrium between the two parties. However, 
this is the complete opposite to that of the politically disruptive effects that Beck 
proposes. Instead, what has actually transpired is a return to the conventional political 
framework described earlier of government as ‘protectors’ and industry as ‘producers’. 
So, on the one hand Beck’s assessment of risk forging a ‘reinvention of the political’ 
(Beck, 1994) is evident. On the contrary though, and to be sure, it is with caution that 
the term ‘reinvention’ must be used, for the assessment that this situation lends itself to 
is one of a return to the era when risk continue to be produced in the face of modern 
regulatory instruments. As Beck (1998, p.12) notes, “risk societies are characterised by 
the paradox of more and more environmental degradation… and an expansion of 
environmental law and regulation.” Furthermore, when taking into account that risk 
society is said to presuppose or lead to the emergence of a reflexive second modernity, 
we see that the case above indicates little in the way of reflexivity. Instead, this situation 
is apparent of an inverted reflexivity- a reinstating of modernist principles with regard to 
how the environment is managed. On face value this could be taken to signal the 
reverse of what is thought to be ideal change for better risk management and in turn 
that we are digging ourselves into a deeper hole. However, a closer analysis reveals 
that perhaps this is the wrong place to be looking for signs of relevant and meaningful 
political change:  
 
“Subpolitics, then, means shaping society from below. Viewed from above this results in 
the loss of implementation of power, the… minimization of politics. In the wake of 
subpoliticization, there are growing opportunities to have a voice and a share in the 
arrangement of society for groups hitherto uninvolved in the substantive technification 
and industrialization process: citizens,… social movements.” (Beck, 1994, p.23)   
 
So, change comes from outside the realm of institutional politics, not inside, for that 
would be restructuring not redefining. Then what does this changing political dynamic 
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between government and the mining industry really mean, for it is still part of the 
subpolitical? The assessment can be made that because this analysis is from ‘the 
above’ as oppose to ‘from below’, it is not a return to traditional politics being witnessed 
but rather a sign of ‘the loss of implementation of power’. What is thus being witnessed 
is the destabilisation of the dominance that both parties had in the decision-making 
arena. Risk has split their hierarchical, mutually beneficial relationship- neither wants to 
take blame- and in the panic government is able to retreat to its (correct) position of 
authority “as the trustee of the nation’s water resources… (acting to) ensure the water is 
protected… managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner” (NWA, Act 
36 of 1998, 1(3)). However, the mining industry is now left behind to deal with a problem 
which to be fair is not only their responsibility. The result is now twofold. Firstly, on the 
negative side, the problem is simply embroiled in more politics as the mining industry 
makes use of it’s ‘fall back position’ by going to court and disregarding government 
stipulations10. The effect of which simply dragged out the process of finding a solution or 
putting in place mitigation strategies. All the while the toxic water levels were rising in 
the underground shafts. Here, the power play which has developed between 
government and industry and their subsequent strategic moves are taken to signal a 
fear of losing legitimacy and therefore either side’s strategies are really one of a 
simulation of power. The most concerning aspect of this is that the relationship between 
the mining industry and government has suffered, thereby jeopardising the chance of 
moving towards a better governance strategy for the problem. Furthermore, this 
concern over a loss of legitimacy and credibility in the face of uncontrollable risk shows 
that accountability is also a key aspect. By not just asserting power, but also 
demonstrating a sense of responsibly government and industry are able to justify 
themselves to an increasingly sceptical public (Benn, 2004).  
 
On the positive side however, it can be argued that a power vacuum of sorts that has 
emerged (and still exists today) because neither side knows what to do nor can either 
side agree on what to do. Beck (2000) explains that power is at risk and diminishes in 
institutions when rival expert groups become independent of one another and compete 
                                                 
10 In 2005 government finally issued a directive in terms of the quality of water allowed to leave the mine 
property in accordance with the NWA stating you can’t allow pollution to leave your property. However, 
because the mines had no real other alternative beyond their already costly treatment plants they 
(rightfully in many respects) took government to court. Between 2005-07 numerous courts cases between 
government and the mines arose in trying to reach an agreement (Zorab, 2009, interview).    
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and confront one another. Not only is power at risk, but one could also say power is ‘up 
for grabs’. Hence, environmental activists, NGO’s and other extra-institutional actors 
begin to enter the frame. By way of making what are often undeniable moral claims and 
statements these groups and organisations are able to cultivate a foundation of both 
political and non-political legitimacy and power. At the same time, those formal 
institutional actors of government and industry struggle to re-cultivate their legitimacy 
which is in the process of being eroded as the perceived uncertainty and 
uncontrollability of the risk grows. 
 
4.3.3.2 Subpolitics: NGO’s, activists and civil society               
 
Having discussed changing political dynamics at the level of traditional institutions, the 
focus is now on the role of subpolitics in opening up new arenas for disputation, 
negotiation and more importantly, transformation. This is essentially where the state of 
risk society begins to change course, allowing for a more positive outlook. At the local 
level of the AMD risk on the West Rand, three factors are identified as driving the 
process whereby new political arenas are created: NGO involvement; media coverage 
and research agendas. Arguably, these three factors have played the greatest role in 
bringing stakeholders together and opening the water problem on the West Rand up for 
debate in a more democratic manner (Turton, 2009, interview; Cobbing, 2009, 
interview).  
 
Firstly, the activism that has been attracted to the area in many instances is considered 
to have been the single most important factor in mobilizing the mining industry and 
government involvement. Almost single handedly, the self-proclaimed ‘whistle-blower’ 
and environmental activist, Mariette Liefferink, CEO of the NGO Federation for a 
Sustainable Environment (FSE), brought the AMD problem to the attention of the public 
in 2003. Since then, her continued involvement in the issue at hand has helped keep it 
in the public domain. This is to the extent that she is said to personify NGO and 
environmentalist involvement (Zorab, 2009, interview). Several issues arise however in 
terms of defining her role in relation to government and industry. Firstly, the question of 
why and how she has gained credibility must be analysed. Secondly, it is important to 
interrogate the relationship the NGO (as represented by Liefferink) has, on the one 
hand, with government and, on the other hand, the mining industry. What do their 
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relationships mean and what does this tell us about the transformations taking place 
concerning the governance of the AMD problem? Admittedly, there are indications of 
both progressive, deep-rooted change and artificial restructuring. Determining what 
elements of change account for what is thus imperative in order for an assessment to 
be made regarding the long-term implications of the conditions of risk society. The 
following deals with these issues simultaneously. 
 
In order to address the question of why and how Mariette was able to gain legitimacy, it 
is helpful to outline certain conditions thought to lead to the emergence of an 
environmental politics outside the traditional institutions. According to Hogenboom, et al 
(2000), environmental subpolitics is a result of the following three conditions: 1) 
government policy remains tied to natural-science based approaches to environmental 
risk, leaving questions of norms, public perception and values unaddressed, 2) 
decision-making is immobilized by internal conflicts of interest, and 3) current policy 
proves to be too bureaucratic and rigid to meet diversity of society-environment 
interactions. The previous sections concerning the apparent conditions of risk society 
are evidence that all three of these problems have been encountered since the decant 
became a political issue.  
 
In addressing the first condition giving rise to subpolitics, it is clear that government 
policy has tended to remain tied to a natural-science based approach throughout the 
governance process. Its main contribution in terms of regulation came in the form two 
directives issued to the mines- both of which were defined in narrow scientific terms. In 
the first instance, a directive was issued in terms of the apportionment of liability 
(discussed above), based on calculations of how much water needed to be pumped and 
by who. Secondly, a directive stating the acceptability of the quality of water which was 
being pumped by the respective mining companies prior to discharge into the 
environment was drawn up11. Evidently then, both were based on strict and exclusively 
scientific terms. The consequence of which resulted in the already affected communities 
and environment being neglected. In turn, Liefferink responded by advocating for the 
rights of both the community members and the environment to be included in the policy 
process. A particular example highlighting her efforts in this regard concerns a farm 
                                                 
11 DWA issued a directive allowing the mines to discharged treated water with a maximum level of 2000 
mg/L of sulphates into the Tweelpoies Spruit. 
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which borders the property of Rand Uranium (the initial and main decant point). The 
farm was a host to various livestock and horses; however when the AMD decant stuck 
most of the owners animals died. The water on the farm owner’s property was then duly 
tested for toxic metals and found to be unfit for human and animal consumption. 
Eventually, the owner was made an offer by the mines after failed efforts at trying to sell 
what was now essentially untenable land. By virtue her intervention advocating for the 
farmer’s rights, what was previously a problem judged in economic and scientific terms, 
into a problem which is of a distinct human and moral nature. That the mines finally 
bought out the farmer is indicative of their acceptance of the social nature of the 
problem. Thus, what we see here is a subpolitical situation which resulted from narrow 
government policy. In turn, actors in the extra-institutional arena were able to gain a 
strong degree of credibility and legitimacy by incorporating issues relating to the social 
nature of the problem into the policy framework.   
 
Concerning the second condition, decision-making is indeed immobilized by internal 
conflicts of interest, as the example of organized irresponsibly and inter-government 
conflict illustrates. In this regard, Liefferink’s credibility in particular has been enhanced 
via the role she plays in providing extra resources for both government and the mining 
companies. From a government perspective, her role of watchdog and public scrutinizer 
represent a channel though which government can better understand the problem, 
thereby informing them as to where to direct their influence. This consultative, 
‘outsourcing’ role is beneficial for government as it takes pressure of them from a 
legitimacy point of view. In turn, the strategies may be perceived as more relevant and 
informed. However, there is also the expressed downside that her role can serve as a 
cover for government failure. By responding to her queries and criticisms, government is 
able ‘to be seen to be doing something’. In relation to the mining industry, she is able to 
act as an inter-mediatory body between them and the communities. For example, she 
has been appointed to do workshops in order to warn the communities in terms of the 
impacts of mining and not to visit mining sites (Liefferink, 2009, interview). The main 
advantage here for the mining industry is that by working with the NGO in this manner, it 
limits their liability (Liefferink, 2009). At the same time, the funds they provide for her to 
implement such endeavours allows her to fulfill her role as a public role player and 
service provider to the community.  
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Finally, in response to the idea that subpolitics arises due to bureaucratic and rigid 
policy processes, evidence can be found in the decision-making process concerning the 
WUC project. Setting aside the fact that there is risk involved in the proposed solution 
itself, the project was first put to government formally in early 2009. The required draft 
feasibility and scoping assessment was conducted and handed to government for 
approval at that time. Following many delays it was finally accepted, in which case the 
final EIA report required in order for construction to begin was handed over to the 
relevant departments. This was in August 2009 and at the time of writing (early 2010) 
there has still be no finalisation or indication as to the future of the project. Instead, 
debate and argument between industry and government continues to unnecessarily 
extend the decision-making process. Not being roped into the politics of the process or 
allow herself to become complacent by the possibility of a final solution (which 
nonetheless would still leave much to be done by all stakeholders), Liefferink continues 
to lobby for sustainable change: 
 
“We’re looking for a sustainable solution with immediate implementation, because its 
unfair and unethical for downstream users and an ecology which has no voice, to suffer 
these impacts while commercial companies are debating.” (Mariette Liefferink, quoted in 
Bega, 2010). 
 
Thus, the effect of bureaucratic and inflexible policy process, coupled with poor 
government administration has enhanced the debate at the subpolitical level. In so 
doing, it also highlights the ineffective nature of the current institutional decision-making 
mechanisms for dealing with environmental matters. A point which is further highlighted 
by the fact that on the 14th of January 2010, amidst the debate, AMD passed the ECL 
and began overflowing uncontrollably into the surface environment, in what was judged 
to be an environmental disaster (Liefferink, 2010). The point here is that the 
bureaucratic policy process served to exacerbate the risk, whether or not the project 
was approved. Should it have been dealt with more efficiently (perhaps via other 
mechanisms), it would mean that either a solution would already be on track or, in the 
case of it not being approved, an alternative was being more readily explored. Instead, 
in many respects the situation seems to be getting worse, again demonstrating how and 
why actors outside the traditional institutions emerge as legitimate stakeholders. To the 
degree that institutions are unable to manage the AMD threat, Liefferink, as operating 
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outside the bounds of traditional politics, has now even be admitted to work within them. 
In late 2009, she was appointed to serve on the board of the National Nuclear 
Regulator, indicating a willingness from government12 to recognize the importance of 
non-institutional knowledge forms.             
     
In having now analysed how room is opened up as a result of the inefficiencies in the 
modern institutional risk management framework, certain other aspects of the 
subpolitical are important to discuss in relation to the case of AMD. For starters, one of 
the most powerful instruments serving to add credibility to Liefferink’s pursuits has been 
the media (Liefferink, 2010, interview). Here, her relationship with reporters and other 
individuals within the field has been the key mechanism for both turning the issue into 
one of relevance for civil society and for allowing her to legitimately claim a standing of 
respect and authority within the political setting. Going back to the condition required for 
the construction of an environmental risk (table 5.1) the power of the media lies in its 
ability to dramatise the problem. Newspaper headlines such as: ‘A Rising Acid Tide’ 
(Fourie, 2005), ‘Where poison water seeps from the earth’ (Bega, 2010) and ‘Acid mine 
drainage single most significant threat to SA’s environment’ (Naidoo, 2009) have served 
to elevated the status of the problem to one of national importance. Additionally, the 
AMD problem on the West Rand has been featured extensively in other forms of media 
too (e.g. Financial Mail (magazine); 702 Talk Radio; Carte Blanche and 50/50 
(television)). 
 
The third component operating outside the traditional political realm is that of research 
agendas. Most prominently, the Water Research Commission (WRC), the Council for 
Geosciences (CGS) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) have 
been involved in producing numerous studies implicating the mining industry as 
extensive polluters of the West Rand. It has been alluded to that in the past, despite, 
and because of knowing about the risk posed by mining pollution in the area, secrecy 
and information suppression was common regarding scientific reports (Adler, et al, 
2007; Turton 2009; Liefferink, 2010, interview). However, the demise of apartheid in 
1994 can be seen as a pivotal aspect that helped uncover the truth behind the risks 
                                                 
12 The NNR is a recently formed government affiliated body responsible for the regulation of all nuclear 
related matters. Their relevance to the AMD problem is due to the radiological contamination in the water 
due to the presence of uranium on the West Rand goldfields.    
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posed by mining. Specifically, by virtue of the fact that information that had been, or 
would otherwise have been suppressed, now became public property. Considered 
pivotal in raising the alarm about the impacts and risk of AMD on the West Rand are the 
following documents: 
 
Study Broad Conclusions 
Coetzee, et al (2006) – An 
assessment of sources, pathways, 
mechanisms and risks of current and 
potential future pollution of water and 
sediments in gold-mining areas of the 
Wonderfonteinspruit catchment  
This study found that a significant 
amount of uranium is entering the 
WFS via controlled and uncontrolled 
point discharges. It claims that this 
pollution poses a threat to 
downstream water users and warms 
that future mine closures in the area 
could lead to further AMD decant into 
various water sources. 
National Nuclear Regulator (2007) - 
Radiological Impacts of the Mining 
Activities to the Public in the 
Wonderfonteinspruit Catchment Area. 
The report claims that the water in the 
Wonderfonteinspruit has been 
polluted by polonium and lead, by-
products of gold mining activities in 
the close vicinity. There are claims 
that the natural water in the area 
affected by the pollution is unsafe for 
human, animal or plant consumption 
(NWDACE, 2008). 
Winde (2009) – Uranium pollution of 
water sources in mined-out and active 
goldfields of Southern Africa – A case 
study on the Wonderfonteinspruit 
catchment on extent and sources of 
U-contamination and associated 
health risks 
Study results indicate that uranium 
levels in water resources increased 
markedly since 1997, mainly due to 
the highly polluted water decant from 
the flooded mine void on the West 
Rand. A main concern is that the 
pollution levels found in the study 
area are comparable to those 
detected in the Northern Cape, which 
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have been linked to increased 
incidences of leukaemia in the area.  
           
Table 4.2: List of studies relating to AMD and related environmental problems on the 
West Rand. These studies are thought to be fundamental to addressing current policy 
and institutional failures in management of environmental risks posed by mining 
activities.     
 
While the role of the scientific community and these reports are not yet at the stage 
where they can be called ‘agenda-setters’ (Turton, 2009), their importance cannot be 
undermined. The reason for this is that concern has been raised about the extent to 
which the research community is being allowed to act in favour of society, as oppose to 
existing structures of governance. An interviewee involved in recent research relating to 
water indicated that the close affiliation between many of the research institutes and 
government meant final research publications are often watered-down (Whitcutt, 2009, 
interview). That is, broad statements in any reports citing that pollution and water 
contamination problems were due to mining activities are often deleted owing to the 
potential implications at the ministerial level of government. Instead, it was noted that “if 
you want a point like that raised you have to raise it outside South Africa” (Whitcutt, 
2009, interview). Therefore, based on this assessment, the fact that the three studies 
illustrated above have made it into the public sphere can be seen to represent the 
further opening up of traditional decision-making centres. Indeed, each of the three 
papers are believed to individually represent distinct break through moments in their 
own right (Turton, 2009, interview).                 
 
Despite problems such as this though (which are by no way confined to South Africa 
alone), the importance of extra-institutional actors for broadening the institutional 
framework of risk management is well illustrated in the West Rand case. It is clear that 
Beck’s predictions of a new subpolitical arena are certainly being played out to a 
considerable extent over the AMD risk. Specifically, the above analysis reveals how a 
single activist operating outside traditional boundaries has been able to gain credibility 
in an environment where credibility and legitimacy are seemingly in short supply. In 
particular, by drawing on a discursive interpretation of risk beyond the realm of formal 
institutions, Liefferink has been able to bring the AMD problem out of its otherwise 
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narrow framework and take it to the affected public. Coupled with the role of a 
progressive research community and the media, it is thus possible to conceive of a 
strong coalition being formed. This coalition representing a growing force beyond the 
traditional institutions and one which is capable of changing the risk society dilemma 
which the situation on the West Rand seems to be caught in.   
   
However, also clear is the fact that an interrogation of the meaning of what is emerging 
in this subpolitical arena is required. In other words, it is necessary to ask what this 
subpolitical ‘trialogue’ (see Adler, et al, 2007; Turton, et al, 2007) says about the 
direction in which the governance process surrounding the AMD risk is heading. This is 
perhaps the most fundamental question that needs to be analysed here for two reasons. 
Firstly, in-line with the notion that modern societies are becoming late-modern societies, 
it is argued that the relationships between government, the market and civil society are 
shifting (Arts and van Tatenhove, 2006; Beck, et al, 2003). The above illustrates this to 
be the case with regards to the process emerging for managing the AMD threat. 
However, that this ‘shift’ is simply a generic theoretical assumption, its significance on a 
contextual level requires interrogation. Furthermore, to do justice to the risk society 
theory it is necessary to expand on what has so far been a relatively pessimistic 
discussion. Despite being criticized and questioned for the “glumness of its attitude 
towards contemporary societies” (Dingwall, 1999, p.474), Beck’s theory has an almost 
equally convincing, albeit implicit, positive outlook. For Beck, the ‘opportunities of risk 
society’ lie in the reconstruction of the social definition of risk and the management of 
environmental problems in different cultural frameworks (Beck, 1998).  
 
Unsurprisingly, as the above discussion suggests this relies strongly on what happens 
at the level of the subpolitical. This is even more so in the context of South Africa, 
because unlike those countries of the West (on which Beck bases his insights), in no 
way is it possible to claim that risk distribution has replaced wealth distribution at an 
institutional level. Thus, subpolitics can be argued as possibly the most vital component 
in changing the tone of how the AMD risk is approached. As long as government and 
mining industry remain the dominant policy informants’, one can have little hope of 
moving out of this risk society. Indeed, it can be imagined that without the intervention of 
civil society, the condition of organised irresponsibility would continue to betray those 
who are really at risk. All the while science would be given free reign as the panacea to 
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all the environmental and social ills related to mining. In reality though, the inequalities 
of risk would simply be perpetuated by unfettered technological intervention.  
 
Considering this, the connection between a risk society and a reflexive society is now 
becoming more apparent. Without the cries and demands for ‘institutional innovation’ 
from the level of civil society, transformation is hard to imagine. Thus, to this extent the 
risk society theory has provided valuable in-depth insight into the process of institutional 
change. Indeed, subpolitics seems to represents a probable route out of the risk society 
dilemma facing the West Rand. Up to this point it is clear that the AMD threat has 
challenged capability of the modern institutions to cope with environmental risk. On the 
one hand then, Beck’s prophecy has played out in this unexplored context of South 
Africa. Yet, on the other the idea that in the face of risk, societies become reflexive, that 
is they confront these condition of risk society, remains to be explored. To be sure, this 
is both a difficult and interesting point of departure. It is easy to imagine any society, 
developed or developing, first world or third world, faltering under the pressures of risk. 
However, it is far more difficult to ascribe a similar generic model to how the react. In 
other words, describing what reflexivity might look like, and what evidence there is of its 
occurrence in the case of the AMD threat is a different matter entirely. So, having 
reached the conclusion that the situation on the West Rand strongly resembles the 
conditions of a risk society, the question is now: in what way does the AMD risk, have 
the power to transform certain social and institutional dynamics? Or rather, what 
evidence is there to suggest that certain social and institutional dynamic are 
transforming?  
 
4.4 Beyond Subpolitics: The Implications and Challenges of Risk in a Divided 
Society 
 
Most evident in this examination of the subpolitical engagement between the NGO and 
the mining industry and government respectively is the ambivalent nature of the 
relationship. There is the positive aspect whereby sincere and socially important 
intervention is augmented (e.g. community workshops). Yet, there is also the downside 
whereby civil society involvement is easily manipulated into a tool to serve institutional 
interests (e.g. enhancing public perception of government legitimacy). Indeed, this is 
one of the dangers that is perhaps more threatening in a situation where probability of 
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change occurring (and being enabled to occur) is undermined by the context in which is 
occurs. That is to say that the huge divide between institutional stakeholders and 
community stakeholders in many ways invites government and industry to get away with 
action which is superficial and rhetorical at best. What you essentially have are multi-
million rand business interests conflicting with the interests of the nearby communities 
who are literally the poorest of the poor. Certainty the advent of the AMD incident 
served to thoroughly uncover this incongruous ‘relationship’, throwing the institutional 
status quo into question along with that of experts and the legitimacy of government. 
However, the question as to the real effect risk has on social boundaries and inequality 
in South Africa seems unavoidable in this case.  
 
A fundamental argument for risk society lies in the fact that society becomes 
increasingly concerned with the distribution of risk, over the distribution of wealth. If 
society indeed is transforming into a risk distributing society whereby ‘some of the 
carefully erected boundaries between classes are whittled away’, what might account 
for this on the West Rand? Is it possible to say that it is happening at all? Ultimately, the 
point here an attempt to analyse the implications of the AMD risk beyond those of 
organised irresponsibility, the undermining of faith in science and the debates of 
subpolitics. Can it be said that society is becoming reflexive in response to the threat 
posed by the uncontrolled discharge of contaminated mine water?  
 
The concept of a double-risk society (Rinkevicius, 2000) becomes relevant at this point, 
for it exposes the reality of South Africa as a less developed country having to 
simultaneously cope with economic insecurity and risk anxiety. However, to make what 
seems a fairly accurate statement is to also say that risk is not an equalizing force to the 
extent that Beck proposes for the ‘welfare states of the West’. The truth is that those 
communities on and surrounding the area of decant are at direct risk, while the nearby 
hub of economic activity that is Johannesburg remains unaffected. They are facing the 
conditions double-risk society, not ‘society’. Yet, this does not negate the fact that the 
risk has become a significant political concern (in 2009 it was elevated to the ministerial 
level of government) and it seems that at the micro-level, this concern is of similar 
magnitude to that of wealth distribution.  
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As stated previously, Beck understands reflexive modernization to be the stage 
whereby society begins a process of self-confrontation with the effects of the condition 
of risk society. So, indeed then we might have what could be called the rudiments of a 
reflexive society. This notion is based on the fact that concern for the risk has reached a 
level whereby institutions, coupled with pressure from an increasingly aware public, are 
necessarily having to confront the issue as more than just ‘business as usual’. 
Interestingly though, those who are most at risk (the environment and communities) are 
largely voiceless and ignorant to the fact of the risk. Rather, as Liefferink explained from 
her efforts to educate the affected communities, they are more concerned with getting 
jobs than anything else (Liefferink, 2010, interview). This introduces a compelling 
argument now, because on the one hand there is genuine political concern for both the 
distribution and management of the risk, yet those most threatened do not form part of 
the debate13. So, in a way what we have is a political struggle dominated largely by 
groups disconnected from the direct implications of the risk. In other words, the debate 
between government, industry and civil society is being fought on behalf of, and out of 
concern for, the environment and affected communities. Thus, in reality it can be argued 
that it comes down to a debate of morals (not science or economics) more than 
anything else.   
 
While this may be refuted or denied by those outside the official scope of the problem, 
inside things seem different. Yes, assigning responsibility and struggling over issues of 
finance are the rhetoric’s of debate, however, inside each individual institutional 
structure- government, the mining industry and NGO’s- a different story appears. There 
is little by way of resentment or animosity between these groups. Instead, a common 
theme is that many of the individuals interviewed feel they are able to maintain a good 
relationship, and are on good terms, with many of their individual institutional 
counterparts. Furthermore, representatives from government, industry and civil society 
alike, all unanimously agreed and raised the point that their concern for the environment 
and society was one of personal morals above all. The problem thus can be framed 
more in institutional terms (as predicted), as oppose to debating it at the level of agency. 
Particularly in South Africa and in the case of AMD, institutions are seen to be the 
obstacles to moving forward:  
                                                 
13 This is not to deny the fact that community concern exists, but rather to highlight the idea that the 
political concern for the risk and those affected stems largely from outside the communities themselves.   
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“You can do anything without the official structures”  
(Mike Whitcutt, scientist, private).                 
 
“So, we believe it’s an institutional problem…we believe it requires some out of the box 
thinking. Change the policy- make it work.”  
(Rex Zorab, Sustainability manager, Rand Uranium) 
 
“It is not a relationship issue. It is the bureaucracies within the structures of government 
that results in the delays and the non-scientific understanding of what must be done and 
how. There’s good people in government.” 
(Louis Kruger, Sustainability manager, Mintails) 
 
Consequently, it would seem that despite posing a serious challenge to the existing 
techno-scientific knowledge base in terms of a solution, the problem can be defined in 
part as a moral dilemma, caught in the structures of traditional institutional apparatus. It 
is in many ways a moral struggle between the rigid institutions of government and 
industry on the one hand, and an increasingly educated and demanding civil society. 
Contrary to popular belief government do recognise their duty to protect the water 
resources, as does the mining industry recognise its duty to find a solution. However, 
the respective action each party has taken has been confined to the limits of the 
institutional order of the day. As Beck (1998, p.14) concedes, “we have to recognize the 
ways in which debates of this sort- by which… industries have been forced to justify and 
defend their activities in the public domain- are constrained by the epistemological and 
legal systems within which they are conducted.” For example, government acts within 
its ‘system’ by doing what it ought to do: issue directives and set legal precedence. The 
same goes for the mining industry, who in accordance with the apportionment of liability 
(and at a significant cost to themselves), pump water in order to avoid any further and 
preventable toxic overflow.  
 
Two things are now apparent from this discussion. Firstly, the insight provided by the 
risk society theory has proved to be extremely effective means of examining the 
circumstances. That is, it has guided this research in the right direction by forcing an 
interrogation at the level of institutions. Secondly, it was argued that risk in the context 
of South Africa’s socio-economically unequal climate cannot be an equalizing force that 
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‘whittles away carefully erected boundaries. However, after second thought perhaps it is 
indeed true. By virtue of the fact that risk is clearly a moral issue amongst government, 
industry and civil society (they are all human beings remember) the result is that they 
are involved in a struggle of how to best legitimate their actions on a moral basis. They 
are involved in a debate which in the end is engendered by concern for society and the 
environment. In this way, the AMD risk has had a levelling effect in that, it has forced 
“people, expert groups (and) cultures… to get involved with each other whether they like 
it or not (Beck, 1998, p.11)”. That individuals are also tied to their respective institutions 
and institutional norms is essentially what limits action of a higher order.  
 
“People (in government) belong to a structure they can’t change and have to act 
accordingly”           
(Mike Whitcutt, scientist, private) 
 
Ultimately, made clear here is that the main implication of the AMD risk has been to 
cause institutional failure in terms of government and industry intervention. It has also 
been illustrated that to a large extent they are pinned down by rigid traditional 
institutional structures which have rendered them incapable of effectively managing the 
problem. Specifically, the case of organised irresponsibility and the challenges that risk 
poses for science testify to this fact. Crucially, both analyses have also demonstrated 
that most of the decision-making and intervention strategies remain tied to a traditional 
approach to environmental governance. In turn, this explains the institutional failure. As 
explained previously, the traditional approach to environmental governance is defined 
as the command-and-control approach. Thus, the challenge of risk in the AMD case is 
to break from this approach and make the transition to what was described previously 
as the ‘progressive approach to environmental governance’. Indeed then, this would 
mean that society would have to become reflexive. In this way, it is possible to conceive 
of a changing form of governance in reaction to the apparent institutional failure to 
represent Beck’s idea of reflexive modernisation. Unfortunately, in the case of the AMD 
situation, moving from a traditional governance approach to a progressive approach is 
fraught with challenges. The following and final section highlights the challenges.   
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4.5 From Risk to Reflexivity: Challenges to Reflexive Governance in South Africa   
     
It has become clear that in order to better manage the conditions of risk society that 
have developed on the West Rand, society needs to become reflexive. Although 
described previously, the following elaboration on Giddens’ (1990) concept reflexivity 
places it in direct relevance to the environment as is thus useful here: 
 
“Reflexivity can be regarded as the condition that arises when a society actively 
becomes concerned by the unintended consequences of their historic developmental 
trajectories; and actively seeks to do something about altering the outcome in a more 
environmentally-sustainable way.”   
(Giddens, 1990, as cited in Turton, et al, 2007, p.11) 
 
Specifically, the usefulness of this understanding can be seen in providing a fitting 
understanding of exactly how we might examine (or look for) reflexivity in relation to the 
management of an environmental risk. This now allows us to ask the question as to how 
might society be seeking to do something about addressing the AMD risk in a more 
effective way than has been described so far? Considering that managing the 
environment is necessarily a governance process, progressing from a state of risk 
society to one of reflexivity can be argued to be symbolized by the transformation from 
one form of governance to another. That is, from a traditional (command-and-control) 
form of governance to a progressive form of governance. This could be called ‘reflexive 
governance’. As the above has made clear, in order to realize reflexive governance, it is 
key that institutional transformation takes place. However, as was also explained above, 
it seems we are in an institutional dilemma characterised by rigid, inflexible structures. 
On the one hand government is constrained by its institutional structures, whereby it is 
only able to act as a decision-maker and regulator:      
   
“Government’s position is that in terms of their value systems they have no options. 
Without a cost effective answer (from the mining industry), they will say no to any 
solution.”  
(Mike Whitcutt, scientist, private) 
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On the other hand, the mining industry acting within its parameters as a corporate 
institution is unwilling to properly finance a solution. They will pump the water, but not 
pay for a long-term solution. This is because, as Beck argues, the institutions of 
industrial modernity were formulated around the notion of economic progress and the 
distribution of wealth (Matten, 2004). So when faced with risk, the dilemma is that their 
institutional rationale is in conflict with the necessary action:       
 
“… I can say the problem with pollution is not really our problem, our real problem is 
getting the funds and getting the will power for people to get together and solve it. But 
it’s going to cost.” 
(Basie Van Der Walt, Rand Uranium)               
 
In order to escape the risk society which has developed on the West Rand would mean 
that this institutional wall needs to be overcome. According to the risk society theory, the 
subpolitical role played by civil society is where the necessary institutional innovation 
might come from. Implicit in this idea is that civil society has the power to engender 
institutional change. As they are not bound to the same structures, orders and norms as 
either industry or government, their range of options in terms of action and advocacy is 
that much wider14. This idea finds support in what has been termed ‘good governance’ 
(Pegram, 2006). Good governance is taken to require participation, transparency, 
equity, accountability and integrated and ethical decision-making. Importantly, it is 
stated that this process must be built around open policy-making and a strong engaged 
civil society. Both Beck’s idea of subpolitics and the concept of good governance find 
similarities in terms of the need for civil society to be both present and accepted in the 
overall political arena. 
 
The fact however, is that despite the role being played by activist, NGO’s, research 
groups and the media, the ideals of good governance are yet to be realized in terms of 
the AMD problem. That is to say that we are yet to have moved into a situation 
characterised by reflexivity and a reflexive form of governance. Instead, progress 
towards what would be a more effective form of governance for managing the AMD 
                                                 
14 Certainly, they are limited by other means. Most significantly in the case of the activism on the West 
Rand, insufficient funding and the multidisciplinary stakeholder input necessary are the two main factors 
limiting civil society’s actions (Van Eeden, 2007).  
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problem faces several challenges, many of which are not unique. Pegram (2006) 
specifically outlines common challenges facing good governance: 
 
• Change and maturity in the governance systems 
• Institutional memory 
• Information and communication 
 (Pegram, 2006, p.62) 
 
These challenges are all evident in the case of the AMD problem. The fact that South 
Africa is in many ways a fledgling democracy has resulted in a governance system 
which is having to continuously change and mature. When the AMD risk first became a 
serious problem (in 2002), it was a direct challenge to the way in which the environment 
was governed in relation to mining. Essentially, no strategies or systems were available 
to handle a problem of this magnitude:  
 
“…it’s the first time it’s happening in South Africa, so it’s really groundbreaking work.” 
(Marius Keet, Regional-Director, DWA)   
 
It was really only in 2005 that the problem received any attention from the formal 
structures of government (Zorab, 2009, interview). The effect of which has had 
consequences for the stability and predictability of governance (WRC, 2006). The multi-
departmental nature of the problem, whereby both DWA and DMR had to get involved 
despite their conflicting interests, seriously delayed progress towards relevant policy-
making. So, for several years following the emergence of the problem the situation 
resembled that of a risk society in terms of undermining institutional capabilities. 
Subsequently, almost eight years since the decant started, there has been some 
evidence of reflexivity relating to governance. Most significantly, this came in the form of 
a ‘government task team on mine closure and water management’15. The real impact 
this may have on the future management of the risk posed by AMD is yet to be seen. 
                                                 
15 The government task team on mine closure and water management was established by the directors-
general of the Departments of Minerals and Energy (DME) and Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) in 
August 2005 with the objective to facilitate decision making on water management and related problems. 
It was also set up to implement safe and sustainable mine closure options within mining areas in South 
Africa (DME, 2010). 
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While on paper it is lauded as a very fruitful strategy, it is still in its infancy and yet to 
unfold to any significant extent.   
 
A second challenge that the surrounds the governance of the AMD problem is that of 
institutional memory. In fact, institutional memory is one of the most cited challenges 
facing the governance process of the AMD risk. Due to the complexity of the problem, 
both from a political and scientific point of view, the high turn over in staff in the public 
sector seriously challenges government’s legitimacy. This is explicitly highlighted by the 
fact that in 2009, the Director-General of Water Affairs was suspended. As a key 
government figure involved in the AMD issue, who also co-chaired the government task 
team mentioned above, the capacity for reflexive governance on government’s part is 
again seriously challenged. An additional problem relating to institutional memory is the 
fact that in there is also very little continuity in terms of personnel between presidential 
terms. In turn, because the AMD problem is a long-term situation, the political will for 
dealing with the problem seems to continually be undermined. The following quote 
perfectly illustrates this point: 
 
“…we are dealing with a system where people are being elected on a five year term and 
that accounts for the political office bearers and the executive management at local 
government. Now if you look at the continuity of those people that had been in office the 
previous five years then you will see that there is less than 10% of office bearers that 
were successful and continued with the next 5 year term. So we are getting new people 
on board. So now for example if I take the political component in this particular area you 
will see that there is a very limited presence and involvement from a political point of 
view in a problem that affects their constituents.” 
(Stephan Du Toit, Mogale City Municipality) 
 
Finally, a major challenge to good governance in South Africa is understood to relate to 
information sharing and communication between institutions (WRC, 2006). Indeed, 
information sharing is a stumbling block which is concerning for the governance process 
on the West Rand. Most significant is the fact due to the political nature of the problem, 
information continues to get suppressed and hidden from the public: 
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“There’s been no education, too much defending, too many things hidden from the 
public, instead of saying we admit we have a problem.” 
(Basie Van Der Walt, Rand Uranium) 
 
“The mines don’t want to talk chemical toxicity, so they will always try to deflect the ball, 
what they trying to do is say you don’t understand (the problem), only a handful of 
people understand… trust us.”  
(Dr. Anthony Turton, scientist, private) 
 
Furthermore, despite initiatives such as the government task team, communication 
between institutions is seen to be lacking. Poor institutional linkages can be seen to 
perpetuate the state of risk society. The fact that decision-making remains bureaucratic 
as oppose to democratic, is seen to have the consequences of separating decision-
makers from those with on-the-ground knowledge: 
 
“…the structure of the government task team is also fatally flawed because it does not 
allow involvement from civil society or local municipality or local government for that 
matter. So it is open for debate what information they are getting and how they respond 
to that.” 
(Stephan Du Toit, Mogale City Municipality) 
 
Beck’s (1998) understanding of a reflexive society rests on the idea of an ‘ecological 
democracy’. An institutional culture characterised whereby the areas of economic, 
scientific and development decision-making are be open to public scrutiny and debate. 
From this perspective, the fact that information continues to get suppressed and 
communication between stakeholders is poor can thus be seen as problematic for the 
future of the situation on the West Rand. Essentially, what this indicates is that decision-
making continues to occur within the formal institutions of government and industry. 
Coupled with the above challenges facing government in particular, there is little hope 
that those decisions made are relevant for the conditions of a risk society.  
 
Most evident from the discussion above is that reflexive governance in terms of dealing 
with the AMD risk is far from being realized. While civil society pressures continue to be 
exerted on government and the mining industry, so as long as the challenges to good 
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reflexive governance are not overcome by the institutions themselves change will 
certainly be limited. Indeed, grassroots subpolitics is where Beck finds hope for 
institutional innovation. Yet, civil society pressure alone cannot change the status quo. 
One the one hand, subpolitics is necessary to initiate institutional transformation. At the 
same time though, the formal institutions need to be permeable to the ideas, creativity 
and knowledge possessed by civil society. So, it can be said that a dynamic relationship 
between civil society and the institutions of government and industry is essentially what 
defines a reflexive approach to governance. At this stage however, it seems that 
government and industry are both unwilling and unable to change. All the while civil 
society continues to press on.  
 
Thus, it is argued that the political has not broken open and erupted beyond the formal 
responsibilities and hierarchies (Beck, 1994) sufficiently to the point that Beck’s vision of 
a society beyond that of risk may be realized. Certainly, it is apparent that those arenas 
that were previously ‘unpolitical’ (i.e. civil society) have become political. Unfortunately, 
those institutions which were (are) political (i.e. government and the mining industry) 
have not as yet become ‘unpolitical’. Instead, government and industry continue to 
enforce the status quo by sticking to their “current narrow-mined more-of the-same 
attitudes” (Beck, 2000, p.138). They continue to (incorrectly) consider themselves 
exclusively capable of making the correct (and just) decisions, despite their failure to 
overcome the self-imposed obstacles to achieving good governance. Furthermore, they 
seem unwilling to accept that fact that risk in the age of risk society cannot be controlled 
by the same logic which created it. Clearly then, until the formal institutions come to 
terms with the ‘real’ problem , the realization of a reflexive governance system and a 
long term sustainable solution to the problem facing the West Rand seems far off.    
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 The Implication of Risk in a Divided Society 
 
The environmental risk facing the West Rand has served to uncover the paradoxical 
reality of South Africa’s process of modernization. The risk of AMD stems from what 
was a development approach that subscribed to a strictly industrial modern 
conceptualization of the environment. This approach was embodied by a policy of 
simple mineral extraction whereby no consideration was given to the qualitative 
dimensions of such action. In this way, material gains were formulaically sought as a 
rational means for achieving progress. However, by virtue of the fact that today the 
traditional institutional processes are unable to guarantee security from a threat which is 
the consequence of such rationality, those processes themselves are becoming 
questioned. To this extent, the idea that modern societies, on their way to a stage of 
reflexive modernity, become increasingly dominated by and unable to control the 
dangers that have been produced during the stage of industrial modernity, has just 
begun to play out on the West Rand. That certain institutional features of society have 
become socially and politically problematic (Beck, 1998), it is argued that the situation 
unfolding on the West Rand is tantamount to that of a risk society. Specifically, the 
problematic nature of trying to establish a meaningful environmental agenda with 
regards to the mining industry in a country which necessarily has to pursue a discourse 
of economic growth testifies to this fact. At the same time, given such unique socio-
political circumstances in South Africa, the institutional implications and effects of risk 
also play out in some rather novel and contradictory ways. Both the predicted and novel 
implications are outlined below. 
 
In certain respects, the situation on the West Rand follows in near parallel with Beck’s 
prophecy of a risk society. Notably, the surprise and unexpected force with which the 
conditions of risk arose meant that as predicted, decisions and action were taken 
according to the embedded and conventional patterns of industrial society. Such was 
the case that the instrumental approach adopted was accepted as necessary and 
sufficient for the appraisal of the risk posed by AMD (Stirling, 2003). In turn, the truth 
behind the idea that modern institutions and instruments are in fact unable to cope with 
the self-imposed consequences of modernity has since become apparent. Specifically, 
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the insight generated in this study shows how attempts to employ the principle logic of 
economics and science to solve the problem are ineffectual. Firstly, governments 
attempt to apportion liability in financial terms has only succeeded in engendering 
further political conflict between themselves and the relevant mining companies. 
Subsequently, a state of organized irresponsibility has emerged, whereby the question 
of who is specifically accountable remains unanswered while the risk itself has been left 
to intensify. Secondly, the mining industry claimed to be able to offer a scientifically 
sound, long-term solution in the form of the WUC water treatment plant. However, this 
essentially conventional strategy is now being questioned on the basis of its ability to 
provide certainty in terms of the quality of water that will be produced for consumption. 
Ultimately, these implications of risk in the context of the AMD problem demonstrate 
that the risk society theory is revealing of some valuable insights. Most significantly, the 
need for institutional transformation characterized by an approach of less-of-the-same 
and more-of-the-new is seen as necessary. In this instance more-of-the-new is 
represented by a reflexive approach as oppose an instrumental one. The challenges to 
realizing this are elaborated upon later in this section.    
 
While there were distinct similarities between the implications of the AMD risk and the 
risk society theory, there was also evidence to the contrary. In particular, this became 
apparent in the form of what might be called an inverted reflexivity. Here, the force with 
which the risk has undermined, delegitimized and destabilized the institutions of 
government and the mining industry, as is said to occur under conditions of risk, is 
questionable. Instead, there is reason to suggest that both have been able to reassert 
and re-legitimate themselves somewhat by more rigorously adopting an instrumental 
approach (as oppose to simply continuing to do so). Evidence for this is found on the 
one hand, in the forceful regulation of the mining industry whereby the quality of water it 
releases into the environment is now strictly monitored. Indeed, prior to the risk 
becoming problematic this was never the case. On the other hand, we see industry 
eagerly trying to compel government to adopt a scientific approach (i.e. the water 
treatment company) based on an unquestionable faith in the ability to guarantee 
certainty, despite evidence suggesting otherwise. So, from this perspective, the 
respective institutions are seemingly able to deny what is otherwise argued to be the 
inevitable eventuality of risk- the emergence of a reflexivity modernity where faith in the 
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political, scientific and technological foundations of modern society are openly contested 
(Burchell, 1998).  
 
Importantly, the reason for this can be argued to have some relation to the political 
context, whereby the legitimacy of the state in particular is already under question. 
Taking what is a seemingly authoritative stance, allows for a public perception of 
credibility thereby potentially reinstating a degree of legitimacy. In reality, this situation 
can be explained as the symbolic use of politics, whereby the announcement of certain 
measures and regulatory actions represent sheer rhetoric (Matten, 2004). This applies 
to both government and the mining industry. In parallel to this, a tactic of complete 
avoidance was also used at times, especially by government. In this case, the risk itself 
was explicitly ignored out of fear of getting involved in a problem known to be beyond 
their (i.e. government’s) already compromised capabilities. Capabilities which are 
particularly compromised at the level of environmental management. As Beck (2000) 
notes, the interrelationship between ignoring a risk and enforcing risk production is 
significant.  
 
Consequently, one cannot afford to overlook the effect that risk has on weak or 
incomplete institutional arrangements, such as those present in South Africa. In contrast 
to Beck’s welfare states of the West, the confusion and uncertainty engendered by the 
risk is superimposed on what are already unstable institutional foundations. In which 
case the effects of risk are compounding and result in a potential shrinkage in creativity 
and institutional flexibility, leaving little room for society to maneuver out of the 
conditions of risk society. In other words, as has been demonstrated, in such 
circumstances there is the possibility of a move towards a more authoritarian state of 
control. Thus, if we are to concede that certain contextual factors render the 
management of risk that much more challenging, it can also be said that the potential 
for those countries beyond the scope of Beck’s work to deviate from the prescribed risk 
trajectory (i.e. towards reflexivity) is increasingly probable. Rather than the gradual and 
sequential transition implied by Beck, the situation becomes that much more complex 
and turbulent. The implication here is that the AMD risk has forced an instrumental 
response which in turn presents the possibility that the conditions of risk society are 
unwillingly exacerbated.   
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Despite the continuity of this embedded approach though, transformation is slowing 
taking place. In large part this is in the form of a concerned society reacting to an 
institutional system which seems to be perpetuating the risk. Following the unique and 
intense political nature of risk for modern societies, the traditional political and policy 
arena is said to be converted into a ‘subpolitical’ arena. In this case, the subpolitical is 
characterized by an active trialogue between government, industry and civil society. 
Within this new decision-making arena, civil society (in the form of NGO’s, activists, the 
media and research groups) is increasingly questioning, exposing and attempting to 
deal with what amounts to institutional failure. Having witnessed over six years of 
ineffectual crisis management on the part of government and industry on the West Rand 
(van Tonder and Coetzee, 2008), civil society has become an increasingly prominent 
and influential role player. As Beck (2000) argues, the reality of ‘self-annihilating 
progress’ casts doubt on the status-quo and places society under pressure to negotiate 
new foundations. Here, the pressure to realize new foundations is in fact pressure to 
realize old promises of new foundations- promises that were made following the advent 
of democracy in 1994 and which reside in the Constitution (1996) of South Africa. To 
the extent that the threat of AMD continues to pose a threat to the environment and 
society, civil society is indeed beginning to question the status quo and pressure 
government and the mining industry to transform. In doing so, it is argued that the risk 
itself is contributing to the growing conflict which is understood to be occurring between 
an increasingly reflexive civil society and an ineffective institutional system unable to 
fulfill the ideals of its legislative underpinnings.   
 
In this way, the AMD risk can be seen to represent both an opportunity and a danger for 
South Africa. The opportunity lies in the fact that South Africa has the chance to break 
from the continuity of past policy injustices and begin to institutionalize what would 
represent sustainable social, environmental and economic development. However, the 
danger is that the conditions of risk society in a divided society may allow those who 
produce the risk to distance themselves from it, while for others the risk grows. Risk is 
claimed to have a levelling effect that whittles away the carefully erected boundaries 
between classes (Beck, 1998). In South Africa though, the opposite is also a possibility. 
If the risk of AMD is not dealt with in a way which breaks from the modes of industrial 
society, whereby risk is managed without reference to the human beings affected by it 
(Dingwall, 1999), change will be difficult to imagine. That is, a change at the level of the 
 118
risk itself which continues to defy claims of scientific certainty and a change in political 
discourse whereby the idea that “everyone has the right to and environment which is not 
harmful to their health or well-being” (Paragraph 24a of chapter 2: Bill of Rights) 
continues to be violated.  
 
5.2 The Future of the AMD Risk on the West Rand 
 
Predicting the risk trajectory South Africa is following is unsurprisingly difficult, given the 
uncertainty that society is subject to in the era of risk society. Although Beck seems 
quite certain that under conditions of risk society, what ever happens, society 
necessarily becomes reflexive (see Beck, 1998, p.18), the account given here does not 
open itself to the same degree of optimism. A reflexive society is defined as one which 
confronts the “effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the 
system of industrial society” (Beck, 1994, p.6). This means that in order to break from 
the socially and politically destabilizing effects of risk society, an environmental risk 
must be understood to constitute more than just a problem of the environment. Instead, 
it must be understood as a problem of the environment and a problem of (and for) 
society. Essentially, the threat posed by AMD is a problem which is the result of poor 
environmental governance. Therefore, it is argued that a form of ‘reflexive governance’ 
is required. In this case, reflexive environmental governance is taken to be a process of 
governance synonymous with that ‘good environmental governance’ (Pegram, 2006). 
The foundations of this approach are built around a process of open policy-making, a 
professional bureaucracy and a strong, engaged civil society.  
 
Unfortunately, the situation on the West Rand faces many challenges to achieving what 
would be a more effective governance approach. Despite a strong and engaged civil 
society, the policy-making process remains largely dominated by the institutions of 
government and industry. Considering the current challenges within and between the 
two institutions (e.g. immaturity of government and lack of effective information sharing 
and communication), it is unsurprising that they have yet to become genuinely reflexive. 
Policy amendments to NEMA and MRPDA and the recently established government 
task team on mine closure and water management still need to be scrutinized in terms 
of their true intentions. In light of the possible ineffectual outcome of such strategies, 
there is still support for Beck’s prophecy that inevitably society does become reflexive. 
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This is found in the idea that faced with extreme circumstances of environmental risk, 
societies are forced to become reflexive (Turton, et al, 2007). The danger for South 
Africa then is that the action taken is necessarily reactive and done so only because 
certain costs have materialized. While we are not at that stage just yet, it seems that we 
are certainly on a water-shed, where the decisions made now are going to influence the 
future of South Africa’s water resources for the long-term.  
 
This water-shed being a metaphor for the emerging tension between the two policy 
perspectives relating to the mining industry. That is, a policy approach of continued 
simple extraction and its opposite, in an approach of environmental sustainability and 
human rights realization. Importantly however, it is argued here that the policy of simple 
extraction per se, cannot be blamed for the tension regarding the risk. Rather, it seems 
that the conflict over liability avoidance and the resulting state of organized 
irresponsibility is playing a large part in perpetuating and intensifying the tension. In this 
way, organized irresponsibility sends a clear message to proponents for sustainable 
and rights-based change of an institutional system which is unable to cope with the 
consequences of its policy decisions and therefore, unable to cope with the 
consequences of modernization.  
 
In which case, despite the importance of civil society’s role in the decision-making 
process concerning risk management, government’s role cannot be underestimated or 
neglected. The reason for the conditions of risk society which currently overshadow the 
West Rand is almost exclusively due to the interrelationship between industry and its 
institutional context. The result of which has brought about a viscous cycle of 
irresponsibility and minimal collaboration (except where profits were at stake) (Hamann, 
2004). If government is able to overcome the current challenges, which it both faces 
and creates, to establishing a state of reflexive governance, it can be expected that a 
renewed institutional context will emerge. A context that will encourage greater co-
operation between government, industry and civil society, allowing for reasonable trade-
offs to be agreed upon in contrast to what has proved to be ineffectual centralized 
decision-making.               
 
To this end, the risk posed by AMD on the West Rand has also been recognized as an 
opportunity to learn from our mistakes and plan for the future. The West Rand is by no 
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means the only area in South Africa face with the problem of AMD, but it is the most 
publicized, recognized and politicized. The adjacent central basin, underlying 
Johannesburg’s city centre is predicted to overflow in early 2011. Additionally, AMD 
pollution from the coalfields of Mpumalanga is argued to poses an even greater threat to 
the environment than has been seen on the West Rand (Jones, 2009; Turton, 2009). As 
a result of a reflexive civil society, embodied by the activism of Mariette Liefferink, the 
situation on the West Rand offers itself as a ‘pilot project’ for what the future hold in 
terms of managing the consequences of our modernity. The agreed upon fact is that 
South Africa actually possesses much of the required scientific and technological know-
how to deal with the problem (Cobbing, 2009; Van Der Walt; 2009; Turton, 2009, 
interviews). This means that how we choose to embrace the shift from being a risk 
society to being a reflexive society rest squarely with the institutions that caused the 
problem. The challenge for both industry and government is thus for them to break from 
their out-dated institutional moulds, engage with the efforts of civil society and reform 
their practices in conditions of reflexivity.  
 
Finally, with regards to this research, it is clear that Beck’s theory has been able to 
provide valuable insight into the implications of the AMD risk. Crucially it has revealed 
that the major problem facing society is not the risk itself, but the redundancy of the 
institutional mechanisms being employed. In this way it has proved to be relevant in 
conceptualizing the nature of the impacts of the risk and identifying where the true 
weaknesses lie in terms of current risk management processes. Essentially, it has taken 
it out of it conceptual framework wherein it was perceived as a problem of science and 
finances, and placed it firmly in a framework which reveals it as a distinct procedural 
problem. Accordingly, this research as a whole has highlighted the need for greater 
attention to be paid to the socio-political and institutional context of the risk. While 
scientific insight remains an imperative, there is an apparent deficit in the amount of 
multidisciplinary research being undertaken. Ideally, such research could also be filtered 
back into the plethora of existing scientific content relating to AMD. In this way, this 
research is seen as a small, but contributory effort towards that endeavor.            
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APPENDIX – A: Interview Schedule 
 
1. How do you interpret the AMD problem in the Western Basin? Is it fair to call it a 
risk to both the environment and society and is it really such a problem? 
 
2. What are the risks? 
 
3. Do you think the problem is being controlled to some extent? 
 
4. Are the media reports accurate in the sense of alarm they engender? 
 
5. Are the tool and mechanism currently available adequate to deal with the 
problem? 
 
6. What are your views on WUC? 
 
7. In your view, how are the following issues helping or hindering the process of 
addressing the problem? 
- scientific evidence  
- government intervention 
- public participation 
- political framework and actor dialogue 
 
8. What are some other significant obstacles to overcoming the problem? 
 
9. Is decision-making a problem? What are some key issues? 
 
10. Do you feel that the scientific facts are being taken cognizance of or are they 
being ignored or debated to some extent? What effect is this having on the 
outcome of the problem? 
 
11. How is fact that the mining companies multi-nationals influencing the approach to 
the problem?  
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12. Can you comment on any significant political changes regarding the process of 
managing the AMD problem, such as increased stakeholder involvement or how 
knowledge is being used? 
 
13. Do you feel there is a disconnect between government departments in terms of 
their approach to environmental issues such as this?   
 
14. What has the significance of NGO and activist involvement in the issue relating to 
AMD been with regards to highlighting and broadening the issue in terms of 
public awareness and political and corporate mobilization? 
 
15. What warrants the West Rand pollution problem getting media attention over 
other sites? 
 
16. What is your feeling about the issue of liability? How should it be apportioned? 
 
17. What is your view on the future in terms of the problem and how it may transpire 
further? Do you think we are closer to dealing with the problem? Do you feel we 
are in a transitional stage in terms of dealing with problems such as AMD? 
 
18. In terms of stakeholder involvement, where does the power lie? Is there a 
particular side dominating the debate over the issue? Are there certain 
stakeholders that are influencing the debate unfavorably?   
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APPENDIX B: Photographic Material  
 
 
 
Photo 1 – The first water to decant from the flooded mine void occurred from a 
borehole in late August 2002. This borehole was alongside the Tweelopiespruit. 
(taken from Krige, 2006) 
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Figure 1 – The Western Basin Mine Void. The water decant point is shown as well as 
the affected water systems flowing north. 
(taken from Krige, 2006) 
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 Photo 2 – The dam constructed to intercept water decanting from the underground 
mine void.  
(Krige, 2006) 
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